6.25전쟁의 발발원인에 관한 연구 : 스탈린과 김일성의 상호작용 중심으로

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Since the Korean War, multi-laterally analyzed by Traditionalism, Recisionism, Post-Traditionalism, and Post-Revisionism, was an international war with a notion of civil war, researches have taken a similar approach as the studies on the Cold War. As John G. Stoessinger puts it, wars, which may determine the rise and fall of a nation, represent the extremely interdependent situation. For that reason, making a rational judgment requires a foundation of so-called principles and rationality, more than just fragmentary knowledge or orders of a leader. Based on the idea that wars are the outcomes of strategic judgments of leaders who represent the nations, this article analyzes the decision making processes of Kim, Il-Seong and Stalin via game theory along with the survey on the previous literature. After the analysis, we found that Kim's strategy in preparation of the Korean War served as a foundation to make Stalin to choose the strategies that Kim wants, and Stalin as well responded in an anticipation of Kim's strategies in order to maximize the benefits upon the victory of the war.