법과 개발(Law and Development)과 동북아시아 발전국가론의 전개에 관한 고찰

조혜신(趙惠信 ) 숭실대학교 법학연구소 2017 法學論叢 Vol.39 No.-

한국법에 대한 연구는 주로 실정의 법률을 단위로 여기에 국한하여 이루어지는 것이 대부분이고, 그 목적 또한 실정법의 입법, 해석, 집행 등에 맞춰져 있다고 할 수 있다. 하지만 한국의 정치, 경제, 사회, 문화 등을 아우르면서, 과거와 현재의 법 현실과 법의 상호관계를 거시적으로 또한 학제적으로 규명해 나가는 것은 한국법의 중요한 한 축을 이루는 것이라 할 것이다. 비록 단편적인 측면이 없지 않으나 이러한 관점에서의 한국법에 대한 연구가 외국의 연구자들에 의해서 시도되어 왔다는 점은 흥미롭다. 한국의 경제적 및 정치적 발전의 성과 및 과정에 대한 관심에서 비롯된 한국법에 대한 외국의 법·정책 연구자 및 실무자들의 연구는 꽤 오래 전부터 시작된 것으로 보인다. ‘법과 발전’의 관계는 ‘현재’라는 새로운 맥락에서 끊임없이 규명되어 나가야 할 문제이며, 상당한 경제적 발전에도 불구하고 또 다시 발전의 진정한 의미를 묻지 않을 수 없는 한국의 상황에서는 더욱 그러하다. 특히 법과 개발에 있어서 최근의 흐름이라 할 수 있는 ‘신발전국가론(New Developmentalism)’ 은 한국법에 대한 연구에도 시사하는 바가 적지 않으리라 생각한다. 이에 본고에서는 법과 개발, 그리고 그 한 흐름으로 등장하고 있는 발전국가론의 전개를 고찰하면서 그 과정에서 도출된 방법론적 통찰을 살펴보고, 각각의 이론적 전개에 있어서 한국법은 어떠한 의미로 이해되어 왔는지를 살펴보고자 한다. 마지막으로 결론으로서 그간의 이론적 및 실무적 시행착오를 통하여 도달한 새로운 의미와 방법론의 수용을 전제로, 한국법 연구의 방향성을 간략하게 제시하고자 한다. 사실 그간의 법과 개발에는 법과 발전의 관계에 관한 ‘하나의 일반적인 규준(reference)’이 있다는 방법론적 전제, 즉 ‘연역적 접근방법’을 취한 것에서 비롯된 한계를 보여 왔다. 이러한 점에서 최근의 신발전국가들에 대한 연구에서 목도되는 경향인 각론적 접근은 상당히 의미 있는 것이라 할 수 있을 것이다. 또한 법과 개발에 관한 전통적 이론들은 적어도 동북아시아의 발전국가들에 대해서만큼은 분명한 한계를 드러냈다고 평가할 수 있다. 따라서 한국법에 대한 연구도 일반적으로 일정한 결과를 산출하는 처방으로서의 과학적 이론이 아니라, 구체적으로 설명가능한 분석체계로서의 연성적(soft) 이론을 구축하는 것을 목표로 이루어질 필요가 있을 것이다. 이는 비단 한국과 한국법의 성과를 널리 인정받기 위해서만은 아니고, 통합적·거시적 관점에서의 한국법 연구를 통하여 그간의 분절적·미시적 법학 연구의 한계를 다소간 극복할 수 있을 것이라는 점에서 그 가치가 있다 하겠다. 그리고 이러한 연구는 오늘날 한국 사회가 당면하고 있는 어려운 문제들을 정확히 인식하고 대안을 찾는 데 혜안을 제공해 줄 수 있을 것이다. 그러므로 한국이라는 고유한 맥락을 충분히 고려한 발전국가론의 전개를 위해서는 실정법을 너머서서 법현상에 대한 사회과학적 분석을 바탕으로 정치적·경제적·사회적 측면을 고루 파악하는 통합적·입체적 연구가 이루어질 필요가 있다. Study on ‘Korean Law’ is a sociological research to understand the interaction between reality of politics, economy, society and culture, and law. The Korean Law has been studied since quite long ago by researchers of law and policy as well as practitioners. This paper aims to assert the need for Korean Law studies through presenting the significance from the perspective of ‘Law and Development’, and its appropriate methodology. The law and development studies has shown its methodological limitation of ‘deductive approach’ that assumes there is one general reference for the relation between law and development. Recent researches on New Developmental States, however, indicates meaningful improvement by adopting inductive and caseby-case methodology. The traditional theories of law and development seems to have failed in explaining the cases of Northeast Asian Developmental States. In this sense, Korean Law studies need to purse a soft and descriptive theory rather than a scientific and prescriptive one. Not for being praised by other countries in the world but for overcoming the limitation of segmented and microscopic legal researches, it is worthy of studying. Furthermore it could contribute in finding out the exact sources of a variety of social problems and their solutions. In order to establish Developmental States Theory that properly considers the unique context of Korea, it is needed to conduct integrated and multi-dimensional studies comprehensively covering political, economic, and social aspects based on social-scientific analysis.

독일 연방카르텔청의 온라인 플랫폼 기업결합 시장획정 사례 분석

조혜신 연세대학교 법학연구원 2023 法學硏究 Vol.33 No.1

독일 연방카르텔청은 다수의 온라인 플랫폼 기업결합 사건과 보고서에서 플랫폼 관련 시장획정에 있어서 플랫폼이 중개하는 대상, 즉 접촉 혹은 거래라는 상품이 아니라 중개서비스 그 자체에 초점을 둔다는 점을 분명히 하였다. 다만 플랫폼이 제공하는 그 중개서비스로 인해 가능하게 되는 이용자간 상호작용의 구체적 내용, 즉 중개의 결과로서 이용자간 거래가 성립되는지 여부, 그리고 그렇게 성립된 거래에 플랫폼이 당사자로서 참여하는지 여부에 따라서 여러 유형으로 분류가 가능한 것이다. 이렇게 본다면 플랫폼의 핵심적 기능인 ‘중개’를 중심으로 다양한 플랫폼을 유형적으로 분류하는 것은 충분히 유의미하다고 할 수 있다. 이에 따라 연방카르텔청은 매칭플랫폼과 관심・광고플랫폼의 유형이 분석의 출발점으로 적절하다고 판단한 것이고, 여기에 일반적인 시장획정의 기준이라 할 수 있는 ‘수요시장개념’을 적용하여 플랫폼의 중개서비스 수요에 있어서 구분되는 둘 혹은 그 이상의 이용자 그룹의 관점에서 시장획정을 전개하면 될 것이다. 플랫폼 시장획정에 있어서 고려되어야 할 가장 두드러진 특징은 바로 양방향의 간접적 네트워크 효과로 인해 두 이용자 그룹간 수요가 연결되어 있다는 것이다. 이 점을 잘 드러내는 것이 매칭플랫폼 유형이고, 이 때문에 두 이용자 그룹을 하나의 시장으로 획정할 수 있는 것이다. 하지만 관심・광고플랫폼의 경우에는 두 이용자 그룹이 상호작용하는 양상과 네트워크 효과가 작동하는 방식이 이와는 상당히 다르기 때문에, 시장획정에 있어서도 두 그룹을 각각 별도의 관련시장으로 획정하는 것이 합리적일 수 있다. 경쟁법적 관점에서 플랫폼의 특질을 포착하고, 이를 바탕으로 플랫폼을 유형화한 다음에, 각각의 유형에 대한 원칙을 수립해 나가고자 하는 연방카르텔청의 시도는 규범적 판단의 체계를 수립하는 차원에서 중요한 의의를 갖는다. 하지만 미국 연방대법원의 American Express 판결에서 보듯 양면시장의 개념과 이론 그 자체에 대한 이견이 여전히 존재하고, 경쟁법의 원칙을 변경할 정도로 그 이론적・정책적 확신을 획득하지는 못하였다는 점은 염두에 두어야 할 것이다. 그럼에도 불구하고 플랫폼 일반이 아닌, 적어도 ‘온라인’ 혹은 ‘디지털’ 플랫폼에 관한 한 기존의 경쟁법적 분석체계와 기준을 그대로 적용하기는 어려운 것이 아닌가 생각된다. 비록 ‘이론’을 ‘규범’으로 수용하는 것에는 신중을 기해야 할 것이나, 그간의 여러 경쟁당국의 법적용을 통해 축적된 사례들과 이를 바탕으로 정리되고 있는 경쟁당국의 심사기준들은 그 과정을 점진적으로 밟아나가고 있는 것으로 보인다. 이러한 점에서 본고에서 살펴본 연방카르텔청의 기업결합 심사 사례들과 이를 바탕으로 제시된 접근방법은 향후 이론적으로 혹은 정책적으로 검증해 나갈 수 있는 토대를 마련하였다는 점에서 충분한 의의를 갖는다.

독점규제법상 방해남용의 부당성 판단기준 -경쟁저해성 판단기준을 중심으로-

조혜신 ( Hye Shin Cho ) 한국경쟁법학회 2011 競爭法硏究 Vol.24 No.-

The abuse control against the market-dominant undertaking`s abusive conduct under Article 3-2 in the Korean Competition Law aims not only at maintaining the remaining competition in the market where there is only the limited competition because of the existence of market-dominant undertaking but also letting other participants compete on the merits` of them, so that the competition in the market may be encouraged more. In order that, the prevention against dangerousness(Gefahrdung) lies at the root of abuse control, in that abuse control would respond to the conduct which has the objective possibility to harm the competition through exerting marketdominant position. Then the illegality of hindering abuse under Article 3-2 could be structured as two judgement elements: one is assessing the objective dangerousness to impede maintainance and encouragement of remaining competition and competition on the merit in the market according to its type, the other is balancing the interests of the allegedly harmed concerned specifically. This paper focuses on the first elements in which the results or effects of the conduct will be judged. Considering the purpose and nature of abuse control in the competition law, illegality of hindering abuse in the aspect of effect could be described as ``the effects or results of hindering competition in the relevant market with recourse to the methods which is not correspond to market-dominant undertaking`s performance``, for which the concept of ``Hindered Competition(Wettbewerbsverzerrung)`` in GWB can stand. Referring to the criteria for judging the abusiveness in EU Competition Law, the hindered competition could be understood as ``the effect to impede the maintainance and encouragement of the level of remaining competition in the market’, the degree of which would be the extent to affect the structure of the market in which competition has been weakened already because of the existence of market-dominant undertaking itself. It can be sufficed when either the existing level of competition is weakened or decreased, or the encouragement of existing level of competition is hampered. The hindered competition could be assessed in concrete, through examining whether the dangerousness of the conduct is not only ``nontrivial`` concerning the degree of it, but also ``non-temporary`` concerning the consistency of it, as we see in the case Rama-Werbeaktion(1978) by Kammergericht in Germany. The dangerousness need not be proved as an actual results with concrete evidences, rather the corelation between conduct and result is enough to assumed with the inductive rule of experiences. Surely any hindering abuse cannot be banned directly without considering various business justifications.

시장지배적 사업자의 리베이트 제공행위에 관한 미국의 판례에 대한 분석

조혜신 ( Hye Shin Cho ) 한국경쟁법학회 2012 競爭法硏究 Vol.25 No.-

Leading cases of US courts regarding rebates show us three different perspectives on rebate by market-dominant undertakings. The first one is the perspectives of ``unfair method of competition`` in Brown Shoe case of the Supreme Court. The second one is the perspective of ``level of price`` in Barry Wright, Concord Boat, Virgin Atlantic Airways and Casacade of some Circuit Courts of Appeals, which is following the so-called ``Predatory Pricing Standard`` originated from Brook Group case of Supreme Court. The last one is the perspective of ``method of foreclosing competitors`` in SmithKline, LePage`s and Ortho of some other Circuit Courts of Appeals, which can be called as the ``Foreclosure Standard``. Although there is a certain limitation in applying the standards used in cases of US courts to cases in the context of Korean Competition Law directly, we would be able to draw very insightful implications for reviewing ``unreasonableness``, especially when judging whether competition in the relevant market has been hindered under the Article 3-2 in the Korean Competition Law. First of all, we should be cautious not to apply Predatory Pricing Standard as a maximum level of criterion (not as a minimum level) for regulating rebates, in that it is probable to leave a vacuum in regulating market-dominant undertakings` abusive conduct. On the other hand, Foreclosure Standard, especially a standard in LePage`s case seems to be quite insightful when we conduct a legal review under the abuse control in Article 3-2 of Korean Competition Law, that is firstly assuming foreclosure of competitor on the basis of typical dangerousness of the conduct in question, and secondly letting this assumption be rebutted through concrete proofs. Of course, it is undeniable that the quite formal standard in LePage`s case which assumes foreclosure of competitor from the mere fact that a market-dominant undertaking supplies products it`s competitor doesn`t, has a possibility to impede price competition through rebates. Therefore it seems to be appropriate to adopt SmithKline case which requires to prove at least indirectly that it`s competitor has very little choice to meet market-dominant undertaking`s rebate.

독점규제법 30년 회고: 시장지배적지위 남용행위 규제에 관한 공정거래위원회 심결례의 분석

조혜신 ( Hye Shin Cho ) 한국경쟁법학회 2011 競爭法硏究 Vol.23 No.-

This analysis is aimed at reviewing briefly how KFTC has been operating the abuse control under Article 3-2 of the Competition Law since its adoption in 1981. Considering our current situation where concentrated market structures in major industries have not been sufficiently improved yet, the abuse control in the competition law will still have significant importance. Before we try to find an answer to the question which role the abuse control should play in order to obtain the goal ``the free and fair competition``, a reflective study needs to be done firstly to see the real history of abuse control for last 30 years. In terms of methodology, it would be better to analyze cases regarding the abuse control according to the effect of abuse as well as the type of conduct concerned rather than each section of Article 3-2. We can find out that KFTC had focused on the regulation of exploitative and hindering abuse done in relation to trading partners for most of years since its enactment. This could be understood as a necessary and reasonable policy in that concentrated market structures in Korea are supported by the enormous economic powers and strengthened by the systematized distribution networks. However KFTC seems to be moving toward the regulation of exclusionary abuse, since the Supreme Court has applied a more stricter standard for the reasonableness of abusive conducts. It raises doubts whether it is proper to switch to another direction in enforcing the abuse control at this moment. A new direction in competition policy should be backed up with the facts such as de-concentrated market structures or positive change in behavior of market-dominant undertakings generally, because it is likely to depress the enforcement of abuse control considerably. As of now, we cannot say we are confronting so much improved economic realities. Rather, it is time to reflect the nature of abuse control fundamentally, that is, achieving the competitive market structures gradually through the effective regulation of behaviors in specific cases.

시장지배적 사업자의 리베이트 제공행위에 관한 EU의 판례에 대한 분석

조혜신 ( Hye Shin Cho ) 한국경쟁법학회 2013 競爭法硏究 Vol.27 No.-

We can see the typical examples of traditional, structuralist and form-based approach to abuse control through analyzing cases regarding rebates by dominant undertakings in EU Competition Law. A recent discussion for modernization of EU Competition Law demands the fundamental improvement in enforcing abuse control. Therefore all the criticisms of abuse control apply to precedents related to rebates by dominant undertakings in the same way. However we would be able to draw some implications from analysis on rebate cases of EU courts in that it is an regulatory example of abuse control which Korean Competition Law also adopts. Firstly, standard of judgement focusing on trading partners rather than competitors and consumers of EU case law corresponds to the requirements of the Number 3 in Article 3-2 Section 1 which prohibits the unreasonable hindrance to other undertakings. If rebates by dominant undertakings is prohibited as discriminatory or compulsory conduct, when the restraints of freedom to choose source of supply is prominent, the prohibition on hinderance to other undertakings of Number 3 would apply to. Secondly, it is necessary to notice the EU courts` judgment on how and to what extent the competition authority should prove the effect of rebates in question. Lastly, the unfairness in EU rebates cases implies that the demand that fairness should be accomplished in trade in which dominant undertakings participate is not irrelevant in abuse control. Simply speaking, rebates by dominant undertakings is regulated in EU Competition Law as hindrance which impairs customers` capability or possibility of competition through the restraints of freedom of choice, or unfairness in trading conditions. Now we should think over which perspective and standard of judgement we will take in order to regulate rebates by market-dominant undertaking in the Korean Competition Law, reflecting the regulatory examples of US and EU courts.

EU 경쟁법에 대한 현대화(Modernization)의 절차적 및 실체적 측면에 대한 고찰

조혜신 ( Hye Shin Cho ) 한국경쟁법학회 2012 競爭法硏究 Vol.26 No.-

The modernization in EU Competition Law was procedurally and institutionally motivated by restructuring of enforcement system with the expansion of EU. Responding to this challenge, Commission intended to decentralize the enforcement system and adjust the substantive laws to decentralized enforcement system. Namely, in order to apply EU Competition Law uniformly, the objective of Law should be unitary so that it is not dispersed to other objectives other than competition itself. Furthermore, the criteria for each regulation in Law should be abstract and general to keep consistency even when they are applied by many competition national authorities. It is the economic analysis that is expected to be the proper measure to maintain the uniformity and consistency in EU Competition Law. In this way the modernization originating from the problems in procedure and institutional aspects naturally continued to substantive aspects, with influences of Neo-classical economics and experts and scholars in US being added on. Reflecting on the process of substantive modernization, the demand for consistency in each regulation in Law has been the powerful motivation. However, the consistency rationale of Commission which is the premise for substantive modernization is questionable when we consider there have been quite different responses to modernization for each regulation in EU. In this sense, we need to understand more accurately and deeply each regulation`s intrinsic purpose and function within the whole system of Competition Law. So to speak, it might be necessary to admit that more economic approach could be used more comprehensively in some areas, but not in other areas. The modernization in EU Competition Law is currently underway. We, as a third party, should observe this process carefully focusing on the response of EU Courts from now on, having in mind that we had better relativize their discussion and results rather than accept uncritically.

경쟁정책과 중소기업정책의 조화를 위한 독점규제법의 과제

조혜신 ( Hye Shin Cho ) 한국경쟁법학회 2014 競爭法硏究 Vol.29 No.-

Although competition policy and SMEs policy have overlapping goals and methods, and are capable of being in conflict or harmony, thorough examination of the relation between two policies does not seem to be enough. Considering the realities that the competitiveness of SMEs has not been improved substantially in spite of the quantitative and qualitative development of laws and policies for SMEs, as well as that the difficulties for SMEs in competing with large companies has not been getting better in spite of the enforcement of competition laws and policies, we might assume that those two laws and policies have not been enforced harmoniously with encroaching each other`s effects. If referring to Germany, policy means for protecting and nurturing SMEs ultimately aim to create the best environment for ‘competition’, and try to strengthen the competitive powers of competitors through increasing the level of competition in markets. Also, it is necessary to satisfy the requirement of ‘market conformity’ meaning that all the policy means should not distort competition. Reflecting on the relation between SMEs policy and competition policy, we come to realize that the Korean competition law has several clauses for protecting SMEs, though it does not explicitly aim at it in Article 1. Among them, the important ones are, first, the exemption for cooperatives comprising of small companies in Article 60 and, second, cartel approval for competitiveness of SMEs in 2nd clause of Article 19, both of which are meant to support the competitiveness and countervailing power. However, those two have not been actively utilized so far, and questioned in terms of not only usefulness but also interpretation. Fundamentally, it is doubtful whether the former is proper mean which minimizes the distortion of competition, and it needs to be considered that the latter should be constrained not to restrain competition. Next, the regulations against abuse of market dominant position in Article 3-2 and unfair practice in Article 23, which can be said that they are expected to contribute to protect SMEs through regulating large companies, should be highlighted in that they are the best ways to correct SMEs` disadvantages for now. Furthermore, the assumption of substantial restraint of competition in 4th clause of Article 7 with similar purpose would be useful in protecting SMEs` business area against large companies` aggressive expansion.

온라인 플랫폼 사업자의 이용약관에 대한 경쟁법적 규제 - 독일 Facebook 사건의 시사점을 중심으로 -

조혜신 ( Hye-shin Cho ),강보선 ( Bo-seon Kang ) 한국경쟁법학회 2021 競爭法硏究 Vol.43 No.-

In regulating abuse of dominance cases concerning online platforms under competition law, exploitative abuse should be the main focus in light of the practices that violate the interests of platform users by platform undertakings. The exploitative practices of online platforms include excessive pricing or imposition of any terms and conditions on users. In particular, considering that major online platforms are generally dominant undertakings in the relevant market, prohibition of abuse undermining consumer interests stipulated in Article 3-2 (1) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act may have significant implications. In this sense, the German Facebook case could provide important implications. Due to the complexity and opacity which arise from the contract made by online platforms, consumers in online platforms are not only structurally inferior to information or to bargaining power, but they are also in a situation where there is not effective competition due to the presence of dominant undertakings in the relevant market. It would be difficult for consumers to refuse to enter into contracts with dominant undertakings and have opportunities to enter into contracts with other undertakings. Under these dual constraints, the purpose of the latter part of paragraph 5 in Article 3-2 of the Korean Competition Law is to protect consumers whose interests are likely to be infringed directly. Furthermore, this would require a broader interpretation of the concept of consumer interests. The reference for this concept of consumer interests could be the ‘self-determination’ that is the premise of freedom of contract, and the basic rights of consumers under the Framework Act on Consumers. In particular, factors that violate consumer self-determination include constraints on the possibility of alternative choices, restrictions on accessing the information on which choices are based, or imposition of disadvantages terms and conditions of contract, which are the main reasons for undermining consumer interests.

[노무법인 상담실 엿보기] 연차휴가 사용 촉진 및 통보를 전자로 한 뒤 휴가 계획을 전자 회신으로 받아도 될까요?

조혜지 (주)중앙경제 2024 노동법률 = (The) labor law Vol.- No.402