프랭클린 루즈벨트 (Franklin D. Roosevelt) 大統領과 冷戰의 起源 = Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Origins of the Cold War

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study is intended to examine Franklin D. Roosevelt's foreign policy toward the Soviet Union during the Second World War in order to determine how and why the Cold War started. To find the origins of the Cold War, I try to focus on Roosevelt's personal diplomacy to Stalin and his decisions made at the Yalta Conference. Without the understanding of the Yalta Conference, it would be impossible to discuss the Cold War issues.
The "Big Three" met in February 1945, at the Russian Black Sea resort of Yalta.At the time the three leaders met at Yalta, the Anglo-American armies were still west of the Rhine, recovering from the Hitler's last winter offensive, 'Battle of the Bulge,' while the Red Armies were within 100 miles of Berlin. Therefore, at Yalta Stalin was to be in a doubly advantageous position, for the conference took place not only on the morrow of a severe allied reverse and at the moment of the Red Armies great military victories, but also at a time of Anglo-American suspiction and discord. To President Roosevelt and his American advisors of the Yalta delegation, Britain's imperialism seemed a more dangerous obstacle to the postwar peace than the Soviet Union.
The establishment of the United Nations was a major American preoccupation at Yalta. Knowing that American public opinion would not permit him to commit troops to Europe for any length of time after Germany's surrender, Roosevelt wanted to draw the Big Three into a postwar international organization before particular issues could divide them into opposing camps. Through the United Nations, he hoped to achieve a selfenforcing peace settlement that would not require American enterprise could work freely.
The immediate issue was the question of the treatment of Germany after her defeat. The Big Three reaffirmed their agreement that Germany must surrender unconditionally, be disarmed, and be denazified. Occupation zones were brought in to occucy one zone at the insistence of Churchill, who foresaw Britain left alone facing Russia in Europe. But no agreement could be reached on reparations either. Stalin supported by Roosevelt, proposed that a total of $20 billion in reparations from Germany plus forced labor be drawn from all the occupation zones: Russia get halt of this total.
While the German question had the most serious repercussions in Europe during the postwar period, the problem which occupied the most time at Yalta was Poland. Roosevelt found himself in no position to gain from Stalin's concessions for the Polish Government in London. Stalin made it clear that Russia required a "friendly" Polish Government to guatrantee the future security of the Soviet Union. The Russians had tried to pretermine the Polish settlement by recognizing a hand-picked government in the areas already occupied by Soviet troops. Roosevelt and Churchill got Stalin to accept the "reorganization" of this new government to include some pro-Western Poles, and to promise future elections.
While Roosevelt's greatest wish was to provide for the creation of international security organization, Churchill and Stalin desired only a permanent alliance between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union: they hoped to create relative spheres of influence in postwar Europe. They thought that Roosevelt's design for the international organization would be naive and unrealistic. Roosevelt's design for United Nations was heavily weighted with members friendly or subordinate to the United States, and it provided for the right of veto over any actions taken against the wishes of any one of the Big Three. Stalin accepted Roosevelt's design, without showing much interest, after a compromise had been reached on Poland and after the addition of two Russian states-the Ukraine and White Russians voting members. Churchill accepted the design on the condition that the trusteeship provisions for United Nations supervision of former colonies would apply to "not one scrap of British Territories." Roosevelt agreed to hold the U.N. general conference in the United States. The place set was San Francisco: the time, April 25, 1945.
United Nations was based on the assuption, as Roosevelt said, that the great powers would consider themselves "morally bound not to go to war against other nation." The choice America faced was either to work to achieve cooperation within the framework of the United Nations or to meet the developing threat of Soviet expansionism by force. Roosevelt and his advisors chose the former alternative.
Althoght the President seemed preoccupied with military and political affairs in Europe, he was, in fact, very interested in the situation of the Far East. The United States had been the Allied power which had been most involved in the war against Japan. American military leaders generally believed that Soviet help would shorten the Pacific war and save an incalculable number of American lives. They expected to lose as many as 1 million men in another D-Day, an amphibious landing in the Japanese home islands. Roosevelt therefore agreed to an expanded Soviet role in Far East-possession of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, a share in postwar influence in Korea, and support in negotiating two warm water ports and railroad rights in Manchuria with the Chinese in return for a promise of Soviet military assistance against Japan and Soviet's recognition of Chiang Kaishek's regime in China.
No single act of President Roosevelt's career has been more harshly criticized than his Far Eastern agreements with Stalin at Yalta. After the war, the Yalta showed that "the high point of Soviet diplomatic success and correspondingly the low point of American appeasement." Why did Roosevelt agree to the Far Eastern pact? It is clear that the agreement motivated primarily by military and not political considerations. Deciding that China was too weak and disorganized to be given a strong role in the settlement of Asian affairs, Roosevelt decided a secret agreement with Stalin designed to win the war against Japan and to set the pattern of Sino-Soviet relations in the postwar era.
It can be said that the responsibility for the failure of the peace after the First World War falls more on the Senate than on Wilson. But the failure of peace after the Second World War, with the Cold War and the victories of Communism in China, rests primarily on Roosevelt.
Roosevelt's conception about communism was incredible. He ignored Russian history and communist ideology and simply thoght that Soviet Russia and the United States, because they both desired the defeat of the Axis, had identical expectations for the future. He saw no need to fear communism if an international organization existed, and believed that if Russia could be given security through such an organization, the Communist regime would gradually accomodate itself to the general society of nations.
The damage to the interests of the West was done when the frames of American political and military policy decided the military strategy of the war in terms of military efficience only, without giving adequate consideration to the political implication that would grow from the distribution of military power at the end of the war.
Consequently, President Roosevelt met Stalin at Yalta with the wrong assuptions and the false intelligences, and then could not check Stalin's postwar expansionim.
This failure became one of the most vital causes of the Cold War. The President much overestimated his ability to influence Stalin, and put excessive hope on the possibility of solving the Russian issue through international organization. He miscalculated Stalin's political ambition. The United States should have taken a much stronger line.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 問題의 提起
• Ⅱ. 얄타회담의 歷史的 背景
• Ⅲ. 얄타회담
• 1. 決定의 순간들
• (1)독일의 운명
• (2)폴란드 문제와 발칸반도
• (3)국제연합기구의 탄생
• (4)극동아시아 협정
• 2. 얄타회담의 決算
• Ⅳ.結論
• 參考文獻