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Chalmers on Implementation and Computational Sufficiency
( J Brendan Ritchie ) 서울대학교 인지과학연구소 2011 Journal of Cognitive Science Vol.12 No.4
Chalmers (2011) argues for the following two principles: computational sufficiency and computational explanation. In this commentary I present two criticisms of Chalmers` argument for the principle of computational sufficiency, which states that implementing the appropriate kind of computational structure suffices for possessing mentality. First, Chalmers only establishes that a system has its mental properties in virtue of the computations it performs in the trivial sense that any physical system can be described computationally to some arbitrary level of detail; further argumentation is required to show that the causal topology relevant to possessing a mind actually implements computations. Second, Chalmers` account rules out plausible cases of implementation due to its requirement of an isomorphism between the state-types of a computation and the physical system implementing the computation.