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      An Empirical Analysis of Market Power in The Dallas-Forth Worth Milk Market

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      https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A104821668

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      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

      In this paper, we develop a dynamic structural model based on a dynamic supergame and measure market power for the Dallas-Forth Worth fluid milk market in the U.S. In particular, we compare the conduct parameter estimates from a static model with that...

      In this paper, we develop a dynamic structural model based on a dynamic supergame and measure market power for the Dallas-Forth Worth fluid milk market in the U.S. In particular, we compare the conduct parameter estimates from a static model with that from the dynamic model and illustrate bias in the market-power measure in a static model. And we also analyze the cyclical behavior of firm conduct. We find that the conduct parameter in a static model underestimates true market power if firms’ behaviors are posited by a dynamic oligopoly game. We also verify that firm conduct in the Dallas-Forth Worth fluid milk market is countercyclical against demand shocks and expected future cost shocks. Our results indicate that the firms’ conduct in the Dallas-Forth Worth fluid milk market is consistent with what dynamic oligopoly models predict. This implies that the firms consider not only the contemporary reactions of the other firms’ but also future market competition. Therefore, the measurement of market power requires the specification of fully dynamic pricing relationship.

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      참고문헌 (Reference)

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      1 Haltiwanger, J., "The Impact of Cyclical Demand Movements on Collusive Behavior" 22 (22): 89-106, 1991

      2 Appelbaum, E., "The Estimation of the Degree of Oligopoly Power" 19 : 287-299, 1982

      3 Gallet, A. G., "The Effects of the Business Cycle on Oligopoly Coordination: Evidence from the U.S. Rayon Industry" 181-196, 1995

      4 Azzam, A., "Testing for Switching Market Conduct" 25 : 795-800, 1993

      5 Graddy, K., "Testing for Imperfect Competition at the Fulton Fish Markets" 26 (26): 75-92, 1995

      6 Rothschild, R., "Sustaining Collusion When the Choice of Strategic Variable Is Endogenous" 28 : 373-385, 1995

      7 Pearce, "Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria: Collective Rationality and Intertemporal Cooperation" Yale University 1987

      8 Van Damme, E., "Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma" 47 : 206-217, 1989

      9 Farrell, J., "Renegotiation in Repeated Games" 1 : 327-360, 1989

      10 Abreu, D., "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games" 60 : 217-240, 1993

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      28 Jesse, E., "Fluid Milk Prices and Price Spreads. Marketing and Policy Briefing Paper" Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison 2003

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      32 Borenstein, S., "Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets" 27 (27): 429-451, 1996

      33 Brander, A. J., "Dynamic Oligopoly Behavior in the Airline Industry" 11 : 407-435, 1993

      34 Chang, Y. M., "Duopsony Models with Consistent Conjectural Variations" 1 : 8-11, 1994

      35 Deneckere, R., "Duopoly Supergame with Product Differentiation" 11 : 37-42, 1983

      36 Bresnahan, F. T., "Duopoly Models with Consistent Conjectures" 71 : 934-945, 1981

      37 U.S. General Accounting Office, "Diary Industry: Information on Milk Prices and Changing Market Structure" U.S. General Accounting Office, Resources, Community, and Economic Department Division 2001

      38 Sergerstrom, P. S., "Demons and Repentance" 45 (45): 32-52, 1988

      39 Kamien, M. I., "Conjectural Variations" 12 : 117-118, 1983

      40 Corts, K., "Conduct Parameters and the Measurement of Market Power" 88 : 227-250, 1999

      41 Cotterill, Ronald W., "Competition, or the Lack Thereof in Local Fluid Milk Markets.' San Francisco, Seattle, Chicago, Miami and Dallas-Forth Worth" Food Marketing Policy Center, University of Connecticut 2001

      42 Bresnahan, F. T., "Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Industry: The 1955 Price War" 457-482, 1987

      43 Bagwell, K., "Collusion over the Business Cycle" 28 (28): 82-106, 1997

      44 Roller, L. H., "Capacity and Product Market Competition: Measuring Market Power In a ‘Puppy-Dog’ Industry" 18 : 845-865, 2000

      45 Domowitz, I., "Business Cycles and the Relationship Between Concentration and Price-Cost Margin" 17 : 1-17, 1986

      46 Robets, M. J., "An Empirical Analysis of Dynamic, Nonprice Competition in an Oligopolistic Industry" 19 : 200-220, 1988

      47 Rotemberg, J. J., "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms" 76 (76): 390-407, 1986

      48 Kawaguchi, T., "A Spatial Equilibrium Model for Imperfectly Competitive Milk Markets" 79 (79): 851-859, 1997

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      50 Dockner, E. J., "A Dynamic Theory of Conjectural Variations" 40 : 377-395, 1992

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      2016 0.59 0.59 0.66
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      0.61 0.57 0.894 0.2
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