신용카드 가맹점수수료에 대한 카드 고객의 지불의사액

남승오 한국지급결제학회 2018 지급결제학회지 Vol.10 No.2

Since the credit card activation policy in 1999, it has grown to become a major payment tool in commerce, and as much as the increased market size, so have the card-related issuers, merchants and customers. Especially in Korea, where the ratio of self-employed people to those employed and small business owners among self-employed businesses is high, the rate of credit card merchant account fees, including credit cards, has become a very important policy issue. A total of 11 the rate of merchant account fee adjustments since 2007 are indicative of this situation. The financial authorities was used to adjust the rate of credit card merchant account fees by calculating the eligible costs involved in card payments, and the key to the cost calculation scheduled for 2018 is reducing marketing expenses. They say that they can reduce merchant account fees by reducing the cost of one-time marketing. However, marketing costs are primarily aimed at increasing the size of the card market by increasing the benefits of card customers, thereby increasing the benefits of both merchant and credit card issuers and even card customers. Thus, reducing one-sided marketing costs is likely to reduce the overall benefits of the card market and thus not achieve the targeted policy effect. In this study, we estimate credit card customer's WTP for their benefit from credit card, other than the annual fee, to see if there is a possibility that the card customer are willing to pay for making up the card issuers’reduced income. The results of the study estimated at 1,000 respondents using contingent value methods show an additional WTP of about 3,600 won per household. Currently, the total number of credit cards issued is about 100 million as of 2017, which can be expected to be an additional 36 billion won for credit card companies. Moreover, about 90 percent of respondents said they would pay extra fees other than annual fees for the benefits of using credit cards, which is seen as not wanting to reduce the current benefits from card customers. Therefore, a reduction in the rate of merchant account fees through the ongoing reduction of marketing costs by financial authorities is questionable in its effectiveness. In this study, we further looked at the impact of respondents’ willingness to pay additional costs on credit card benefits based on the characteristics of the respondents and households. We were able to confirm the estimation that the higher the education, higher income, lower the number of credit cards we have and the higher we have, the more likely we are to pay for them. By utilizing this technology, credit card companies will be able to improve their profits through customized product development and marketing strategies. 1999년 신용카드 활성화 정책이 추진된 이래로 상거래에서 주요 지불수단으로 성장하였고 증가된 시장규모만큼이나 카드사, 카드가맹점, 카드 고객도 크게 늘었다. 특히 취업자 대비 자영업자의 비율이 높고 자영업자 중에서도 영세한 사업자가 많은 우리나라의 경우 신용카드를 비롯한 카드수수료율이 매우 중요한 정책적 이슈가 되었다. 2007년 이래로 총 11번의 수수료율 조정은 이러한 상황을 잘 보여준다고 할 수 있다. 금융당국은 카드 결제에 수반되는 적격비용을 산정해 수수료율을 조정하는데, 2018년 예정된 원가 산정의 핵심은 마케팅비 축소에 두고 있다. 일회성 마케팅 비용을 줄여 가맹점 카드수수료를 인하할 수 있다는 입장이다. 그러나 마케팅 비용은 주로 카드 고객의 혜택을 증대시켜 카드 시장의 규모를 키워 가맹점과 카드사 그리고 더 나아가 카드 고객 모두의 편익을 늘리는데 그 목적이 있다. 따라서 일방적인 마케팅 비용의 축소는 자칫 카드시장 전체의 편익을 줄여 목표한 정책적 효과를 얻을 수 없을 가능성이 있다. 본 연구에서는 수수료율 인하로 인한 카드사 수익의 감소부분을 카드 고객의 비용으로 일정부분 충당하여 카드시장 참여자의 편익을 유지할 수 있는 가능성이 있는지 알아보기 위해 카드 고객이 현재 제공받고 있는 신용카드 혜택에 대해 연회비 이외의 추가적 비용을 지불할 의사가 있는지 살펴보고 그 금액은 어느 정도 되는지 추정해 보았다. 1,000명의 응답자를 대상으로 조건부 가치측정법을 이용하여 추정한 연구결과는 가구당 약 3,600원의 추가적 지불의사액이 있는 것으로 나타났다. 현재 신용카드 총 발급 건수는 2017년 기준 약 1억 장으로 3천 600억 원의 추가적인 카드사 수익을 예상해 볼 수 있다. 또한 응답자의 약 90%가 신용카드 이용을 통해 얻는 혜택에 대해 연회비 이외의 추가적 비용을 지불할 의사가 있다고 한 것은 카드 고객의 입장에서도 현재의 혜택 축소를 바라지 않는 것으로 판단된다. 따라서 현재 진행되고 있는 금융당국의 마케팅 비용 축소를 통한 카드 가맹점수수료율 인하는 그 실효성에서 의문점이 든다고 할 수 있다. 본 연구에서는 추가적으로 응답자 및 가구의 특성에 따른 응답자의 신용카드 혜택에 대한 추가적인 비용의 지불의사에 대한 영향력을 살펴봤다. 고학력, 고소득, 나이가 적은 그리고 보유하고 있는 신용카드의 개수가 많은 사람일수록 더 추가 비용을 지불할 확률이 높다는 추정 결과를 확인 할 수 있었다. 이를 활용하여 카드사에서는 맞춤형 상품 개발과 타케팅 전략을 통한 기업의 수익 향상을 이룰 수 있을 것으로 판단된다.

AUTOMATED PAYMENT, FINANCIAL DECISION-MAKING AND A PUBLIC POLICY CONUNDRUM

Sandra Awanis,Ahmad Daryanto 글로벌지식마케팅경영학회 2016 Global Marketing Conference Vol.2016 No.7

Introduction Credit card issuers across countries now offer automated payment facilities online to ensure that consumers commit to regular repayments. However, insofar it is unclear whether repayment automation leads to better financial decisions. With an average of $880 billion of revolving debt in the U.S., it is no surprise that policy developers seek to remedy the global credit card debt problem. The current research makes three contributions. First, our study raises public awareness about the negative effects of automated payments on credit card repayments. Contrary to the established assumptions that autopay helps consumers to manage consumer finances (e.g., www.directdebit.co.uk), our experiment unanimously show that autopay facilities reduce the amount of credit card repayment. Second, our study offers a contemporary and relevant insight into the consumers’ online credit card management, which is distinct from its offline counterpart. Specifically, in an online environment, consumers can process information on their credit card and saving almost simultaneously. For example, some consumers may access credit and saving accounts in different browser tabs, while others who own credit and saving accounts from the same institutions may be able to access both accounts within the same webpage. Finally, our study enriches understanding of individual differences in repayment decisions behaviour. Our results indicate that certain attitudinal tendencies to credit cards heightens the effect of autopay on repayment, but this effect is intensified when the context involves those with low level of saving. Conceptual Development The Psychology of Automated Payment Credit cardholders often set up automatic monthly payments to avoid missed payments and incur penalties. The freedom and convenience associated with online banking means that credit card consumers can easily set up automated payment at an amount that they feel comfortable. Consumers can choose any amount ranging from the minimum amount, which is typically is set at 2% of the overall balance, to the full credit card balance. Prior research on goal pursuits suggests that people divide goals into subtasks to experience the motivational benefits of greater self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997). In this case, the use of automated repayment provides a sense of goal progress as it allows repayments to be made in smaller instalments, which in turn, bolsters one’s perception of self-efficacy with respect to the overall goal (i.e. total credit card balance). However, a boosted sense of achievement resulting from subgoal completion may lead consumers to undermine absolute progress towards the overall goal. As such, the subgoal – rather than the superordinate goal – becomes the most salient point of reference for individuals’ motivations towards goal pursuit (Besharat, Carrillat, & Ladik, 2014). Unfortunately, the focus on subgoals can lead to a sense of complacency and reduced persistence towards superordinate goal (Gal & McShane, 2012). Therefore, we expect that the presence of automated repayment cause consumers to focus on the more manageable subgoals (i.e., monthly repayments) rather than the unwieldy superordinate goals (i.e., total credit card balance). In addition, we theorise that the convenience of automated payment removes the salience of the “pain of paying” (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998) away from future credit card repayment. A key characteristic of credit card expenses is that the “pain” of payment, which provides a nudge for self-reflection and intervention from overspending, is held at bay until the end of the month. However, with automated payment, such deliberation point is subverted to a one-time deliberation. Because automated payment shifts attention away from subordinate goals and reduces the complexity of monthly deliberation, we expect that consumers making automated credit card repayments will commit to less amount of repayment than those making non-automated payments. H1: Automated payment leads to lower repayment amount compared to regular non-automated payment. The Psychology of Credit and Saving Accounts The default setup of many credit card accounts tends to demarcate credit and debit (saving) accounts. For example, consumers may have separate login accounts to access information about their credit and debit accounts. Such financial accounts separation means that consumers also categorise debt and saving into separate mental accounts (Hershfield, Sussman, O’Brien, & Bryan, 2015). Previous research suggests that such erroneous categorization of overall wealth can lead consumers to make financially detrimental decisions, such as taking on high-interest rate debt, while simultaneously holding money in low-interest rate saving account (Sussman & O’Brien, 2015). The absence of overall wealth information in credit card accounts and statements means that people are likely to focus their attention to arbitrary information that may misshape one’s perception of wealth. We therefore expect that the absence of accurate information of financial capability in the form of saving account balance will lead consumers to anchor their repayment decisions on perceived wealth informed by the available credit limit. In contrast, the presence of saving information in credit card account has a direct influence over credit card repayment decision because it represents an accurate picture of one’s overall wealth. Thus, higher (lower) balance of saving account will lead to higher (lower) credit card repayment. We expect that the positive effect of credit and saving account on repayment transcend over the effect of repayment mode (i.e. automated versus non-automated repayment) as it reconciles the consumers’ saving and debt mental accounts. Hence: H2: The amount in saving account influences the amount of credit card repayment. Individual Differences in Susceptibility to Credit Card Debts Prior studies regularly report that credit card as a payment mechanism yield psychological effect on the consumers’ evaluation at the point of purchase. In comparison to more transparent and vivid payment methods such as cash, credit card payments causes consumers to trivialise past payment (Soman, 2001), reduces self-control (Chatterjee & Rose, 2012) and overvalue past income (Soman & Cheema, 2002). However, other studies suggest that consumers exhibit different individual differences in susceptibility to credit card’s psychological effects (Awanis & Cui, 2014; Rick, Cryder, & Loewenstein, 2008). For example, those characterised as spendthrifts, instant gratifiers, low in self-regulation and financial sophistication are likely to emphasise on the bright side of credit cards (i.e., spending/lifestyle facilitator). Consequently, these consumers tend to overspend with their credit cards. We expect that such individual differences in credit card mentality will reflect on the consumers’ repayment habits. Thus, we expect a negative relationship between individual-level susceptibility to credit card debts and repayment amounts. In addition, we also expect that individual differences in credit card debts susceptibility will moderate the relationship between automated payment and repayment decision (H1). Indeed, those who advocate the bright side of credit card (high susceptibility) may appreciate, or even celebrate automated payment facilities, as it makes credit card experience more convenient and worry-free. To this end, we suggest that individual-level differences in susceptibility to credit card debts will moderate the relationship between automated payment and repayment amounts. Furthermore, we propose that such moderated relationship is stronger and consequently more problematic among those with constrained resources (low saving). Specifically, cash-strapped consumers are at risk of placing greater emphasis on the bright side of credit cards to make up for their lack of financial resources. The combined effects of individual susceptibility to credit card effects and the misguided promise of automated payment are likely to lead these individuals to a path of revolving debt. Meanwhile, those with sufficient resources are unlikely to suffer the same extent of indebtedness due to their wealth. Thus, we hypothesise that the moderating effect of individual susceptibility to credit card debts on the relationship between automated payment and repayment amount will differ across those with low and high saving: H3: In low saving conditions, susceptibility to credit card debts moderates the relationship between automated payment and the amount of credit card repayment; in high saving no such moderation effect is expected. Method We conducted a 5 (current account balance) x 2 (payment mode) between-subject experiment involving a hypothetical scenario and repayment decisions. Current account balance has five levels: no account balance information (served as a control condition), $500, $1000, $2000 and $3000 and payment has two levels: autopay and regular payment. Across all experimental conditions, the minimum required payment and credit card balance were kept constant. In total, eight hundreds and nine US credit card users (458 women, 11% were aged 18-44 years, 42% from 25-34 years, 24% from 35-44 years and 23% were aged more than 45 years) were drawn from Amazon Mechanical Turk and were paid $.35 each for participation. Participants were asked to imagine that they had just logged onto their online account where they could see their online credit card statement with a balance of $1.937.28 and a minimum payment of ?35.78. This minimum required payment was equal to two-percent of balance. The amount of credit card balance reflects the U.S. average of consumer credit card balance (Salisbury, 2014). Participants were told that they also saw their current accounts (i.e., the amount of money in their debit cards) and were also told that they do not have any other forms of financial obligations. Participants were instructed to indicate the amount of credit card repayment they would make in the light of the information provided in the online statement. We expect that the consumers’ understanding of compounding interest will affect their credit card repayment decisions. Therefore, we controlled for the participants’ financial knowledge, measured using three quiz-style questions following Navarro-Martinez, et al. (2011). Scores were calculated by tabulating the number of correct answers (one score for a right answer and zero for a wrong answer) and points are summed across the three questions to arrive at a single knowledge score. We measure participants’ susceptibility to credit cards effect (SCCE) by a 12-items scale adapted from Awanis and Cui (2014) (Cronbach’s α=0.89). The scale has been found to be invariant across cultures e.g., UK and Singapore. The scale items used a 7-point Likert format (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). Results and discussions A 5 (account balance) x 2 (payment mode) ANOVA revealed a main effect of current account balance, F(4,755)=61.50, p<0.001, η2=.246, such that higher current account will lead to higher repayment (Mcontrol=$960.64 (SD=53.91), M1=$181.85 (SD=58.08), M2=$390.55 (SD=53.78), M3=$1075.07 (SD=54.71), M4=$1138.45 (SD=51.84), see Figure 1). The ANOVA design also revealed a main effect of autopay vs regular payment mode, F(1,755)=28.44, p<0.001, η2=.04, such that the autopay (Mautopay=619.39, SD=35.17) brought about lower payments than the regular mode (MRegular=879.24, SD=33.72). Therefore, H1 and H2 are supported. Interaction effect of payment mode and susceptibility within low versus high account balance. We then examined the interaction effect of payment mode and susceptibility to credit card debt within three conditions: account balance is lower than the credit balance (high saving) and account balance is higher than the credit balance, and a control condition. We, therefore, recode the five levels of account balance experimental conditions into a dummy variable with three levels: 0 for control, 1 for low account balance and 2 for high account balance. The experimental conditions with account balance lower than the credit balance (i.e., $500 and $1000) is coded as 1 and those with account balance higher than the credit balance is coded as 2, no account balance information presented (i.e., control condition) is coded as 0. We centred the means of SCCE and use a PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013) to estimate the interaction effect. Within low balance: the moderated regression results revealed the main effect of autopay (b=-233.23, t=-7.46, p=<0.001), main effect of SCCE (b=-43.318, t=13.04, p=<0.001) and interaction effect between autopay and SCCE (b=-81.48, t=25.64, p=<0.001) on credit card repayment. Simple slope analysis reveals that at there were significant differences in the repayment amount between low vs. high SCCE for regular participants (b=-81.70, t==-5.55, p<0.001). In contrast, for autopay participants, the effect of SCCE on credit card repayment is not significant (b=-.21, t=-.01, n.s). Within high balance: the moderated regression results revealed the main effect of autopay (b=-317.39, t=-3.57, p=<0.001) and main effect of SCCE (b=-135.10, t=-3.88, p=<0.001) on credit card repayment. The interaction effect between autopay and SCCE on credit card repayment is not significant p>.5).Within control: the moderated regression results revealed the main effect of autopay (b=-301.69, t=-2.13, p=<0.001) and main effect of SCCE (b=-156.24, t=-2.58, p=<0.001). The interaction effect between autopay and SCCE is not significant p>.5). Figure 2 shows the interaction effect discussed above for the two account balance experimental conditions: low account balance (panel A), high account balance (panel B). Patterns in control condition is similar to panel B. Based on these results, H3 is supported. General Discussion Automated payment is not as virtuous as many have assumed. In fact, autopay facilities encourage may reduce consumers’ long-term goal of debt repayment by craftily shifting attention away from superordinate goals to the more manageable and rewarding subgoals. We recommend that policy developers and practitioners should exercise caution in promoting the use of automated payment to enhance financial management. Such recommendations should come with a set of actionable guides to reduce debt levels in shorter time. Our findings also suggest that separation of many credit and debit accounts means that people tend to categorize debt and saving into separate mental accounts. This affects people’s ability to make informed repayment decisions, which should reflect one’s real ability to pay. Interventions that help people to accurately measure their real financial capabilities are expected to raise their repayment decisions. Therefore, we suggest that policy makers and practitioners reconcile credit card and saving account in a single online platform to enhance the consumers’ repayment decision.

미국 소비자 신용의 최근 동향

김문환(Kim Moon Hwan) 국민대학교 법학연구소 2010 법학논총 Vol.22 No.2

With more than 641 million credit cards in circulation and accounting for an estimated $1.5 trillion of consumer spending, the U. S. economy has clearly gone a plastic money. Millions of American families use their personal, general-purpose credit cards such as Visa, Mastercard, American Express and Discover. Credit cards have long been a very good deal for people who pay their bills on time and in full. In the early 1980s, the credit-card business was a quiet, slightly boring industry in the States. Banks gave credit cards only to the best consumers and charge them a flat interest rate of about 20 percent and an annual fee. The profitability of credit cards really began from the middle of 1980s, when the banking industry successfully eliminated a critical restriction: the limit on the interest rate a lender can charge a borrower. Deregulation, coupled with a revolution in technology that enables the almost real-time tracking of personal financial information and the emergence of nationwide banking, has facilitated the widening availability of credit cards across the economic spectrum. But for some, the cost of credit is often far greater than it appears. With the relaxing of usury laws in some states, and the ready availability of credit scores in the late 1980s, banks began offering cards with a variety of different interest rates and fees, tying the pricing to the credit risk of the cardholder. Then the math whizzes arrived. They emphasized that the biggest profits did not come from people who always paid off their bills but rather from less-responsible clients through skyrocketing interest rates, late fees and other penalties. Since 1995, the percentage of the industry’s income from cardholder fees has more than doubled to 40 percent. In 2007, credit-card companies collected $ 40.7 billion in profits before taxes. Today Americans carry an average of 5.3 all-purpose cards in their wallets, and the average household has $10,679 in credit-card debt, according to the Nilson Report. A growing share of the industry's revenues come from what they call deceptive tactics, such as “default” terms spelled out in the fine print of cardholder agreements. Penalty fees and rates are sometimes triggered by just a single lapse. This flurry of unexpected fees and rate hikes come just when consumers can least afford them. With many consumers mired in debt and angry at what they consider gouging by credit card companies, however, the issue of credit card reform has gained broad populist appeal. Members of Congress and the Obama administration have seized on the discontent to push for reforms that the industry succeeded in tamping down when the economy was flying high. The Capitol Hill voted overwhelmingly on May 2009, to put new restrictions on the credit card industry, passing a bill whose backers say will make card-issuers spell out their terms in fewer words, using plain English, and treat customers more fairly. In response to the prospect of lost revenue, banks are expected to look at reviving annual fees, curtailing cash-back and other rewards programs and charging interest immediately on a purchase instead of allowing a grace period of weeks. The industry claims that the new legislation will force banks to issue fewer credit cards at greater cost to the current cardholders and make credit harder to get at a time when many Americans need it. The law would further squeeze banks' revenue when they are being hit with a high rate of credit card charge-offs. The government's stress tests showed that the nation's 19 biggest banks will take on $ 82 billion in credit card losses in the next two years. The recent economic downturn challenged that formula, and banks started dumping the riskiest customers and lowering their credit limits in earnest as the recession accelerated. Now, consumers who pay their bills off every month are issuing a rising chorus of complaints about shortened grace periods, new hidden fees and higher i 1. 개요 2008년 미국에서 금융위기가 발생하여 대형 은행들이 파산위기에 직면 하면서 이에 따른 고실업, 저소비로 경제적 고통을 받고 있는바, 이러한 미국의 높은 실업률은 금융기관의 신용카드 연체율과 관계가 깊다. 미국에서 소비자보호 업무를 담당하는 연방준비위원회 (Federal Reserve Board, FRB)에 따르면 2008년 현재 미국 소비자의 빚은 2조 5,600달러로 심각한과소비 상태였음이 드러났다. FRB는 경제위기로 힘들어진 소비자의 금융부분 규제를 위하여 지난 2년간 약탈적인 대부(predatory loans), 남용적인주택금융대부 관행(abusive mortgage practices), 불투명한 주택자산대부(opaque home equity loans)와 신용카드에 관한 정보의 오도(misleading information) 등에 관련한 규정들을 새로이 개정하거나 제정하여 왔다. 특히 오바마 행정부에서는 은행 등 금융기관이 기만적인 금융행위를 하는 경우를 찾아내어 이를 시정함으로서 소비자를 보호하는 여러 가지조처를 강력하게 추진하여 왔다. 이러한 노력이 결실을 보아 연방의회가 2009년 5월 소비자를 강력하게 보호하는 포괄적인 신용카드 입법(Credit Card Act of 2009)을 제정하였다. 동 입법의 공식 명칭은 “신용카드기록 보존책임과공개법” (Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009)인바, 동법은 1968년 聯邦議會가 거래조건의 공개규정을 중심으로 제정한 貸付眞實法(Truth in Lending Act, TILA)과 다른 여러 입법의 내용을 수정한 내용이다. 동법은 금융기관이 소비자에게 좀 더 친절하게 신용카드 사업을 하도록 규정한 점에서 소비자들의 승리를 가져온 입법이다. 개정 입법은 카드 회사가 급속하거나 소급적인 방법으로 신용카드 이자율을 인상하지 못하게 할 뿐만 아니라, 가혹한 위약금수수료 부과나 돈을 단기간에 갚게 하거나 기타 다른 남용적인 업무를 금지하고 있다. 그 핵심은 신용카드회사들이 함부로 수수료와 이자율(fees and rate)을 변경하지 못하도록 한 것이다. 앞으로 신용카드회사들이 수수료를 인상하려면 이를 소비자에게 통지하여야 하며, 나아가 대학생들에게 신용카드를 광고하는 것을 훨씬 어렵게 하였다. 새로운 신용카드 입법은 대체로 2010년 2월 22일 부터 효력을 가진다. 그러나 미국은행연합회(American Bankers Association)는 새로운 입법으로 은행들이 모든 카드회원들에게 다시 연회비(annual fees)를 부과하기 시작할 것이며, 이자율(interest rates)도 오히려 높아지게 될 것이라고 주장하였다. 그래서 결과적으로 카드대금을 정시에 납부하는 신용이 높은회원들이 불리하게 될 것이라고 전망한다. 그러나 오바마 대통령은 입법의 목적은 재정적으로 무책임한 사람들을 보호하려는 의도가 아니고 카드회사가 이득이 생기게 하는데 있다고 주장하였다. 또한 금융계에서는 동법이 새로이 개정됨으로서 신용도가 낮은 카드회원들은 카드의 갱신이 어렵게 되었을 뿐만 아니라, 돈을 빌리기가 훨씬 어렵게 되었다면서 강력하게 반대의견을 나타내었다. 2. 신용카드 종래 미국에서 신용카드 발행회사의 수입원은 카드가맹점으로부터 받 는 가맹점수수료와, 신용카드 회원에게서는 연회비(annual fee)와 이자(interest)를 받는 구조로 운영되었다. 은행들이 신용이 높은 소비자들에게만 신용카드를 발급하여 대략 20%의 균일한 이자율을 부과하였으며연회비도 그러하였다. 그러나 1980년대에 들어와 금융기관들이 신용카드의 이용도를 늘리기 시작하였는데 마침 여러 주가 유연한 대금업법(usury laws)을 채택하는 등의 규제완화(deregulation) 바람으로 카드회사의 수지가 본격적으로 늘어나기 시작하였다. 그러면서 누구나 쉽게 신용카드를 발급받게 되었고 은행들은 카드 회원의 신용위험을 측정하여 이자율과 연회비가 다양한 카드를 발급하기 시작하였다. 그런 후

신용카드 대금채무자의 항변

김대규 대한민사법학회 2002 민사법연구 Vol.10 No.2

A credit card called plastic money or third money enables its user to buy ticket, service, hotel room, commodities and whatever without paying cash. The concept of credit card means any card, plate, coupon book or other credit device existing for the purpose of obtaining money, property, labor, services on credit. In our country credit cards were first issued in 1969 by Shinsegae department store. There were more than one hundred million cardholder and exceed 680,000 billion Won in 2002. If we use credit cards soundly, they will be a inducement to institute credit society earlier and set up a rich credit world. These days, credit cards are now widely used. And there are needs to protect to card cardholder. But there are many problems to solved credit card transaction. If a bipartite card is used, there should be no legal hardship. But many difficulties appear when a tripartite or multi party card is used. In U.S.A., The Uniform Consumer Credit Code forbade the use of waiver of defense clause. In this country, I think because it is against a good faith principle. I can expect that there will be a large number of legal problems taking place from credit card transaction. This thesis is a study on the legal relation and quality of credit cards, purporting to survey credit card transactions, dealing with the validity of the waiver of defense clause of a credit card and intending to solve controversy occurring in connection with credit cards.

신용카드 부정사용의 유형과 손실부담

최상회(Choi, Sang-Hoe) 원광대학교 법학연구소 2010 圓光法學 Vol.26 No.1

The credit card has become an essential part of our everyday life, serving as an inseparable tool in the national economy as well as in the household one. However, this useful tool has been causing a lot of negative side effects and disputes as well with people's misuse or abuse of it. Now, the legislation of credit card transaction like credit professional finance law is made up of individual and dispersive legislation form which is focusing on restriction by legal form. So, in case of happening disputes related to credit card, because consumer tries solutions in search of the act unsystematically, there will have to be complementaries in legislation and in policy about this. Credit card fraud is a wide-ranging term for theft and fraud committed using a credit card or any similar payment mechanism as a fraudulent source of funds in a transaction. The purpose may be to obtain goods without paying, or to obtain unauthorized funds from an account. Credit card fraud is also an adjunct to identity theft. This paper is a study on the type of the consumption on the credit card fraud and try to find a solution to a problem in loss on credit card fraud. This is intended to make an overall survey on credit card transaction and find out suitable legal tool for solving disputes arising in connection with them. And this is the way increase a trust in credit card system, furthermore it will be contributed to build the society of credit.

신용카드 범죄에 대한 재조명

정진연 숭실대학교 법학연구소 2007 法學論叢 Vol.17 No.-

현재 우리사회의 경제활동인구 중 대부분이 신용카드 또는 현금카드를 사용하고 있고, 신용카드는 현금이나 수표를 대신하는 중요한 결제수단의 하나로 자리 잡아 가고 있다. 이러한 신용카드의 기능으로는 물품의 구입 또는 용역의 제공을 받고 일정 기간 후에 카드 발행 회사에 그 대금을 지불하는 외상거래의 기능과 카드 발급시 약정된 일정금액까지는 일정기간이 지난 후라도 카드발행회사에 그 대금을 지불하지 않아도 되는 신용거래의 기능이 있다. 아울러 그 사용이 보편화된다면 매 거래마다 서면에 의한 증빙자료를 남기기 때문에 탈세도 예방되며 공금의 경우 그 관리와 사용에 있어 부당한 지출이 억제되는 부수적인 효과도 있다. 그러나 신용카드는 위와 같은 편리한 기능이 있는 반면, 그 역기능 또한 무시 할 수 없다. 이와 같이 신용카드 또는 현금카드의 이용이 보편화되면서 이와 관련된 범죄 또한 급격하게 증가하고 있는데, 신용카드 또는 현금카드가 관련된 범죄에 대하여 그 성격이나 범죄의 유형, 죄수 등에 관하여 아직은 체계적이고 심도 있는 연구가 이루어졌다고 보기에는 미흡한 점이 없지 않다. 이 글에서는 실무상 문제가 되고 있는 신용카드 또는 현금카드와 관련된 범죄의 유형을 살펴보았고, 이에 대한 학설과 대법원 판례를 정리해 보았다. 결론적으로 신용카드를 사용한 범죄의 유형은 갈수록 다양화되어 가고 있고, 고도로 조직화되어 가고 있는데 반하여, 이를 기존의 금지규정과 처벌규정 등으로 규제하는 것은 극히 어려움에도 불구하고, 자신 명의 신용카드를 부정사용 및 타인 명의 신용카드를 부정사용과 관련된 범죄 유형에 대하여는 판례의 태도가 어느 정도 정리되어져 가고 있는 듯하다. 그러나 신용카드를 이용한 여러 가지 형태의 불법 대출과 탈세 등에 대하여는 현행 규정의 해석에 의하여 처벌하는 것은 상당히 어려운 점이 있고 거래의 실제를 따라가지 못하고 있다. 따라서 이러한 점에 대하여는 궁극적으로 입법에 의한 해결을 도모하여야 할 것이다. Currently, as most of the people in the economy use credit cards or debit cards, credit cards are becoming one of the most important methods of payment substituting cash and checks. The functions of credit cards are to make payments in credit of the services rendered or products released after a set period of time, and credit transactions as withhold the payment after a set period within the set amount as agreed on issuance of the credit card. Furthermore, if the usage becomes more popular, credit card will prevent tax evasion as its use will be recorded in document on every transaction, and suppressing the management and use of unreasonable expenditure of public money as accompanying effects. Nevertheless, credit cards' negative functions cannot be neglected, notwithstanding the expedient functions as noted above. As the patterns of credit card crimes are becoming more diverse and highly organized, despite the difficulty to prosecute with the existing prohibition statutes and punishment statutes, precedents on the patterns of crimes regarding illegal use of one's own credit card and illegal use of someone else's credit card are fairly setting in to order. But there are difficulties in prosecuting various patterns of use of credit card in illegal loans and tax evasions under the interpretation of the current regulations and following the actual state of the transactions. Thus, these issues should be solved eventually through legislation.

신용카드 시장의 높은 이자율의 원인에 관한 연구

고혁진(Hyuk Jin Ko),박영석(Young S. Park) 한국경영학회 2010 經營學硏究 Vol.39 No.5

Ausubel (1991) reported that interest rate stickiness was present in the US credit card market, which in turn led to a market failure, citing switching costs, adverse selection problems and consumer irrationality as prime culprits. Furthermore, Zwicki (2000) and Park (1997) pointed out moral hazard of credit card users which eventually raised interest rates of the market. As mentioned in the introduction, interest rates of the Korean credit card market are fairly high. Based on previous studies, this study examines whether interest rate stickiness exists in the Korean credit card market, and whether adverse selection and moral hazard issues are present due to the high interest rates. If there are problems of adverse selection and moral hazard in the domestic credit card market, it may explain the rationales behind high interest rates. If it is not the case, however, it may indicate that the market should lower the credit card interest rates. Major findings of this study are as following. First, interest hikes of credit cards due to increases in borrowing rates are greater than interest declines due to decreases in borrowing rates of the previous month. This clearly confirms that there exists interest rate stickiness in the domestic credit card market. When delinquency rates are considered, the model becomes more relevant and the stickiness of interest rates affected by changes in borrowing rates becomes greater. Meanwhile, when finance limits expand, finance balances of high credit rating groups hardly change while those of low credit rating groups do rise. This reveals that adverse selection issues are relevant to the credit limit. Considering that previous studies failed to reach an agreement over adverse selection pertaining to interest rates, the finding is more interesting. If there is an adverse selection problem, either of the following cases should be true; 1) when interest rates are on the rise, people with high credits should meaningfully decrease their credit card usage while those with low credits hardly cut back on the usage, or 2) when interest rates go down, people with low credits should meaningfully increase their credit card usage while those with gooediredits hardly change the usage. However, the empirical analysis did not idely fy adverse selection issues either of the cases, burueounmore incredit balances of the low credit group meaningfully decrease when interest rates declines. Therefore, it can be construed that Korean credit card market is free from adverse selection problems concerning interest rates. Lastly, if moral hazard of credit card users exist in the market as Park (1997) claimed, defaulters should spend on credit up to or nearly the limit in the month right before they are behind on the payment when their credit default risks maximized. However, in the previous month before default, bad credit groups show little tendency to spend up their credit. Even if some used bigger portions of their credit, it is not because of increases in spending but because of decreases in credit limits. As a result, groundless are the concerns about moral hazard that card users would exercise their option when their credit default risks are at the peak. In conclusion, interest rates of the Korean credit card market are unreasonably high in that there is no substantial risk of adverse selection or moral hazard. Although the Korean economy is recovering from the global financial crisis at a fast rate, the sense of recovery fails to spread every corner of the society. On the contrary, expected income level of the lowincome class is going down. In addition, as risk tolerance in the financial markets declined due to the global financial crisis, ever-rising interest rates of non-banking institutions distress low-income households. One consolation is that the government has recently implemented policies to lower interest rates of the non-banking sector so that low-income people could take out loans at lower costs. Opponen

신용카드 관련 재산범죄에 대한 판례이론의 비판적 검토

오영근 ( Young Keun Oh ) 한양대학교 법학연구소 2009 법학논총 Vol.26 No.3

This paper reviews critically on the attituted of the Korean Supreme Court to the credit card related property crimes and suggests the reasonable solutions of them. The contents of this paper is as follows; I. Introduction II. The Legal Nature of Acquisition and Use of the Credit Card 1. The Legal Nature of Acquisition of the Credit Card 2. The Relationship between the Illegal Acquisition and the Use of Credit Card. 3. Review of the Cases III. The Property Crimes Relating to Another Person`s Credit Card 1. The Illegal Issuance of Another Person`s Credit Card 2. The Illegal Issuance and Use of Another Person`s Credit Card 3. The Illegal Acquisition and Use of Another Person`s Credit Card 4. The Use of Another Person`s Credit Card beyond Trust IV. The Property Crimes relating to One`s Own Credit Card 1. The Illegal Issuance and Use of One`s Own Credit Card 2. The Illegal Use of Legally Issued One`s Own Credit Card V. Conclusion In this paper, the legal nature of the acquisition of the credit card is considered as the acquisition of the property profits. On this basis are analysed the nature of the illegal issuance and use of another person`s credit card and the nature of the illegal issuance and use of one`s own cerdit card. The research mothod of this paper is the literatural approach.

여신전문금융업법 제70조 제1항 제4호 소정의 ‘기망하거나 공갈하여 취득한 신용카드’에 관한 일고찰 ― 판례이론 분석을 중심으로 ―

최상욱 연세대학교 법학연구원 2024 法學硏究 Vol.34 No.1

여신전문금융업법 제70조 제1항 제4호는 강취・횡령하거나, 사람을 기망하거나 공갈하여 취득한 신용카드나 직불카드를 판매하거나 사용한 자를 처벌하고 있다. 강취・횡령의 의미를 생각할 때, 강취・횡령으로 취득한 신용카드라 함은 소유자 또는 점유자의 의사에 기하지 않고 그의 점유를 이탈하거나 그의 의사에 반하여 점유가 배제된 신용카드를 말한다. 그런데 제4호는 강취・횡령한 신용카드뿐만 아니라 기망하거나 공갈하여 취득한 신용카드를 함께 규정하고 있다. 종래 대법원은 ‘기망하거나 공갈하여 취득한 신용카드’의 의미를 강취・횡령하여 취득한 신용카드와 동일하게 파악하고 있었다(2006도654 판결). 이러한 해석은 기망이나 공갈이 가지는 통상의 의미를 왜곡하여 기망하거나 공갈하여 취득한 신용카드의 의미를 제한해석하는 결과를 낳았고, 제4호의 입법취지를 훼손한다는 비판을 받아 왔다. 그런 와중에 대법원은 2006도654 판결과는 다른 해석론을 제시하였다. 2022도10629 판결은 법률을 해석할 때 입법취지 등 체계적・논리적 해석방법을 사용할 수 있으나, 문언 자체가 비교적 명확한 개념으로 구성되어 있다면 원칙적으로 이러한 해석방법은 제한되어야 한다고 함으로써 문리해석의 중요성을 강조하였다. 기망이나 공갈이 가지는 통상의 의미에 입각하여 ‘기망하거나 공갈하여 취득한 신용카드’라 함은 신용카드 소유자 또는 점유자를 기망하거나 공갈하여 그들의 자유로운 의사에 의하지 않고 점유가 배제되어 그들로부터 사실상 처분권을 취득한 신용카드를 의미한다고 판시하였다. 이에 따르면 신용카드 소유자 또는 점유자의 사용승낙 여부에 관계 없이 이들을 기망하거나 공갈하여 카드에 대한 사실상의 처분권을 취득하면 신용카드부정사용죄가 성립하게 되고 제4호의 입법취지에도 부합하게 된다. 또한 카드사용의 부정성 표지도 피해자의 하자 있는 사용승낙과 점유배제에 있다고 보게 된다. 한편 기망하거나 공갈하여 취득한 카드의 의미를 소유자 또는 점유자의 자유로운 의사에 기하지 않고 취득한 것으로서 소유자 또는 점유자로부터 사용승낙을 받지 않은 신용카드로 해석해야 한다는 주장도 제기된다. 소유자 또는 점유자의 하자 있는 의사를 강조한다는 점에서 2022도10629 판결과 유사한 주장이지만 사용승낙을 받지 않은 신용카드로 제한한다는 점을 부가하고 있어서 그 결론에 있어서는 2006도654 판결과 다르지 않다. 한편 2006도654 판결은 공갈로 취득한 신용카드의 사용이, 2022도10629 판결은 기망으로 취득한 신용카드의 사용이 문제된 사안이었고, 2006도654 판결은 신용카드의 취득이 부정된 사안인데 반해서 2022도10629 판결은 신용카드를 취득한 것으로 판단된 사안이라는 점에서 차이가 있기는 하다. 그러나 2006도654 판결과 2022도10629 판결은 제4호에 관한 법리 판시로 볼 여지가 있으므로 전원합의체심리를 통하여 판례변경의 형식을 취하는 것이 합당했으리라 생각한다. §70. 1. 4 of the Credit and Specialized Financial Services Act punishes anyone who sells or uses a credit or debit card that was obtained by usurpation, embezzlement, or by deceiving or extorting a person. The meaning of a card obtained by usurpation or embezzlement is relatively clear. When thinking about the meaning of usurpation and embezzlement, it refers to a credit card that has been taken from the owner or occupant without his will, or has been removed from his occupancy against his will. However, §70. 1. 4 not only defines usurpation and misappropriation, but also includes cards obtained by deception or extortion. Previously, the Supreme Court had interpreted the meaning of ‘card obtained by deception or extortion’ to be the same as that of a card obtained by usurpation or embezzlement. This interpretation resulted in a restrictive interpretation of the meaning of ‘card obtained by deception or extortion’ by distorting the ordinary meaning of deception or extortion, which was criticized as undermining the legislative intent of §70. 1. 4. In the meantime, the Supreme Court came up with a different interpretation theory than the 2006 Ruling. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of literal interpretation by stating that systematic and logical interpretation methods such as legislative intent can be used when interpreting laws, but that such interpretation methods should be limited in principle if the text itself consists of relatively clear concepts. Based on the ordinary meaning of deception or extortion, the court held that the term “card obtained by deception or extortion” means a credit card that has been obtained by deceiving or extorting the owner or occupant of the credit card and effectively disposed of by them without their free will. According to this, the crime of fraudulent use of a credit card is committed if the de facto right of disposal of the card is obtained by deceiving or extorting the owner or occupant of the credit card, regardless of whether the owner or occupant consents to the use of the card. In addition, the illegality of the act of using the card is not centered on the victim's consent to use the card, but on the exclusion of occupation based on the defective consent. On the other hand, it is argued that the meaning of “card obtained by deception or extortion” should be interpreted as a credit card that is obtained without the free will of the owner or occupant and does not have the owner's or occupant's authorization to use it. This argument is similar to the one in 2022 Ruling in that it emphasizes the faulty intention of the owner or occupant, but it is not different from 2022 Ruling in its conclusion because it is limited to credit cards that have not been authorized to be used. On the other hand, there is a difference in the fact that the 2006 Ruling was a blackmail case and the 2022 Ruling was a deception case, and the 2006 Ruling was a case in which the acquisition of a credit card was denied and the 2022 Ruling was a case in which the acquisition of a credit card was recognized. Since the 2006 Ruling and 2022 Ruling can be seen as legal rulings on §70. 1. 4, I wonder what it would have been like to have taken the form of changing the precedent through the en banc review.

신용카드 불법할인행위의 형사책임과 대책

강동범 ( Dong Beom Kang ) 한국형사정책학회 2013 刑事政策 Vol.25 No.2

In this work I will explain the realities and types of illegal money accommodation by means of credit card(Ⅱ), examine the problems of current penal provisions and then propose the revision(Ⅲ) to take effective criminal countermeasures to illegal money accommodation by means of credit card. Illegal money accommodation by means of credit card is defined as loan by abusing a transaction by credit card. Illegal money accommodation by means of credit card(hereinafter referred as “i.m.a.”) is classified 6 types as follows: ①i.m.a. by disguising the sale of goods, provision of services in real space(type 1), ②i.m.a. by purchasing at a reduced price the goods or services procured by a credit card member after having the credit card member procure the goods or services by means of the credit card in real space(type 2), ③i.m.a. by purchasing by proxy the sale of goods, provision of services in real space(type 3), ④i.m.a. by disguising the sale of goods, provision of services in cyberspace(type 4), ⑤i.m.a. by purchasing at a reduced price the goods or services procured by a credit card member after having the credit card member procure the goods or services by means of the credit card in cyberspace(type 5), ⑥i.m.a. by purchasing by proxy the sale of goods, provision of services in cyberspace(type 6). Type 1 and type 4 are punished by Specialized Credit Finance Business Act(hereinafter referred as “SCFBA”) Article 70 (2) 2 (a). And Types of 2 & 5 are punishable by SCFBA Article 70 (2) 2 (b). But if the loaner takes the goods procured by a credit card member as security for loan or does commission sale, he can not be punished by SCFBA Article 70 (2) 2 (b), for the purchase isn`t able to include commission sale or taking as security for loan. Finally type 3 & 6 are not be punishable by SCFBA Article 70 (2) 2 (a), (b) or (c). To fill a gap in penal provisions the SCFBA Article 70 (2) 2 (b) is revised and (d) is stipulated as followings: (b) “act to purchase at a reduced price the goods or services procured by a credit card member after having the credit card member procure the goods or services by means of the credit card, to take the goods as security for loan or to sell it on commission”. (d) “act to make a transaction by credit cards by proxy by utilizing credit card or credit card information of a credit card member”.