샌프란시스코 평화조약의 제3자적 효력과 독도영유권

이환규 ( Hwangyu Lee ) 사단법인 아시아문화학술원 2020 인문사회 21 Vol.11 No.6

본 연구는 샌프란시스코 평화조약이 한국에 법적 효력을 미치는지 여부와 평화조약 규정의 한국에 대한 유효성이 인정되었을 때 한국이 가지는 권리의 내용이 무엇인지를 분석하는데 그 목적이 있다. 평화조약의 경우 원칙적으로 한국은 당사국이 아니기 때문에 법적 효력이 미치지 않지만, 평화조약 제21조는 비당사국인 제3국에 권리가 발생하기 위한 두 가지 요건을 모두 충족시키고 있어서 평화조약 제21조로부터 한국에 권리가 발생했다고 할 수 있다. 또한, 평화조약 제21조는 조약 체결 당시의 관습국제법을 반영하고 있어서, 이를 근거로 한국은 유효하게 법적 권리를 취득했다고 할 수 있다. 따라서 한국은 평화조약 제2조(a)에 따라 일본이 포기해야 하는 제주도, 거문도 및 울릉도를 포함한 한국에 대한 모든 권리, 권원 및 청구권을 가질 권리를 가지게 된다. 그러나 독도영유권과 관련하여 평화조약 제2조(a)의 해석 문제를 살펴본 결과, 예시주의에 입각해서 평화조약 제2조(a)에 독도가 포함되는 것으로 해석되는 경우를 제외하고는 한국과 일본 측의 입장이 대립되는 상황에서 평화조약을 우리측의 독도영유권 주장에 대한 근거로 제시하기에는 충분치 않다는 결론에 도달하게 되었다. The purpose of this study is to analyze whether the San Francisco Peace Treaty has legal effect on Korea, and what rights Korea has when the validity of the Peace Treaty provisions is recognized. In principle, since Korea is not a party to the Peace Treaty, it has no legal effect in Korea. But Article 21 of the Peace Treaty satisfies both requirements for the rights to arise from the provisions of the Treaty to a third country that is a non-party to the Treaty. From Article 21 of the Peace Treaty, it can be said that rights arose in Korea, which is a non-party to the Treaty. In addition, Article 21 of the Peace Treaty reflects the customary international law at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, and based on this, it can be said that Korea has effectively acquired legal rights. Accordingly, Korea has the right to have all rights, titles and claims to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet, which Japan has to give up pursuant to Article 2(a) of the Peace Treaty. However, as a result of examining the issue of interpretation of Article 2(a) of the Peace Treaty regarding the title to Dokdo, We come to the conclusion that the Peace Treaty is not sufficient to present the grounds for our side’s claim to sovereignty over Dokdo.

조세조약의 적용에 관한 소고

오윤(Oh Yoon) 한국국제조세협회 2006 조세학술논집 Vol.22 No.1

A tax treaty is applied to a resident of either contracting state. In general a tax treaty defines “resident of a state” as a person liable to tax in that state. One caveat is that if a person is liable to tax only on the income sourcing in the country, he(or it) is not regarded as a resident of that state. Many times businesses are tempted to make use of a tax treaty even if they are not entitled to the tax treaty because they are not residents of either state. To utilize the tax treaty they are likely to establish a separate entity in a place where the entity can enjoy the tax treaty benefit intended and provide financial advantage to them eventually. Such separate entity is often called as a “conduit company”, which is usually built in a low taxed jurisdiction like tax haven. Contracting states may well try to sanction on the apparent misuse of the tax treaty by a conduit company because they did not intend to extend tax treaty benefit to a person sitting behind it. Especially source country is eager to prevent this type of misuse through a conduit company because it has nothing to win anyhow. This paper intends to provide a few approaches for the interpretation of tax treaty how a source country can sanction treaty shopping by a conduit company such as an offshore investment company. Before a source country applies a tax treaty to an entity, it has to decide whether the entity under question is a resident of the counterpart contracting state. The decision has to be made by the application tax treaties of countries which may affect the taxation of the entity’s income. For example, when the entity has its place of effective management in a country while it was established by the law of another country, the tax treaty between the two countries has to be applied for the decision of its residency. Sometimes the concept of permanent establishment may be utilized to stop double non-taxation, which nevertheless does not help the source country because the entity does not have any nexus in the source country. The source country cannot apply its tax treaty with the country of permanent establishment because a permanent establishment is not a person which in turn can be a resident of a country if it pays taxes there. Even if the source country cannot deny the residency of an entity in the counterpart contracting state, it can find a way not to apply the tax treaty to a resident of the counterpart contracting state. If a specific provision of a tax treaty is stipulated to be applied only to a “beneficial owner” of the income under question, the source country may find a way to argue that the beneficial ownership does not belongs to the conduit company because it is a nominal owner. Even without a specific provision on the beneficial ownership for the case under question, the source country may argue that the concept of beneficial ownership should be extended to such case from the perspective of the purpose and objective of the tax treaty. The concept of beneficial ownership is one of the so called “special anti avoidance rules” applicable tax treaties. If an investment structure is made of a few strata of limited liability companies, the interpretation of tax treaty may not give any clear answer to where the source country finally stops for the application of tax treaty. Possibly the revision of tax treaty to expand the concept of the resident may help, which is out of the scope of this study.

한일기본관계조약의 국제법적 문제점에 관한 재검토

박배근(PARK Pae-Keun) 국제법평론회 2011 국제법평론 Vol.0 No.34

"Treaty on Basic Relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan", concluded on June 22, 1965 between Korea and Japan is a treaty with very small number of articles. However, it is very important treaty as it regulates the ‘basic’ relations between the two States. The unfortunate aspect of this treaty is that it did not resolve clearly the most fundamental problems between them, namely the problems arose from Japanese occupation and rule of Korea from 1910 to 1945. Therefore, this treaty itself has been the subject of many controversies between Korea and Japan. Korea interprets article 2 of the treaty as providing that "all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Korea and the Empire of Japan on or before August 22, 1910" were without any legal validity ab initio. Japan interprets the same article as meaning that they were validly concluded and now it lost its validity and legal effects. With regard to the article 3 of the treaty, there were interpretative differences between Korea and Japan about whether "the Government of the Republic of Korea is the only lawful Government" in the entire Korean peninsular or only in the southern part of it. Now, as Korea does not oppose the establishment of diplomatic relation between North Korea and Japan, this difference became already dissolved. After almost 50 years from its conclusion, it would be necessary to estimate and think about many matters about the treaty. First, it has serious defect as a ‘basic’ relations treaty because it does not include any clause showing explicit common awareness of past history between Korea and Japan, principles to be followed in achieving historical liquidation and the direction of future aimed at by both States. Secondly, article 2 cannot have any significance as a treaty provision as long as interpretive differences about it continue between the two States. To my opinion, it is the attitude of the Japanese government not reflecting and regretting Japanese domination over Korea for 35 years th at caused the conclusion of the treaty without settling those interpretive differences concerning the article 2. Without the change of this attitude, the really friendly and cooperative relation between Korea and Japan would be very hard to be realized. Nonetheless, when we go out of the framework of the treaty and strictly legal perspective, we can see apology by Japanese peoples and reconciliation between the peoples of both States. For this out-of-legal reconciliation, spread of cognizance of real historical facts is important and changes in education in Japan may be expected to play important role.

조약과 일반적으로 승인된 국제법규의 법적 효력 – 헌법재판소와 대법원의 해석을 중심으로 -

노기호 한국법정책학회 2022 법과 정책연구 Vol.22 No.4

Article 6 (1) of the Constitution states, “The treaties concluded and promulgated under the Constitution and the generally recognized international laws has the same effect as the internal law.” In this regard, the Constitutional Court concluded that a treaty as referred to herein is an explicit agreement that has legal effect between states, and the relationship between rights and obligations between the parties. In addition, as a distinguishing criterion for judging whether a treaty is authorized, the Court of Justice is presented in two ways : a formal aspect and a substantive aspect. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court ruled that the general international treaties and international. Although the judgment seems to be regarded as a concept of a generally accepted international law, Conventions that correspond to general international treaties to which Korea has not acceded are already acceded to. Because the treaty is in effect as a manufacturing method, 'Treaties approved in the provinces which Korea did not join but many countries join' should be seen as difficult to find any more. A treaty concluded and promulgated under the Constitution pursuant to Article 6 (1) of the Constitution has the same effect as the domestic law. In this regard, the Constitutional Court first decided on what “domestic law” means in detail. It is made clear that the Constitution is not included in the seeing it happen. In addition, the Constitutional Court has a question on what order of effect has the effect of the legal system of domestic law. Based on the treaty supremacy of the Constitution, the court has the legal effect on treaties concluded with the consent of the National Assembly. Although it does not explicitly state whether it has the effect of domestic legal status, it is an indirect interpretation can be regarded as having the same effect as a command. Important issues that may arise in treaty practice in the domestic application of treaties and generally accepted international law. One issue is how to set the effective date of the treaty, and the national government in concluding and ratifying the treaty. In the case where a treaty requiring the consent of the meeting is being implemented in Korea without the consent of the National Assembly, the validity of the treaty is recognized. In the former case, the date of entry into force of the treaty at the time of conclusion of the treaty is directly [Keywords:treaty, general approval international law, conclusion and promulgation of treaty, same effect as domestic law, consent of the National Assembly related to the treaty. 헌법재판소는 조약이란 국가 간에 법적 효과를 가져 오는 명시적인 합의로서, 당사국 간에 권리·의무 관계를 발생시키는 문서를 말한다고 한다. 그리고 조약인가의 여부를 판단하는 구별기준으로 헌법재판소는 형식적인 측면과 실체적인 측면으로 나누어 제시하고 있다. 한편, 우리나라가 가입하지 않은 일반성을 지닌 국제조약에 해당하는 조약들은 이미 우리나라가 가입하여 국제법으로서의 조약의 효력을 발휘하고 있기 때문에 ‘우리나라가 가입하지는 않았으나 많은 국가들에서 승인된 조약’은 더 이상 찾아보기 어렵다. 헌법 제6조 제1항에서 언급하고 있는 “국내법”이 구체적으로 무엇을 의미하는가에 대해 헌법재판소는 일단, 이 “국내법”에 헌법은 포함되지 않는다는 것을 분명히 하고 있으며, 국내법의 법체계상 어떠한 순위의 효력을 가지는가에 대해서는 헌법의 조약우위설에 입각하여, 국회의 동의를 얻어 체결된 조약에 대해 법률적 효력을 가지는 것으로 보고 있다. 헌법재판소가 ‘일반적으로 승인된 국제법규’에 대하여 헌법적 효력을 가지고 있어 위헌심사의 기준이 된다거나 직접적으로 이 조약에 위반되어 위헌이라고 분명하게 밝힌 적은 없다. 조약과 일반적으로 승인된 국제법규의 국내적용에 있어 조약 실무상 문제될 수 있는 중요한 사안으로는 조약의 효력발생 시기를 어떻게 설정할 것인가와 조약의 체결·비준에 있어 국회의 동의를 요하는 조약을 국회의 동의 없이 국내에 시행하고 있는 경우의 그 효력의 인정 여부를 들 수 있다. 조약의 시행 후에 발생하는 여러 가지의 국제법적인 문제와 국내법적인 문제를 고려하여 조약실무 차원에서 적용할 수 있는 기준을 마련할 필요가 있다고 하겠다.

朝英條約(1883. 11)과 불평등조약체제의 재정립

한승훈(Han Seung-Hoon) 한국사연구회 2006 한국사연구 Vol.135 No.-

Korea concluded the treaties with the United States, Britain, and Germany in 1882. Korean government executed the two main policies of concluding the treaty at that time. One side was the political purpose that Korea would deny Korean subordination policy of Imperial China and achieve independence from Imperial China by application of the International law. The other side was that Korea would conclude the treaties that mitigated inequality. On the basis of investigation into unequal treaties concluded between China or Japan and Western Powers, Korean government was able to conclude treaties of mitigating inequality with Britain, the United States, and Germany in comparison with treaties that China and Japan had concluded with Western Powers. But British Government refused ratification of the Treaty concluded with Korea in 1882. The main reason was that the Treaty concluded between Korea and Britain in 1882 was considered as a basis that China and Japan would establish to require the revision of treaties to Britain by diplomats of Britain to East Asia and British General Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, Shanghae, and Yokohama. So Parkes made out draft of new Treaty. The draft was made up of unequal treaties that Western Powers including Britain had forced China and Japan to conclude. Parkes specially reflected on the opinion of British merchants who lived in East Asia on purpose to protect the British economic profit in East Asia. In the meantime, the treaty policy of Korean government gradually began to recede by the Regulations conclude between Korea and Japan on July, 1883. The United States, Japan, and China exercised their influence directly and indirectly in the process that Korean government receded her policy of the treaty. In the end, Korea concluded the new Treaty with Britain on November, 1883. Parkes, though opinion of Tongligyoseoptongsangsamuamun(統理交涉通商事務衙門)’s officials was reflected on just a little, integrated the inequality of treaties that was enforcing in China and Japan in the Treaty. The tariff on foreign imports was an average rate of 7.5 per cent that was enforcing substantially in China by means of main goods that probably formed nine-tenths of the foreign trade with Korea paying 5, 7.5 per cent. In addition, Parkes got his demands such as the freedom of the trade between open ports and interior trade by British, and the exercise of British extraterritoriality perfectly. According to the Treaty, Britain was able to reconstruct the treaty system in East Asia. Since then, Korea concluded treaties with German, Russia, Italy, and France in turn. The Treaty concluded between Korea and Britain in 1883 became the original form of these treaties regardless of existence of the Treaty ratified between Korea and the United States in 1883. The reason was judged that the Treaty concluded between Korea and Britain in 1883 integrated the treaties that were enforcing in East Asia above all things. After all, the Korean government was forced to regard The Treaty concluded between Korea and Britain in 1883 as the basis of Korean treaty policy.

한·일 조세조약 제10조 제2항 (가)목의 주식의 ‘소유'의 의미 - 대상판결: 대법원 2013. 5. 24. 선고 2013두659 판결-

이정민 서울시립대학교 서울시립대학교 법학연구소 2014 조세와 법 Vol.7 No.2

In the context of judicial relation between tax treaty and domestic tax law, it is general that tax treaty provision overrides the domestic tax law. Therefore, when a foreign entity’s income is tax exempted, tax free, or taxed by the tax rate under the provision of tax treaty, the tax authority in each contracting state shall comply to the tax treaty. According to article 10(2) Ga of Korea-Japan tax treaty, if the beneficial owner of the dividends is a resident of the other contracting state, the tax charged shall not exceed 5% of the gross amount of the dividends if the beneficial owner is a company which owns at least 25% of voting shares issued by the company paying the dividends during the period of 6 months immediately before the end of the accounting period for which the distribution of profits takes place. Regarding the interpretation of the treaty provision mentioned above, the precedent discussed here(“the precedent”) provided that 5% of the treaty income tax rate to the dividends shall be applied as the company which is a resident of contracting state is deemed to ‘own’ substantially the shares of the company paying the dividends, by utilizing the legal owner of the shares of the company paying the dividends. Under the principle of ‘Substance over Form’, the company who is a resident of the contracting state is liable to income tax because the company is the beneficial owner of the dividends. Therefore the treaty income tax rate to the dividends shall be applied. With this respect, the decision of the precedent seems to be appropriate. Meanwhile, the precedent did not make reference on the matter whether the treaty income tax rate should be applied where the treaty requires expressly the company being paid dividends “owns directly” the shares of the company paying dividend to apply the treaty income tax rate. For this, it would be proper to consider the company which is the beneficial owner of the dividends to qualify as a "direct owner" unless the tax treaty expressly exclude the case of indirect owner of the shares of the company paying the dividends. 조세조약에서 규율하고 있는 법률관계에 있어서는 당해 조약이 국내법의 특별법적인 지위에 있어 국내법보다 우선하여 적용되므로, 외국법인의 당해 소득이 조세조약에 의하여 비과세, 면세 또는 제한세율의 적용을 받은 경우에는 그 조세조약에 따르게 된다. 한ㆍ일 조세조약 제10조 제2항 (가)목은 배당의 수익적 소유자가 타방체약국의 거주자로서 일정한 기간 동안 배당을 지급하는 법인이 발행한 의결권 있는 주식을 적어도 25%를 ‘소유’하고 있는 법인인 경우에는 5%의 제한세율의 한도 내에서만 원천지국 과세를 인정하고 있다. 위 조약규정의 해석과 관련하여, 대상판결은 배당소득의 실질귀속자인 체약국 거주자인 법인이 법 형식상 배당소득의 형식적 귀속자를 통하여 배당지급법인의 주식을 실질적으로 소유하고 있는 사안에서 체약국 거주자인 법인이 배당지급법인의 주식을 ‘소유’하고 있다고 보아 5%의 제한세율이 적용된다고 한 원심의 판단을 수긍하였다. 실질과세의 원칙의 적용으로 주식의 형식적 소유자인 명목상의 법인이 아니라 그 배당소득의 실질귀속자인 체약국 거주자인 법인을 납세의무자로 삼게 되는 경우라면 그 배당소득에 대하여 체약국 거주자인 법인이 주식을 소유하는 것으로 보아 제한세율을 적용하여야 할 것이므로, 대상판결의 태도는 타당하다. 한편 대상판결은 주식의 ‘직접 소유’를 제한세율의 적용요건으로 규정하고 있는 다른 조세조약의 경우에도 이러한 사안에서 제한세율의 적용을 긍정할 것인지의 문제에 관하여는 판시하지 않았고, 이는 향후 검토되어야 할 문제이다. 다만 필자의 소견으로는 ‘직접 소유’라고 규정된 조세조약들의 경우에도, 특별히 달리 정하지 않았다면 배당소득의 실질귀속자인 법인이 배당지급법인의 주식을 직접 소유하고 있다고 보아 그 요건을 충족한다고 볼 수 있지 않을까 생각된다.

「일본영역참고도」와 대일평화조약

정태만 영남대학교 독도연구소 2015 독도연구 Vol.- No.19

‘The Japanese Domain Reference Map’(日本領域参考図) was produced by Japanese Government in August 1951, just before signing of Treaty of Peace with Japan(9/8/1951), and after the treaty signing, it was submitted to the Japanese Diet in the process of ratification. On the map, a semicircle is drawn to the east of the Dokdo, apart from a boundary line to cross between Korea and Japan, and shows that Dokdo belongs to Korea. This is same way as ‘SCAP Administrative Areas: Japan and South Korea’ of February 1946. As it was submitted to the Japanese Diet in the course of treaty ratification, Japanese Diet discussed about ‘Japanese Domain Reference Map’ three times in those days and recorded in detail in Japanese Diet records. Diet records of ‘Peace Treaty and U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Special Committee’ of the House of Representatives of October 22, 1951 is one of the records of committee which was held in order to ratify the treaty. The contents discussed about the map in the Diet is recorded in Diet Record of ‘the House of Representatives foreign affairs committee’ of November 4, 1953, two years later of ratification of treaty and Diet Record of ‘the House of Councilors Committee on the Budget’ of March 24, 1970. Even the Takeshima Issue Study Groop does not deny the fact that ‘Japanese Domain Reference Map’ was submitted to the Diet at that time. Treaty of Peace with Japan was signed without regulating clearly the dominium of the individual island, on account of the simplification policy of the treaty. By the way, after signing of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Japanese Government submitted ‘Japanese Domain Reference Map’ which recorded Dokdo in Korean territory, and Japanese Diet approved the treaty based on the provisions of the Treaty and the Map. We can interpret that the Japanese Government and the Diet accepted ‘Dokdo is Korea territory’ in the process of the treaty ratification. In addition, in May 1952, just after the effectivation of the treaty, another map which draws ‘Dokdo in Korea territory’, ‘Japanese domain Map’(日本領域図) was produced and distributed by Mainichi Newspaper. The fact that Japanese Government accepted ‘Dokdo is Korea territory’ at that time is also proved by ‘Japanese domain Map’ indirectly. 「일본영역참고도」는 샌프란시스코 대일평화조약의 조인(1951.9.8) 직전에 일본정부에 의해 제작(1951.8.)되어 조약조인 후 비준승인 과정에서 일본국회에 제출되었다. 「일본영역참고도」는 한일간을 가로지르는 경계선과는 별도로 독도의 동편에 반원을 그려, 독도를 한국령으로 표기하고 있는 점에서 그 이전의 「연합국최고사령부 관할지역도」(SCAP Administrative Areas: Japan and South Korea, 1946.2.)와 같다. 일본국회에 제출된 만큼, 당시 「일본영역참고도」에 관해 논의한 내용은 일본의 국회회의록에 자세히 기록되어 있다. 일본 국회 회의록 중, 조약의 비준 승인 당시 기록으로는 1951년 10월 22일 중의원 ‘평화조약 및 일미안전보장조약 특별위원회’ 회의록이 있으며, 조약 비준 2년 후인 1953년 11월 4일 중의원 외무위원회 회의록 및 1970년 3월 24일의 참의원 예산위원회 회의록에도 기록되어 있다. 다케시마(竹島)문제연구회에서도 「일본영역참고도」의 국회제출은 부인하지 않고 있다. 샌프란시스코 대일평화조약은 조약의 간략화 방침에 따라 개별 섬의 영유권귀속을 명확히 하지 않은 채 조인되었다. 그런데, 샌프란시스코조약 조인 후 조약비준 과정에서 일본 정부는 ‘독도를 한국령’으로 그린 「일본영역참고도」를 조약의 비준 승인을 위한 국회에 제출하고, 일본 국회는 조약조문과 「일본영역참고도」를 근거로 하여 조약을 승인했다. 결과적으로 조약의 비준과정에서 일본 정부와 국회는 ‘독도 한국령’을 승인한 것이 된다. 또한, 조약 발효 직후 ‘독도를 한국령’으로 표기한 또 다른 지도「일본영역도」가 마이니치(每日)신문사에 의해 제작 배포되었다. 일본 정부에서 ‘독도 한국령’을 인정했다는 것은, 조약 발효후의 「일본영역도」에 의해서도 간접적으로 증명된다.

샌프란시스코평화조약의 법적체제와 주요국가의 입장분석

김채형(Kim Chaihyung) 부경대학교 인문사회과학연구소 2016 인문사회과학연구 Vol.17 No.2

1951년 9월 미국의 샌프란시스코에서 평화회의가 개최되었다. 이 평화회의에는 51개 국가들의 대표가 참석하였는데, 이 평화회의의 개최목적은 제2차 세계대전 후 아시아지역의 전쟁상태를 종결하기 위하여 일본과의 평화조약을 체결하는 것이었으며, 이에 따라 1951년 9월 8일 미국의 샌프란시스코에 소재한 오페라하우스(War Memorial Opera House)에서 연합국들과 일본간에 ‘일본과의 평화조약( The Treaty of Peace With Japan)’을 서명하였는데, 이 조약 은 미국의 샌프란시스코에서 체결되었으므로 일명 샌프란시스코평화조약으로도 부른다. 샌프란시스코평화조약에 대하여 이 조약의 영토규정에서 한국의 영토에 관한 규정, 특히 독도문제와 관련하여 일본과 논란이 많은데 이러한 영토규정에 대한 분석은 국내에 많이 소개되어 있으나, 이 조약의 전반적인 내용의 분석은 충분히 되어 있지 못하다. 그래서 본 논문에서 이 조약이 체결될 당시에 샌프란시스코회의에 참석한 주요한 국가들이 이 조약체결에 대하여 어떠한 입장을 갖고 있었는가를 샌프란시스코평화회의 당시의 회의록을 분석하여 관련된 주요 국가들의 입장을 밝혀보고, 이후에 샌프란시스코평화조약의 전반적인 내용과 그 법적체계를 분석하였다. 이러한 분석에 의하면, 그 당시 러시아는 샌프란시스코평화회의에는 참석하였으나, 샌프란시스코평화회의에서 미국의 주도적 역할에 반발하여 이 평화조약에 서명을 하지 않아 평화조약의 당사국이 되지 않았다. 그 당시 러시아대표단은 평화조약에 서명하였다면, 일본과의 영토분쟁에 있어서 러시아의 입장을 정당화하기 위해 평화조약 제2조를 적용하여 일본의 Kurile 제도에 대한 주권주장을 완전히 봉쇄할 수가 있었는데, 그 당시 러시아가 평화조약의 당사국이 되지 않은 것은 러시아의 외교정책의 실수로 볼 수 있다. 일본과의 평화조약의 형태에 대하여는 조약 문안을 교섭하는 초기부터 미국과 영국의 합의가 이루어져 관대한 내용으로 조약안이 작성되었다. 미국측을 대표한 Dulles대사는 제1차 세계대전을 종결하는 베르사이유평화조약의 단점을 잘 알고 있었으며, 따라서 미래를 향한 협력과 평화적 행동을 고취하지 않고 미래에 전쟁의 씨앗을 내포하는 징벌적인 평화조약은 이행이 잘 되지 않는다는 점을 인식하였다. 그래서 미국정부는 일본과의 평화조약이 일본에게 자유를 회복시켜주고 화해의 조약을 체결하려고 결정하게 되었다. 영국 대표도 마찬가지로 일본에 대하 여 관대한 평화조약 체결에 동의하였다. 평화조약은 총 27개의 조문으로 구성된 전후처리에 관하여 상당히 많은 내용을 규정하고 있다. 안보에 관한 규정, 평화조약이 발효된 이후 일본과 연합국간의 양자조약의 관계를 규정하고 있으며, 무역, 해운 기타의 통상관계도 규정하고 있다. 평화조약 체결에서 가장 논란이 된 것은 일본의 점령에서 심각하게 피해를 입은 국가들의 배상문제가 있다. 그래서 평화조약 제 14조에서는 일본이 연합국들에게 전쟁 중에 입힌 피해 및 고통에 대하여 배상을 지불해야 하 는 것을 인정하였는데, 일본의 자원이 완전한 배상을 행하고 또한 다른 채무를 이행하기 위해 서는 충분치 않다는 것이 인정된다는 점도 규정하였다. 그런데 배상을 요구할 수 있는 국가의 범위에 대하여 “현재의 영역이 일본군에 의하여 점령되고 일본군에 의해 손해를 입은 연합국” 으로 제한시켰다. 배상요구를 포기한 국가에 대해서는 배상문제가 발생하지 않으며, 미국과 영국등 주요한 전승국가는 배상청구권 포기를 선언하여 일본이 경제적으로 재기할 수 있는 기회를 제공하였다. The representatives of fifty-one nations at a peace conference convened in San Francisco on September 1951 were presented. The objective of this conference was to conclude a Treaty of Peace with Japan in order to terminate the state of war in the Asian region after the World War II. Because this treaty was concluded in San Francisco, we call this treaty to a San Francisco Peace Treaty. There are many different opinions between Korea and Japan concerning the interpretation of territory of Korea in the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Peace, in particular the sovereignty over Dokdo Island. Though the analysis concerning this territorial provisions of this treaty is introduced, the analysis about overall content of this treaty is not sufficient in the academic journal of Korea. Thus in this paper, I want to make clear the positions which the major countries took concerning the content of the Treaty of Peace at that time of the conclusion of this treaty, after that, I will analyse overall content of this treaty and legal system of the Treaty of Peace. According to this analysis, though Russia was present in the San Francisco peace conference, Russia was opposed at the leading role of the United States in the course of making of the content of this treaty and Russia didn’t sign this treaty. In this reason Russia didn’t become member country of this treaty. The text of Treaty of Peace was presented to the conference under the sponsorship of the United States and United Kingdom after negotiations extending over twelve months between the fourteen Allied nations primarily concerned in the Pacific War. The differences of opinion of those nations were acute. The South Pacific countries, which have great reason to fear a revival of Japanese militarism, felt that greater emphasis should have been placed on security, with precise limitations in the Treaty on Japan’s armaments and forces, and restrictions on her key war-supporting industries. The United States and a majority of the other negotiating nations, on the other hand, did not favor long-term treaty controls which might impair the development of co-operative relations with Japan. The United States asserted that in its view such restrictions in the past had proved ineffective and would prove no less ineffective in the future. American Delegation Dulles was deeply convinced of the unworkability of a punitive treaty which, while it might well be justified because of the crimes of the aggressor, nevertheless contained not an aspiration to cooperation and peaceful action in the future, but rather the seeds of future war. This viewpoint was shared by the United States and the United Kingdom. Thus United States was determined that the treaty should in fact restore freedom to Japan and that only a treaty of reconciliation and trust would be effective. This treaty was the most generous treaty ever given to the vanquished by the victor. It was a treaty that recognized the desirability of having Japan once more in the family of nations and of giving to her an opportunity of becoming economically self sustaining. It was a treaty for peace and not pointing to war. The Treaty of Peace is composed of 27 articles concerning the measures after the World War II. It stipulates security clause, political and economic clauses, claims and property clauses, and settlement of dispute concerning the interpretation or execution of the Treaty. One of the most controversial aspects of the treaty-making was the issues of reparations. The countries seriously injured by the Japanese occupation was adamant in their quest for compensation. Thus Article 14 of the Treaty recognizes that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers but that Japan’s resources make payment impossible or at least impractical at this time. Nevertheless, to insure some measure of reparation, the Treaty provides that Japan shall make available to any Allied nation so desiring the services of the Japanese people in p

1910년 한일조약에 대한 법사학적 재검토

김창록 동북아역사재단 2010 東北亞歷史論叢 Vol.- No.29

The 1910 Treaty, which has been insisted as a legal basis of Japanese colonial rule of Han-peninsula, is still controversial, even after 100 years since it was concluded. The kernel of the question is the effect of the Treaty, which comprises two particular questions : the question of the effect of the Treaty itself and the question of the agreement between Korea and Japan on the effect. Through the serious discussions among Korean and Japanese scholars since 1990's, it has been made clear that the Emperor of the Great Han Empire was oppressed and there were many defects of procedure in the conclusion process of the Treaty. It has been also made clear that the customary international law of those days, which can be identified by the scholars' books, declared that the treaty concluded by oppression was null and void, even though there was a conflict of opinions on the intensity of the oppression. It has been made clear that the interpretations of Korean and Japanese governments on the Article 2 of 1965 Basic Treaty set up in opposition from the beginning and that the opposition continued through the whole process of the conclusion of the Basic Treaty, as well. On the other hand, since 1990's, the Japanese government has expressed its deep remorse and heartfelt apology for the fact that Japan caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of Korea through its colonial rule. In 2005, the Korean government declared that the problems regarding inhumane wrongs such as the Japanese military sexual slavery should not be accounted as settled and thus the legal responsibility of the Japanese government for those wrongs remains. Regarding to the question of the effect of the 1910 Treaty, there is a suggestion that a fundamental reconsideration is needed on the logical frame of the argument based on the scholars' opinions in the era of imperialism. However, the starting point of the argument is law and the argument continues in the context of law. Therefore, it is not appropriate to 'overcome' law. The argument should be settled in the context of law. It would be one option that the Japanese government choose the international law of those days, which supports the invalidity of the Treaty, to overcome the suspicion about the authenticity of its remorse and apology. Another option would be that we build up a new legal frame to declare the illegality of the colonial rule in general, discarding the frame of the international law in the era of imperialism. In 2010, the significant year after 100 years since the conclusion of the 1910 Treaty, the conversation between Korea and Japan should be deepen to achieve more progress in righting the wrongs of the past. 제국주의국가 일본에 의한 한반도 지배의 법적 근거라고 주장되어 온 1910년 한일조약의 자리매김은, 조약 체결 백년째를 맞는 시점에서도 여전히 명확하지 않다. 문제의 핵심은 조약의 효력이며, 이는 다시 두 개의 세부적인 문제를 포함한다. 하나는 조약의 효력 자체에 관한 것이고, 다른 하나는 그 효력과 관련된 대한민국과 일본국 사이의 합의에 관한 것이다. 1990년대 이래 활발하게 전개되어 온 한일 양국 학자들의 논의를 통해, 조약 체결 당시에 대한제국의 황제 등에 대해 강박이 가해졌다는 사실과, 조약 체결의 형식 및 절차상에 문제가 있었다는 사실들이 밝혀졌다. 또한 서양 국제법학자들의 저작을 통해 확인되는 당시의 관습국제법은, 국가의 대표자에 대한 강박에 의해 체결된 조약은 무효라고 하고 있었지만, 조약을 무효로 만드는 강박의 강도에 대해서는 의견이 갈리고 있었다는 사실도 밝혀졌다. 그리고 1910년 조약이 “이미 무효”라고 규정한 1965년 한일기본조약 제2조와 관련해서는, 한일 양국 정부의 해석이 처음부터 대립되었으며, 그러한 대립은 한일회담 시작 단계에서부터 그 전 과정에 걸쳐 이어졌다는 사실도 밝혀졌다. 한편, 1990년대에 들어서부터, 일본 정부는 한국의 식민지 지배에 따른 고통과 손해에 대해 사과하고 반성한다는 입장을 밝혔다. 한국 정부는 일본군‘위안’부 등 반인도적 불법행위에 대해서는 일본 정부에게 법적 책임이 있다고 밝히는 한편으로, 국외 강제동원희생자 등에 대한 지원을 단행했다. 1910년 조약의 효력에 관해 당시의 서양 국제법학자들의 저작을 근거로 한 유효론과 무효론의 대립이 이어지는 데 대해서는, 논쟁의 논리적 틀에 대해 근본적인 검토와 반성이 필요하다는 지적이 있다. 하지만, 논쟁의 출발점이 법이고 지금도 법을 둘러싼 논쟁이 이어지고 있는 상황에서, 법을 넘어서는 것은 타당하지 못하다고 할 것이다. 논쟁의 해소책은 법과 관련지워 추구되어야 할 것이며, 그 방향으로는 우선 일본 정부가 ‘당시의 국제법’ 중 1910년 조약의 원천 무효를 지지하는 국제법을 선택함으로써, 사과와 반성의 선언 이후에도 여전히 그 진정성이 의심되고 있는 상황으로부터 벗어나는 것을 생각해볼 수 있다. 또 하나의 방향으로는 제국주의 국제법의 틀 대신에 식민지 지배 일반을 불법으로 선언하는 새로운 ‘법적 틀’을 구축하고 관철하는 것을 생각해볼 수 있다. ‘1910년 조약 100년’을 맞는 2010년에는, 한일 양국에서 공개된 관련 문서에 대한 심화된 분석을 토대로, 한일간 과거청산의 보다 큰 진전을 이루어내기 위해 한일간의 대화를 더욱 심화・발전시켜야 할 것이다.

을사조약 반대상소와 5대신의 반박상소에 나타난 을사조약의 문제점

이상찬 한국근현대사학회 2013 한국 근현대사 연구 Vol.64 No.-

It is important whether Emperor Gojong approved the signing of the Treaty of 1905(乙巳條約), but not that complicated to confirm a fact. Four documents are required for emperor’s approval. These are the proposal with the emperor’s signature(御押) and seal(御璽), the power of attorney for treaty conclusion,instruments of ratification, and the proposal of publication in the official gazette. However, there is none of 4 documents for the Treaty of 1905. Because it directly came up to the signing step without domestic law procedure. According to legislation of Daehan Empire(“Euijeongbu Bureaucracy”(議政府官制) and “Euijeongbu Conference Regulation”(議政府會議規程)), the proposal for treaty should go through seven stages, ①receiving at the Foreign Ministry ② Foreign Ministry’s discussion request to Euijeongbu ③ passing at the Euijeongbu conference ④ consultation of Joongchoowon(中樞院) ⑤ writing of the adress to the throne ⑥ emperor’s approval ⑦ delegation, signing, ratification. The treaty proposal was received at the Foreign Ministry, but it jumped over the following procedure. Right after the treaty was concluded, on the 19th November, elder statesmen and government officials continued to devote appeals which claim the invalidity of the treaty and their resignation, also they directly tell the emperor their opinions staying at the palace day and night. Even foreign press reported the defect of the treaty. Some killed themselves in despair over their country’s ruination. Japan oppressed people who are appealing against the treaty calling the army, but it could not make the movement stop. Therefore, Japan had to come up with the remedy for the situation. Ito Hirobumi arranged the whole procedure of the treaty(伊藤特派大使復命書). Furthermore, Japan made “five-ministers (5-thieves) of Daehan Empire” write a refutation appeal about the full account of the treaty conclusion to the emperor for it’s own sake. However, the refutation appeal from five-ministers of Daehan Empire actually gave unfavorable evidence toward Japan as a result. The evidence are as follows. Japan neglected the Daehan Empire’s regulation for the treaty conclusion. Emperor Gojong didn’t command the approval of the treaty but the amendment. Emperor ordered in secret for opposition to the treaty. Ito threatened emperor Gojong not to decline to approve the treaty.