도덕철학과 도덕심리학에서 직관과 정서 - 그린(J. Greene)의 이중과정 모형과 하이트(J. Haidt)의 사회적 직관을 중심으로 -

국문 초록 (Abstract)

오랜 합리주의 전통 속에 도덕심리학에서 이성의 역할이 강조되었으며 정서와 신경 상관관계에 대해서는 2000년대 초반까지 거의 알려진 바가 없었다. 그러나 그린과 연구진은 도덕적 딜레마를 사용한 fMRI연구를 통해 도덕판단에 정서가 관여되며 영향을 미친다는 것을 증명했다. 또한 심리학과 뇌 신경과학 연구가 활발해지면서 도덕판단이 종종 뇌 속에서 두 가지 유형으로 매개됨을 밝혀냈다. 그린은 자동적이고 수월하며 빠른 직관 과정의 System 1과 통제되고 힘들고 느린 추론 과정의 System 2로 이들을 규정했다. 하이트는 도덕판단이 주로 직관의 산물이며 추론은 그 이후 나타난다고 주장했다. 그에게 도덕판단은 추론보다 직관적 판단으로 이루어진다. 직관은 즉각적 판단으로 빠르고 수월하며 자동적인 정서적 반응으로 도덕적 감각의 산물이다. 본 연구에서는 도덕판단에서 직관과 정서의 지위 변화를 역사적으로 고찰하고 도덕적 직관에 대한 비판적 논의가 도덕교육에 제안하는 유의점을 논증했다. 특히, 그린과 하이트의 견해를 토대로 도덕적 추론을 면밀히 검토하고 이들 사이에 존재하는 차이와 공통점을 탐색하여 도덕교육에 주는 시사점을 추출했다. 이를 위해 첫째, 도덕철학과 도덕심리학의 발전을 개괄했다. 둘째, 그린의 이중과정 모형과 하이트의 사회적 직관을 분석했다. 셋째, 그린과 하이트의 이론의 차이점과 공통점을 확인했다. 마지막으로 도덕적 직관 이론의 의의와 한계를 탐구하여 도덕교육에의 유의점을 도출했다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

In the long rationalist tradition of moral psychology, the role of reason was mainly emphasized, and little was known about the neural correlation of emotions until the early 2000s. In an fMRI study using a moral dilemma, Greene and colleagues found that emotional involvement affects moral judgment. Their research served as an opportunity to unravel some of the puzzles of moral judgment observed by modern philosophers. A major topic of interest among social psychologists is the role of intuition, emotion, and emotion in determining rational reasoning and other moral judgments. An increase in psychological and neuroscience research has shown that moral judgments are often mediated by two types of brain processes. The first consists of processes that automatically change their pleasure state in response to certain types of socially relevant stimuli. The second type consists of processes in the more general domain that underlie abstract reasoning, simulation, and cognitive control capabilities. These intuitive and deliberative processes often work together to facilitate decisions that are aligned with goals. Greene named the automatic, easy and fast process of intuition as ‘System 1’ and the controlled, laborious and slow process of reasoning as ‘System 2’. Haidt argued that moral judgments are primarily the product of intuition, and that reasoning emerges thereafter. In his view, moral judgments are made more intuitively through reasoning. Intuition is an immediate judgment, a quick, easy, and automatic emotional response, the product of a moral sense. In this study, based on the views of Greene and Haidt, we closely examine moral reasoning and extract the differences and commonalities between them to derive the meaning given to moral education. To this end, first, the development of moral philosophy and moral psychology was outlined. Second, Greene’s dual process model and Haidt’s social intuition were reviewed. Third, the differences and commonalities between Greene’s theory and Hait’s theory were investigated. Finally, the significance and limitations of the moral intuition theory were examined to derive the meaning for moral education.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 요약
• Ⅰ. 서론
• Ⅱ. 도덕교육과 도덕심리학
• Ⅲ. 그린의 이중과정 모형
• Ⅳ. 하이트의 사회적 직관
• Ⅴ. 경험적 도덕과 사회적 직관의 한계
• Ⅵ. 결론
• 참고문헌
• Abstract

참고문헌 (Reference)

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