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李承憲 건국대학교 1978 學術誌 Vol.22 No.1
The power structure in the four big powers surrounding the Korean Peninusula underwent changes, from late 1976 to early 1977, when the Carter administration came to power in the United States, the Hua Kuo-Feng system emerged in Communist China, the Fukuda cabinet was formed in Japan, and a new constitution was enacted and the Brezhnev system was strengthened in the Soviet Union. Consequently, these nations were likely to revise their foreign policies and military strategies, and the power relations among them and surrounding the Korean Peninula were also likely to undergo changes. At this stage, it became inevitable for Korea and the United States to readjust their relationship and policy lines amid severe internal discord. Since the advent of the Carter administration, the problem of the withdrawal of the United States' forces from Korea and the problem of applying human rights diplomacy and moral diplomacy to Korea have emerged as new issues. The reason why some tension was created in the Korea-United States relations was that sole differences arose in perception, policy direction and strategic conception under the transitional international situation, causing some discord to mutual adaptation. However, the two nations tried to distinguish what was right and what was wrong and endeavored to compromise in consideration of the obligation as an ally. As a result, the situation developed into a constructive direction which could be beneficial to the two nations. The movement of the Korean government and people opposing the hasty troop withdrawal without compensatory measures, the unilateral troop withdrawal without obtaining concessions from the Communists, and the prudent attitude prevailing within the United States military and the Congress exerted influence upon the Carter administration. At the end of a series of consultation, a Korea-United States joint statement concerning the planned withdrawal of the United States' troops from Korea was announced in July 26, 1977. As source nationals, several pagers and reports were summarily quoted in Part II. The essential parts are as follows. Dr. Kim Kyung-Won, a special assistant to the President of the Republic of Korea, emphasizes in his paper presented at the "Symposium on Northeast Asian Security" which was held at the Stanford Research Institute, Washington D.C., June 20-22,1977 : "Bound together as allies by common interests and shares ideals, we have nevertheless experienced our share of strains and stresses‥‥ The challenge we face today is how to cope with such tensions as are bound to arise from time to time. And what I should like to suggest is that we can most effectively deal with touch tensions if we can establish our relationships based on common interests, ideals and clear understandings regarding our differences as well‥‥ The emerging partnership between Korea and America should demonstrate to the world that genuine, creative friendship can he forged out of relationships that were originally based on one-sided need for help. It should also play a vital role in our joint efforts to build a more peaceful and prosperousworld." American Ambassador to Korea, Riehard L. Sneider, in his speech at the Korean-American Association dinner, December 12,1977, under the subject "Korea and the United States : A Changing Relationship," frankly pointed out : "We see before us the end of the American 'Big Brother' relationship with Korea. Our two countries have worked hard together to make possible a more balanced, equitable repationship‥‥ Cooperation barred on mutual interests must continue to be the focus of our relations, with each country responsive to the interests of the other, with each sensitive to the internal dynamisms and problems of the other. If we work together with mutual understanding and in a spirit of mutual accomodation, we can strengthen the friendship and cooperation that reflects our history, our ideals, and our hopes for the future." U.S. Army General Richard G. Stilwell, former commander-in-chief, United Nations Command in Korea,1973-76, stressed in his article 'The need for U.S. Ground Forces in Korea': "I hold that the withdrawal of ground forces from Korea, without major counterveiling concessions on the Communist side, will undermine the vitality of free Northeast Asia, exacerbate regional tensions, and greatly increase the risk of armed convict. Thus I contend that the continued forward deployment of those forces is essential to security on the Korean Peninsula, to the stability and forward programs of Northeast Asia, and to the maintenance of the United Spates position and credibility as the preseminent world power." "The 1977 Report on Korea" which the Carter administration submitted to Congress describes President Carter's decision to withdraw U.S. ground combat forces from the republic of Korea over a four-to-five year period and the factors on which the decision was based. It stresses the implications of the withdrawal decision for the deterrence of North Korean aggression, and for the preservation of stability in the Northeast Asia region, where U.S. security interests-and those of Japan, the Peoples' Republic of China and the Soviet Union-converge. The report further discusses the military balance on the Korean Peninsula, the modernization of Republic of Korea's armed forces and continuing U.S. security assistance to the country.
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李承憲,許在一 건국대학교 1975 學術誌 Vol.19 No.1
In this research paper, we tried to put into an orderly perspective the course of relationship between South and North Korea and their respective approach toward unification with emphasis on recent development in the 1970'B particularly related to the idea of Korean peninsular peace system. In doing so, we paid attention to the interaction among various actor levels in concentric juxtaposition-South and North Korea, the four big surrounding powers, and the UN. For Korea, as a divided nation against its will, national unification has been the paramount imperative. Substantially speaking, however, there is a basic difference in the policies and strategies of North Korea and the Republic of Korea for the unification of whole Korea ; one is unification under communism by military force "as pursued by North Korea, and the other is "unification under democracy by peaceful means" as pursued by the Republic of Korea. In the last thirty years since the end of the World War II, the power relation in Northeast Asia surrounding Korean peninsula has undergone vicissitudes according to the change of world-wide power constellation. The erstwhile bipolar confrontation system during the cold war period has been expected to be transformed into a coexistence system under the emerging cross-cutting bi-multipolarity. With the july 4 North-South Joint Communique and the commencement of South-North dialogue in 1972 as turning points, South and North Korea have been conjoined with four big surrounding powers-U.S.A., Japan, U.S.S.R. and Communist China. Subsequently, it has been keenly desired that the convict of interests among these six actors be harmonized and a new peace system or international order be established in Northeast Asia around Korean peninsula. However, North Korea's stubborn adherence to the revolutionary unification strategy poses a damaging challenge. It opposes the idea of institutionalizing peace and security in Korean peninsula through the good office of the Security Council of the U.N. and thus another harsh diplomatic confrontation is anticipated in the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly. The crucial point is to get priority or sequence and to harmonize the status quo requirement of security and the non-status quo requirement of unification.
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