Who Beats Plowshares into Swords? Determinants of Commitment to Ceasefire Agreements

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Although ceasefire agreements end wars, they are not left unthreatened. A number of ceasefire agreements have been threatened or violated in various ways. A ceasefire agreement collapses when at least one adversary fails to comply with the agreement it previously accepted and resumes military conflict against its old enemy. Why do some states break ceasefire agreements while others carry them out? Under what conditions are states less likely to commit to ceasefire agreements? Previous studies on the commitment problem identify regime type, relative capability, and power shift as important variables that affect the ability of states to commit to agreements. Accordingly, this paper examines whether those variables have a significant effect on states’ commitment to ceasefire agreements.
To test the effects of those variables, I build a data set using MIDB, COW, NMC, and Polity IV data. To test the effects of those variables, a dataset was constructed using MIDB, COW, NMC, and Polity IV data. A key finding of this paper is that democracies are no more likely to commit to agreements than nondemocracies, while relative power and power shifts have statistically significant effects on commitment to agreements. This paper suggests that democratic advantage on commitment does not exist, at least with regard to ceasefire agreements.

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