New Technology Venture and the Largest Shareholder in KOSDAQ Capital Market

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This is because corporate governance is determined by the number of outstanding shares and corporate governance can control the management of the company. Corporate governance, which is funded and operated outside the enterprise in the capital market, is heavily influenced by governance. In particular, companies with weak governance are becoming a prey of corporate hunters and are sacrificed. As capital markets are becoming globalized, corporate hunting in international capital markets is becoming more active. International speculative capital is especially focused on early entrepreneurs such as venture companies with weak corporate governance. In the decision－making process of major management decisions, the decision－making process of the general shareholders' meeting, which is the highest decision－making body, is subject to the ownership of shares. This study sought to define whether governance characteristics and the second largest shareholder (“the second shareholder”) can influence the relationship between the first shareholder and the manager's earnings management in a venture firm. The results of this study show that the relationship between the first largest shareholder and profit management of venture firms is not affected by the governance characteristics or the second largest shareholder. This study shows that the shareholding ratio of venture business owners is very high. In addition, the shareholding ratio of the second－largest shareholder is much smaller than that of the first－largest shareholder. In the end, the current corporate ownership system of venture firms does not adequately check and monitor the influence of the first largest shareholder on the management of the company. The results of this study are expected to stimulate various researches on venture capital investment and improvement of corporate governance.

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