(A) Study of the international ABS (Access and Benefit-Sharing) regime for genetic resources and national implementation process : ABSCH mechanism and Andean Countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru)

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is an international agreement that recognizes the sovereign rights of the state over biological resources. Recognition of a country’s sovereign rights over biological resources has been the main conception from the beginning of the adoption of the CBD, but substantive discussions of this issue have long continued. In particular, there were active discussions between the parties to achieve the third objective of the CBD, fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic resources, and as a result, ‘the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Nagoya Protocol on ABS)’ was adopted. The Nagoya Protocol has been facilitating national implementation of the access and benefit-sharing (ABS) since it came into effect in 2014.
The Nagoya Protocol builds on the basic principles of access and benefit-sharing set out in the CBD. The key elements of the ABS framework are based on the grant of Prior Informed Consent (PIC) by a provider to a user and negotiations between both parties to develop Mutually Agreed Terms (MAT) that ensure the fair and equitable benefit-sharing of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge. This agreement includes, as a prerequisite for access to and use of genetic resources, the sharing of benefits arising from the use of the resources with the provider. Conversely, when countries act as providers of genetic resources, they must provide fair and non-arbitrary rules and procedures for access to genetic resources. The Nagoya Protocol covers genetic resources (GRs) and traditional knowledge (TK) associated with genetic resources, as well as the benefits arising from their utilization.
Most countries have agreed on the international regime for ABS as required by the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol. Nevertheless, ABS implementation is not progressing well. This study examines why ABS response and implementation differ at the international, regional, and national levels vertically, and at the dimensions of institutions and related stakeholders in national implementation horizontally in light of the concept of multi-level governance (MLG). In other words, why is there no consensus in the process of forming an international regime and why are there differences at the individual country-region-international levels? In particular, this thesis seeks to analyze the differences and numerous problems among various domestic stakeholders that contribute to the formation of this regime domestically as well.
From the perspective of multi-level governance, this study closely observes and analyzes the Nagoya Protocol, which is most relevant to the formation of the ABS system under the current CBD regime, especially at the international level, and then moves to the regional level (i.e., the Andean Regime on ABS, such as Decision 391 as a Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources). Finally, this study focuses on the domestic governance of the Andean region countries (four countries) selected as the case study subjects through observations of important problems and various obstacles in the process of forming the ABS system in these countries through various analysis variables such as administrative capacity, institutional development, building of information sharing system, enforcing of domestic and international cooperation mechanisms, and related key actors who play a major role in the ABS system, including the central government, local governments, various domestic and foreign companies, research centers, local residents—especially indigenous communities in this region—Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and even biological resources (some countries in the region have recently granted ‘Rights of Nature’ to biological resources).
Following these theoretical arguments and background, this study employs four variables for analysis from the author’s perspective, such as: Administrative Governance, Institutional Governance, Data Governance (Information Sharing with Data Forming and Management), and Domestic and International Cooperation Governance to measure the current process of constructing the ABS system in Andean countries. These four variables are a reconstruction from the author’s perspective of the following 10 conditions that the CBD international regime currently requires to be measured to observe the level of participation of ABS member countries: ABS National Focal Point (NFP), Competent National Authority (CNA), Legislative, Administrative, or Policy Measures (MSR), ABS Procedure (PRO), National Model Contractual Clause (NMCC), Internationally Recognized Certificates of Compliance (IRCC), National Websites or Databases (NDB), Checkpoint (CP), Checkpoint Communiqué (CPC), and Interim National Report (NR) on the Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol for supporting the implementation of Nagoya Protocol. From the author’s perspective, the current ABS international regime and its implementation process can also be reclassified again here with the above four variables based on the terms of ‘goverance’, which are considered essential elements for pursuing common interests by encouraging member countries to actively participate in the ABS system.
The criteria for selecting target countries in this study are that each be a megadiverse country with common genetic resources due to shared biodiversity hotspots, and that it be the first country to access genetic resources through Decision 391 on the Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources in 1996 after the adoption of the CBD. These are countries that have established cross-border ABS systems.
The overall level of statistical analysis of ABS international implementation is showing slow progress because many countries have not yet uploaded national data in the Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing-House (ABSCH). Only a few countries have worked on implementation at the institutional and information sharing level (e.g. MSR, IRCC). Some countries are only participating in international implementation in the present situation.
Administrative governance depends on government capabilities and collaboration between ministries. NFPs, CNAs, CPs, and NRs are all designated by the government and represent it. The designation of NFP can be shown to be the first step in implementing ABS. With 178 countries registered in NFP, it can be shown that most countries are participating in the beginning stages of ABS implementation, but only some countries have registered CNAs, CPs, and NRs. In some countries, multiple agencies are designated as CNAs and CPs, and if there is no coordination and consultation between agencies, this may lead to delays in the ABS implementation process.
In Institutional Governance, MSR has a high number of registrations in India and Latin America countries such as Mexico, Honduras, Peru, and Colombia. In all, 21 countries have uploaded PROs. Thus, the pace of progress in the institutional dimension is too slow.
In Data Governance (including Information Sharing), only 5 countries have registered NMCCs and 43 countries have registered 59 NDBs; some countries (Portugal 4, Belgium 3, France 3), have uploaded multiple websites. In the case of NDBs, mainly European countries have been building online platforms. Progress in the dimension of Data Governance (including Information Sharing) is slow.
Domestic and International Cooperation Governance is evaluated based on IRCCs and CPCs. The concentration of some countries in IRCCs and CPCs is significant. India’s IRCCs account for more than 70% of the total, and India leads the world in terms of ABS agreements with 3,496 IRCCs, where there is a large gap between India and other countries. Taken overall, there are few commercial agreements and IRCCs related to traditional knowledge regarding genetic resources. Regionally, Latin America has few IRCCs. There are a total of 11 countries that have uploaded CPCs, with multiple CPCs from each. A few countries are thus leading in domestic and international cooperation.
The overall level of statistical analysis of the national implementation of ABS in Andean countries also shows slow progress because many countries have not yet uploaded national data to ABSCH.
Bolivia has designated only an NFP from the perspective of Administrative Governance. Not only has little related information been uploaded, but there are also almost no public data, including ABS genetic resource information, implementation procedures, and implementation examples. Compared to Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, ABS national implementation is the slowest.
Colombia has designated an NFP and CNA from the perspective of Administrative Governance. The NFP and CNA in Colombia are solely designated by the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, so it can be said that the convenience of access to information and the administrative efficiency for providing information are high. In Institutional Governance, Colombia registered 10 MSRs, the highest number of MSRs uploaded of the four countries. Colombia is focusing on specifying ABS domestic laws, policies, and regulatory procedures. In Data Governance (including Information Sharing), Colombia has registered 1 NDB, but the website link cannot be opened. Continuity in data management and continuous updating of information appear to be necessary.
Ecuador has designated an NFP, CNA, and CP. In particular, for the CNA and CP, Ecuador has designated multiple ministries and agencies, which increases the complexity of ABS procedures such as ABS access, PIC and MAT, and benefit-sharing, which can be seen as a factor along the dimension of Administrative Governance that makes implementation difficult. From the perspective of Institutional Governance, Ecuador has registered 6 MSRs that include the contents of GRs and Traditional Knowledge associated with GRs and intellectual property rights (IPRs).
Peru has registered an NFP (1), CNAs (7), and CPs (2) in Administrative Governance. The CNA and CP in Peru comprise multiple ministries and agencies, which increases the complexity of ABS procedures such as ABS access, PIC and MAT, and benefit-sharing, which can be seen as a factor making implementation difficult. In addition, it is the only country to upload a National Report (NR). In Institutional Governance, Peru has registered 10 MSRs and 1 PRO. Most MRSs include the contents of GRs and Traditional Knowledge associated with GRs, protect against acts of biopiracy, and support capacity-building. In 2021, Peru revised the Access to Genetic Resources and Their Derivatives to adapt the Nagoya Protocol and Andean Decision 391 (1996) to national realities. Peru is focusing on further specifying the scope and implementation procedures of ABS for genetic resources. In Data Governance (including Information Sharing), Peru has registered 4 NDBs, but some links cannot be opened. Continuity in data management appears to be necessary. Peru has issued the most IRCCs of the four countries in Domestic and International Cooperation Governance. Most IRCCs in Peru are for non-commercial agreements. Compared to other Andean countries, ABS compliance can be seen as the most active in Peru.
The Andean region countries (all four countries) display obstacles in common in conformity with the four Governance realms (Administrative Governance, Institutional Governance, Data Governance (including Information Sharing), Domestic and International Cooperation Governance). However, the governance analysis results of the statistical analysis in Chapter III and of the individual countries in the literature survey in Chapter IV are somewhat different.
Bolivia from the perspective of Administrative Governance has obstacles in non-persistent R&D investment and lack of private participation in utilizing and commercializing biological resources. From the perspective of Institutional Governance, Bolivia requires a variety of other contracts when making access agreements for genetic resources. This increases the transaction costs and risks borne by the petitioner. Particularly in contracts for knowledge and skills, there are high transaction costs and risks to investment security. In addition, there is the debate over the interpretation of existing laws (i.e., Decision 391). In Data Governance (including Information Sharing), illegal extraction of potential resources has become more prevalent, and the location information of vouchers is being managed increasingly strictly in Bolivia. From the perspective of Domestic and International Cooperation Governance, Bolivia has a particular conflict between the internal interests of traditional communities, local governments and development goals, and the external interests of multinational corporations and other parties pushing for the implementation of multilateral agreements.
From the perspective of Administrative Governance, Colombia appears to have difficulties in applying relevant requirements and ensuring legal certainty with PIC. Building a functional domestic ABS system requires greater clarity on PIC and MAT requirements, particularly where indigenous peoples and local communities are involved. In Institutional Governance, Colombia needs negotiation skills due to the excessively conservative and risk-averse attitude of private enterprises toward commercial purposes. In Data Governance (including Information Sharing), Colombia has no linkage between academia and companies due to issues such as intellectual property rights although the government has invested financial resources into the development of genetic resources, and lack of knowledge about scientific methods and objectives makes it difficult for administrative authorities to evaluate scientific research proposals submitted for ABS access requirements. In Domestic and International Cooperation Governance, the continued violence by armed groups and criminal groups against rural, indigenous, and black communities is also considered an obstacle.
From the perspective of Administrative Governance, Ecuador has a lack of research facilities, a brain drain of young researchers, low pay and poor treatment for researchers, and a poor research infrastructure (environment) that forces researchers to leave the field. There is also a lack of infrastructure and equipment for research and of negotiation capacity for technology transfer. In Institutional Governance, Ecuador has the obstacle of conformity with existing laws (i.e., Decision 391). In addition, in Ecuador, the development of commercial applications has largely failed, resource providers have derived only limited benefits, and incentives for biodiversity conservation have been limited, which constitute obstacles. There is a debate on the Buen Vivir concept that enshrines the rights of nature and its application to public policy. In Data Governance (including Information Sharing), Ecuador has a lack of highly specialized taxonomists and a need for further research and improved knowledge of BES (Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services). In Domestic and International Cooperation Governance, Ecuador has conflicts among stakeholders (i.e., local NGOs) in the access and commercialization process, as well as over profit sharing between companies and indigenous communities.
From the perspective of Administrative Governance, Peru has weak monitoring and supervision regarding compliance with the terms and conditions of access contracts. In Institutional Governance, Peru is struggling to update its procedures and regulations to respond in a timely manner to researchers and other stakeholders requesting formal access to genetic resources and financial difficulties. There is poor coordination between authorities granting access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge. Further clarity is still needed on the responsibilities of the various authorities and the parameters of benefit-sharing negotiations. In Institutional Governance, on the user side, the financial benefits are considered too high by private companies, and on the provider side, indigenous peoples and local communities have limited knowledge of the legal framework and are unable to control illegal access by domestic and foreign users. In Data Governance (including Information Sharing), Peru’s obstacle is that the procedures for accessing genetic resources are complex and bureaucratic. In Domestic and International Cooperation Governance, Peru has a strict regulatory system to apply the Nagoya Protocol, but management and operational failures have led to calls for more training in ABS systems among the actors involved in the process: authorities, national and local officials, scientific communities, indigenous communities, and the general public.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

과거에 생물유전자원은 인류공동의 자산으로 인식되어 어느 국가나 자유로운 접근 및 이용이 가능하였다. 그러나 급격한 기후변화와 재난 및 재해로 인해 생물다양성이 급격하게 감소되고, 유전자원의 경제적, 상업적 가치가 점점 증대되면서, 인류의 공동자산임에도 선진국들이 유전자원을 이용하여 얻은 이익을 배분하지 않고 독점하고 있다는 개발도상국들의 주장이 이어지자 1992년 ‘생물다양성협약’이 마련, 1993년에 발효되었다. 생물다양성협약 체결 이후 세계 각국은 유전 자원에 대한 근본적인 인식을 달리하게 되었다.
생물다양성협약으로 인하여 유전자원에 대한 국가의 주권적 권리를 인정하게 되었으며, 생물다양성의 보전과 그 구성 요소의 지속가능한 이용 및 생물유전자원의 이용으로부터 발생되는 이익 공유를 위한 국제적인 틀을 마련하게 되었다. 유전자원에 대한 국가의 주권적 권리 인정은 생물다양성협약 채택 시작부터 주된 관점이었으나, 이에 대한 실질적 논의는 오랜 동안 이어져왔다. 특히, 생물다양성협약의 세번째 목적인 유전자원의 이용으로부터 발생되는 이익의 공정하고 공평한 공유를 달성하기 위해 당사국간 논의가 활발히 진행되어 왔으며, 그 결과 2010년 제10차 생물다양성협약 당사국 총회에서 ‘나고야 의정서’가 채택되고, 2014년 발효됨에 따라 생물유전자원에 대한 접근 및 이용으로 발생되는 이익의 공평한 배분에 대한 이행 방안이 마련되었다.
유전자원에 대한 접근과 이익 공유(ABS)에 대한 국제레짐 논의에서 가장 중요한 핵심요소는 유전자원 및 전통지식에 대한 접근(Access), 이익 공유(Benefit-Sharing), 이행준수(Compliance)이다.
유전자원과 유전자원 관련 전통지식을 이용하는 국가는 그 자원을 제공하는 국가에 사전통보승인(Prior Informed Consent, PIC)을 받아야 하며, 유전자원의 이용으로 발생한 이익은 상호 합의된 계약조건(Mutually Agreed Terms, MAT)에 따라 공유해야한다.
대부분의 국가는 CBD 및 나고야 의정서에서 요구하는 ABS에 관한 국제 협약에 참여하고 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고 ABS 국가 시행은 잘 진행되지 않고 있는 것이 현실이다. 본 연구는 ABS 국제레짐의 발전 과정과 개별 국가별 참여 정도와 수준을 나타내는, 다시 말해서 ABS 레짐 발전을 가늠할 수 있는 ABSCH 메커니즘을 통해 레짐 의 발전 현황을 실증적으로 검증해 보고자 한다(3장). 특히 레짐에 참여하는 개별 국가-지역-국제적 수준에서 차이는 무엇인지를 고찰해 보았다. 특히 본 논문에서는 생물다양성이 풍부한 안데스 국가들을 분석 대상으로 이들 국가들의 ABS 레짐 참여 정도는 물론, 레짐 형성에 기여해 온 다양한 국내 이해관계자들 사이의 차이점과 이로 인해 발생하는 다양한 갈등과 문제점을 다층 거버넌스 차원에서 분석 관찰해 보고자 했다.
본 연구에서는 국제적, 지역적, 국가적 차원에서 ABS 대응 및 이행이 서른 상이한 이유는 물론, 특히 개별 국가별 이행에 있어 다양한 국내 이해관계자들 사이의 차이점을 다층 거버넌스 (Multi-level Governance, MLG) 개념을 활용해 살펴보았다. 본 연구는 다층 거버넌스(MLG)의 관점에서 현 CBD 체제 하의 ABS 레짐 형성과 가장 관련이 있는 나고야 의정서를 특히 국제적 차원에서 면밀히 관찰하고 분석한 후, 지역 수준(예를 들어 유전자원 접근에 관한 공통 체제에 관한 결정문 391에 초점을 맞춘 ABS 안데스 레짐)을 살펴보았다. 마지막으로 제4장에서는 사례연구 대상으로 선정한 안데스 국가(볼리비아, 콜롬비아, 에콰도르, 페루)의 국가별 거버넌스 분석을 통해 개별 국가별 ABS 레짐과 이행 과정에 대한 거버넌스 분석을 진행했다. 특히 ABSCH 메커니즘을 통해 확인된 다양한 변수들을 다층 거버넌스 개념을 통해 재구성, 예를 들어 행정 역량(행정 거버넌스), 제도 발전(제도 거버넌스), 정보 공유 시스템 구축(데이터 거버넌스), 국내외 협력 메커니즘 강화(국내외 협력 거버넌스)으로 재분류해 연구 대상 국가들의 ABS 시스템 이행 과정에서 나타난 다양한 유형의 거버넌스 부재와 한계를 관찰해 보았다. 거버넌스에 참여한 대표적인 이해당사자 혹은 행위자들로는 중앙정부, 지자체, 국내외 다양한 기업, 연구소, 지역주민, 특히 이 지역의 원주민 공동체, NGOs, 심지어 생물자원까지 포함(최근 일부 지역 국가에서는 생물자원에 대한 자연권 부여)되어 분석되었다.
제3장에서는 ABS 정보공유체계(ABSCH)의 자료를 활용하여 통계분석 방식으로 ABS 이행 현황과 이행 정도를 살펴보았다. 나고야 의정서, ABS 시스템 준수와 평가시스템(ABSCH)에서 분류된 10개 조치들을 수평적, 확장적 개념에서 수용해야 하지만 본 연구에서는 4개 카테고리(행정, 제도, 데이터, 협력)로 재분류해 ‘집중과 선택’ 차원에서 거버넌스 정도와 수준을 분석하였다 (제4장).
분석 대상 국가들의 ABS 레짐 참여 및 이행 수준을 다층 거버넌스 관점에서 분석한 결과들은 다음과 같다.
볼리비아는 행정 거버넌스 측면에서 R&D 투자가 지속 되지 못하고, 생물자원 활용 및 상업화에 대한 민간 참여가 부족한 상황이다. 제도적 거버넌스의 관점에서 볼리비아는 유전자원에 대한 접근 계약을 체결할 때 다양한 기타 계약을 요구한다. 이로 인해 청원인이 부담하는 거래 비용과 위험이 증가한다. 특히 지식과 기술에 대한 계약의 경우 거래 비용이 높고 투자 보안에 대한 위험이 있다. 또한 현행법(예: 판결 391)의 해석에 대한 논란도 있다. 국내 및 국제 협력 거버넌스 측면에서 볼리비아는 특히 원주민 공동체, 지방 정부 등과 다자간 협정 이행을 추진하는 다국적 기업 및 기타 이해당사자의 외부 이익 사이에 갈등도 ABS 레짐 이행을 어렵게 하는 원인으로 분석되었다.
콜롬비아는 행정거버넌스 측면에서는 PIC에 대한 관련 요구사항 적용 및 법적 확실성 확보에 어려움이 있는 것으로 보인다. 기능적인 국내 ABS 시스템을 구축하려면 특히 원주민과 지역 사회가 관련된 경우 PIC 및 MAT 요구 사항을 더욱 명확하게 해야 한다. 제도적 거버넌스 측면에서 콜롬비아는 상업적 목적을 위한 민간기업의 지나치게 보수적이고 위험 회피적인 태도로 인해 협상 능력이 필요하다. 정보 공유 또는 데이터 거버넌스 측면에서 고찰된 콜롬비아의 애로사항은 정부가 유전자원 개발에 재원을 투자했지만 지적 재산권 등의 문제로 인해 학계와 기업 간의 연계가 어려우며, ABS 접근 요구 사항을 위해 제출된 과학 연구 제안서를 평가하기 위한 과학적 방법 및 목표에 대한 지식이 부족하다는 한계가 있다. 국내 및 국제 협력 거버넌스에서는 농촌 지역 사회, 원주민 및 흑인 지역 공동체에 대한 무장 단체 및 범죄 집단의 지속적인 폭력이 여전히 이행을 더디게 하는 장애 요소로 분석되었다.
에콰도르는 행정 거버넌스 측면에서 볼 때, 연구시설 부족, 젊은 연구자들의 두뇌유출, 연구자에 대한 낮은 임금과 열악한 처우, 그리고 연구자들이 현장을 떠나게 만드는 열악한 연구 인프라(환경) 등이 거버넌스 한계로 관찰되었다. 생물자원 분야 연구를 위한 인프라와 장비도 부족하고, 기술이전을 위한 협상 역량도 부족했다. 제도적 거버넌스 측면에서 에콰도르는 기존 법률(예: 결정 391)을 준수하는 데 상당한 장애가 있다. 또한, 에콰도르에서는 기술사업화 추진의 어려움, 자원 공급자가 받게 되는 제한된 이익, 생물다양성 보전을 위한 인센티브 제한 등이 거버넌스 한계로 고찰되었다. 또한 자연의 권리를 존중하는 '부엔 비비르(Buen Vivir)' 개념을 공공 정책에 적용하는 과정에서 이해 당사자 간 상당한 갈등과 충돌이 있어 역시 거버넌스 한계를 드러냈다. 정보 공유 또는 데이터 거버넌스에서 에콰도르는 고도로 전문화된 분류학자가 부족하고 생물다양성 및 생태계 서비스에 대한 추가 연구와 향상된 지식이 필요하다. 에콰도르는 국내외 협력거버넌스 분야에서 이해관계자(현지 NGO단체 등)간 접근 및 사업화 과정에서 갈등을 경험해 오고 있으며, 특히 기업과 원주민 공동체 간 이익 공유를 둘러싸고 많은 갈등을 경험하고 있다.
페루는 행정 거버넌스 측면에서 규정 준수에 대한 모니터링 및 감독 부문이 취약한 것으로 관찰되었다. 접근 계약 조건과 관련하여 페루는 유전자원과 전통지식에 대한 공식적 접근과 재정적 어려움을 요청하는 연구자 그룹이 다수 존재한다. 기타 이해관계자들에게 시기적절하게 대응하기 위한 제도적 거버넌스 측면, 예를 들어 절차와 규정을 업데이트하는 데 행정적 어려움을 경험하고 있다. 제도적 거버넌스 측면에서는 사용자 측에서는 민간 기업이 금전적 이익을 너무 높게 간주하고, 제공자 측에서는 원주민과 지역 사회가 법적 틀에 대한 지식이 부족해 거버넌스를 달성하지 못하는 사례가 많다. 특히 국내외 사용자의 불법 접근을 통제할 수 없다는 것은 큰 거버넌스 부재로 관찰되었다. 정보 공유 또는 데이터 거버넌스에서 페루의 거버넌스 문제점은 유전자원 접근 절차가 복잡하고 관료적이라는 데에 있다. 국내 및 국제 협력 거버넌스에서 페루는 엄격한 규제 시스템과 프로세스에 참여하는 행위자(정부당국, 국가 및 지역 공무원, 과학계, 원주민 공동체)의 갈등이 거버넌스 문제점으로 관찰되었다.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• I. Introduction 1
• 1. Scope and Significance of Study 1
• 2. Research Methodology 6
• 3. Selecting the Target Countries 12
• 4. Structure of the Study 15
• II. The International Regime on ABS 17
• 1. ABS Legal Framework, Background and Significance of the Adoption of the CBD and Nagoya Protocol 17
• 2. ABS Framework 26
• 2.1. Scope 26
• 2.2. Core Elements 30
• 2.3. Tools and Mechanisms to Assist with Implementation 38
• 3. ABS Implementing Measures 43
• 4. ABS Agreements within Andean Countries at the Regional Level 47
• III. ABS National Implementation at the International Level 50
• 1. Statistical Analysis of ABS International Implementation 50
• 1.1. Administrative Governance 55
• 1.2. Institutional Governance 57
• 1.3. Data Governance (including Information Sharing) 61
• 1.4. Domestic and International Cooperation Governance 63
• 2. Statistical Analysis of ABS National Implementation in Andean Countries 69
• 2.1. Bolivia 70
• 2.2. Colombia 72
• 2.3. Ecuador 81
• 2.4. Peru 87
• 3. Summary 97
• IV. ABS Implementation at the National (Domestic) Level: Case Studies of the Andean Countries 103
• 1. Bolivia 103
• 1.1. Administrative Governance 107
• 1.2. Institutional Governance 110
• 1.3. Data Governance (including Information Sharing) 111
• 1.4. Domestic and International Cooperation Governance 112
• 2. Colombia 114
• 2.1. Administrative Governance 117
• 2.2. Institutional Governance 118
• 2.3. Data Governance (including Information Sharing) 118
• 2.4. Domestic and International Cooperation Governance 120
• 3. Ecuador 123
• 3.1. Administrative Governance 126
• 3.2. Institutional Governance 129
• 3.3. Data Governance (including Information Sharing) 133
• 3.4. Domestic and International Cooperation Governance 133
• 4. Peru 137
• 4.1. Administrative Governance 139
• 4.2. Institutional Governance 141
• 4.3. Data Governance (including Information Sharing) 144
• 4.4. Domestic and International Cooperation Governance 145
• 5. Summary 148
• V. Conclusion and Summary 152
• 1. Summary 152
• 2. Recommendations for Policy Making and Practice 159
• 3. Limitations and Further Research 161
• REFERENCES 163
• ABSTRACT in Korean 182