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이강조 慶北大學校 人文大學 1987 인문학총 Vol.12 No.-
The aim of this paper is to explain the relation between knowledge and the dialectic of reconciliation which is Hegel's philosophical method in the "Phenomenology of Spirit", and how it takes the historical character and functions as the ground of history. Hegel had an eminent historical sense. The development of thought in the Phenomenology runs paralell with the word-historical development. But the world-history is nothing other than the examples of the development of thought. Spirit, reason and consciousness are the fundamentals for Hegel. Spirit as the substance of all appearances constitutes the idealistic essence of the world. the development or spirit is also the development of science, thus all knowledge and truth are historical processes. "The Phenomenology of Spirit" is "the science of experience of consciousness". For Hegel consciousness has two moments of knowledge and being. Therefore "The science of experience of consciousness" becomes on the one hand actual historical development of individual I as the process of self-knowing, and on the other hand the development of the twofold of knowledge and being, i.e. the development of many forms of historical consciousness. Consciousness finds itself at the summit of its individual development as a moment of the universal spirit. The problem of reconciliation of the twofold of spirit and nature can be completed when the development of spirit is comprehended. The reconciliation of consciousness with itself in all of its forms is the aim of the Phenomenology. The first half of the "Introduction" of the "Phenomenology of Spirit" is an account of the relationship of knowledge to its object as other. This is the essential characteristic of natural consciousness: it does not comprehend itself as its own object but instead understands its object as a external other. Hegel opposes the doctrine of natural consciousness and modern philosophy that knowing is fundamentally separate from its object, and argues instead the both subsist within and arise out of the parousia of the absolute. His proof is the Phenomenology, the conceptualized history of consciousness or spirit as the rational development of knowledge to science and hence as the mediation between all forms of natural consciousness and the absolute. The latter half of the "Introduction" is an account of the development of self-consciousness as experience. The first half was an account of the nature of knowledge, truth, change, and rationality from the perspective of natural conscionsness. The latter half is a consideration of knowledge, truth, change, and rationality from the perspective of self-consciousness, and is as a whole the presentation of Hegel's alternative to the erroneous conceptions of modern philosophy. The two parts thus represent the two moments of consciousness or spirit that appear in the Third Antinomy of Kant's transcendental philosophy. They are, however, also the implicit ground for the reconciliation of this diremption. The end of the Phenomenology as a whole cannot merely consist in the description of the phenomenal development of natural consciousness and the noumenal development of self-consciousness, but must necessarily reside in the demonstration of the unity and ground of both in absolute knowledge. The Phenomenology is the recollection and representation of history as the presencing of the twofold of nature and spirit. This representation is not only the recollection and preservation of accidental event of history, nor is it simply the conceptual organization of nature and spirit. The former, which is the concern of the science of history, is concerned solely with phenomenal realm of practical actuality, and thus can attain at best only empirical truth. The latter, which is not history at all, but psychology or historical epistemology, is concerned solely with logical realm of theoretical activity, and thus is capable of only noumenal truth. The Phenomenology is "both together, conceptualized history" of humanity. This does not mean that the Phenomenology is merely history and logic, but rather the speculative synthesis of the phenomenal and noumenal as the phenomenological ground of history. Thus the Phenomenology is Hegel's attempt of establish a ground for history.
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이강조 영남철학회 1990 哲學論叢 Vol.6 No.-
역사는 명확한 개념이 아니다. 역사는 인간사의 총체이기도 하고, 또 인간사에 대한 설명이기도 하다. 고대인에 있어서는 역사란 가변적 사건들의 설명을 의미하였다. 그리스인에 있어서는 역사는 시나 철학과 마찬가지로 현실 속의 영원한 것을 목적으로 하였다. 그러다가 역사는 근대에 이르러 점차 자유롭고 자각적인 존재인 인간관에 의존하게 된다. 이러한 의미에서 역사는 단순한 기계적인 자연에 대립한 합리적 자유와 목적의 점진적인 발전으로 이해되었다.그리하여 근대인에게는 역사는 자기의식 및 자유에 이르는 인간의 진보에 대한 설명이 된다. 자연 및 자연법칙에 대한 자기의식 및 자유의 관계는 칸트가 순수이성의 제3이율배반에서 제기한 바로 그 물음이다.
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