하이데거 사상에서 예술이 중요시되는 것은 ?

염재철 한국미학회 1995 美學 Vol.20 No.-

특집 : 2. 해석학적 이해 ; 논평 : "〈신 해석학〉의 구상과 의미"에의 논평문

염재철 한국해석학회 1996 해석학연구 Vol.2 No.-

대학 예술 교육의 현황과 개선 방안에 관한 연구(Ⅱ) - 미래적 모형의 제시 - ll. 예술교육의 미래적 포형들 - 1. 예술을 통환 자연에의 회귀 (1) 예술과 자연

염재철 서울대학교 인문대학 예술문화연구소 2001 예술문화연구 Vol.11 No.-

존재지향적인 길에서 예술작품의 작품내적관계 ― 하이데거의 예술철학 논구 (II)

염재철 한국미학회 2011 美學 Vol.65 No.-

Das Werksein des Kunstwerkes fuer Heidegger ist der Bezug des Kunstwerkes zu dem von ihm Eroeffneten. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird sie als die innere Beziehung des Kunstwerkes aufgefasst. Das von dem Kunstwerk Eroeffnete ist die Welt und die Erde. Also ist die innere Beziehung des Kunstwerkes, m.a.W. das Kunstwerksein die eroeffnende Seinsweise des Kunstwerkes der Welt und der Erde. Die Eroeffnungsweise des Kunstwerkes ist das Aufstellen der Welt, und das Herstellen der Erde. Die Aufstellung der Welt und die Herstellung der Erde sind die zwei wesentliche Momente des Werkseins, die eins die innere Beziehung des Kunstwerkes ausmachen. Heidegger fasst solche Beziehung als die Streit auf, welche sich in der Urstreit der Seins-wahrheit beruht. Die Bestreitung der Streit der Welt und der Erde ist die Wesensweise des Kunstwerkes. In der Bestreitung der Streit innerhalb des Kunstwerkes ereignet sich die Lichtung, in der das Seiende als Seiendes sich zeigt. Dieser Eroeffnungsort ist gerade der selbe Ort, den die Griechen mit dem Wort a-letheia genannt hat.

예술 교육의 미래적 모형들/서문 : 예술을 통한 자연에의 회귀 : 예술과 자연

염재철 서울대학교 예술문화연구소 2001 예술문화연구 Vol.11 No.-

시작(詩作)의 존재론적 해명 -하이데거 예술척학 논구(4)

염재철 한국미학회 2012 美學 Vol.71 No.-

하이데거의 시 사상은 그의 예술 사상의 일환이지만, 그는 “시 예술이 모든 예술 가운데서 특별한 위치를 차지한다”고 말할 만큼 예술에서 시를 높이 위치 시켰고, 또 “예술의 본질이 시작”이라 규정할 정도로 시를 중시했다. 시작이 예술 일반과 마찬가지로 그의 존재론에 뿌리를 두고 있음에도 불구하고 하이데거가 시작을 모든 예술 중에서 특별한 위치에 자리매김하는 것은 시작의 요체로서의 언어가 지니는 존재론적 특별함 때문이다. 그래서 이 글은 먼저 언어 문제를 다룰 것이다. 그런 다음 언어와 시작의 관계, 시작의 본질과 인간 존재의 본질의 관계를 차례로 다룬다. 중기 사상길의 하이데거에게 언어는 근원적으로는 존재-진리를 모아들이고 짓는 것이다. 언어는 “존재의 집”이다. 시작의 요체가 언어요, 또 그 언어의 본질이 존재의 수립이라면, 곧 시작은 언어를 통한 존재 즉 상주하는 것의 수립이다. 존재는 존재자처럼 고정된 채 감각될 수 있는 것이 아니라, 끊임없는 흐름이자 변함이자 없앰이다. 그래서 그것은 수립이라는 특별한 방식으로 모아들여지고 또 그 같은 흐름, 없앰, 숨김으로서의 그 자신을 보여주어야 한다. 시작은 존재-진리의 특별한 수립 방식이다. 시인은 본질적 말하기로서의 시적 응답 방식을 통해 존재의 아름다움을 모아들이고, 수립하는 자이다. 시인은 존재의 고요한 소리를 듣기 위해 깨어 있어야 한다. 그리고 그렇게 깨어나 있는 시인은 존재의 밝음 가운데 그 가까이 머물러 있어야 한다. 그리고 그렇게 근원 가까이 머무를 때 오직 그 때에만 시인은 고유한 것, 즉 표현의 명확성을 ‘자유롭게’ 사용하는 것이 허락된다. 물론 이 때의 자유는 먼저 시인의 말이 저 성스러운 것의 찬란한 빛에 순응함을 전제로 한다. 존재가 건네는 고요한 소리를 듣기 위해 깨어 있고, 그 가까이 머물고, 그리고 그것에의 순응 가운데 말하기 -이것이 시인의 본질적 말하기이자 동시에 바로 “인간은 이 땅 위에 시적으로 거주한다”의 진정한 의미이다. In der Heideggerschen Kunstphilosophie ist die Dichtung hoeher als die andere Kuenste gesetzt. Er sagt, dass das Wesen der Kunst die Dichtung ist. Warum Heidegger die Dichtung als so hoehres ansieht, kann in der spezialen Position der Sprache, welche der Kardinal der Dichtung ausmacht, eroertert werden. Die vorliegende Arbeit eroertert also zuerst das Wesen der Sprache, und dann die Relation der Sprache und der Dichtung, der Dichtung und des Wesens des Menschen. Die Sprache in der zweiten Phase des Heideggerschen Denkwegs ist das die Seins-Wahrheit versammelnde und errichtende. Sie ist so das Haus des Seins. Und wenn die Sprache der Kardinal der Dichtung ist, wenn das Wesen der Sprache die Stiftung der Seins-Wahrheit ist, so ist die Dichtung die Stiftung der Seins-Wahrheit mittels der Sprache. Das Sein ist nicht der Gegenstand der Empfindung und des logischen Denkens. Das Sein ist das unaufhoehrende Fliehende, wandelnde, sichvernichtende als solche. Also ist es in der dichteden Stiftung zu versammeln und zu zeigen. Dichtung ist die speziale Weise der Stiftung der Seins-Wahrheit. Der Dichter versammelt und stiftet die Schoenheit der Seins-Wahrheit in der Weise des wesentlichen Sagens. Fuer das wesentliche Sagens muss er aufgewacht fuer die Stimme des lautlosen Seins sein. Und er muss ihr naeher bleiben. Nur wenn er in solchermassen der Lichtung des Seins aufwachend naeher bleibt, dann ist ihm die Moeglichkeit erlaubt, sie frei entzusprechen, m.a.W., sie dichterich auszudruecken. Das Aufwachen, das naeher Bleiben, und das freie Entsprechen: dies ist das wesentliche Sagen des Dichters und zugleich der Sinn des "dichterischen Wohnens des Menschen auf dieser Erde".

후기 하이데거 : 하이데거의 존재 -언어 경험

염재철 한국해석학회 1997 해석학연구 Vol.3 No.-

영화 작품의 의미 발생과 그 존재론적 근원

염재철 한국미학회 2001 美學 Vol.30 No.-

I ask in this thesis: "What to see in a cinema and how to see it?" In general, people think that they see the moving image on the screen and understand its meaning on it when they see a cinema. The greater part of earlier and contemporary theorists also think so. However, they are different in answering as to from where the meaning of a cinema generates. I examine here four views about the generation of meaning in cinema: Russian formalists' one, French realists', Jean Mitry's, which is to synthesize and to succeed to the two previous views, and Film Semiotists', which is in common with Jean Mitry in some aspect. And I reformulate these views as follows: The meaning of a cinema comes from intentions of directors, from unique creating methods, or from the reality cinemas represent. These views are mistaken in seeking for the generation of meaning in something external to a cinema, not in itself. These mistakes are also connected to the mistake about "seeing" a cinema. According to these views, when we see a cinema, we see it by following directors' intentions, focussing on its creating methods, or perceive the reality that it is to represent. However, this kind of seeing is far from our real and primary experience with cinema. When we see a cinema, we are really absorbed in it with almost forgetting ourselves. And what we are connected to in this primary experience of a cinema is the world which is opening in it. This world is not merely a world as a set of beings(Seiende) but a world as a connection of Being(Sein). Every cinema opens its own ontological world. This ontological world is something secrete that we really closely experience. To see a cinema is to experience the ontological world that it opens. This experience has three features. The first one is Thrown-ness(Geworfenheit). When we see a cinema, we are thrown to an ontological world. We know this thrown situation through Mood(Stimmung), which is why we feel so and so when we see a cinema. The second one is Project(Entwurf). We are not only thrown to an ontological world, we also throw ourselves whenever we are thrown. While we are throwing ourselves, we get Understanding(Verstehen), which is different from all kinds of conscious knowledge. The last one is Logos(Rede), as clearly articulated knowledge through the circulation of Mood and Understanding in the ontological world of a cinema. It is prior to our language and basis of our words and writings. The meaning of a cinema generates from our ontological experience of it. But this experience is more complex than we think since both the world of a cinema and my ontological world are involved. I have a body that is tamed in the world where I have lived. So I experience an ontological world of a cinema as such a body. Accordingly, our experience of a cinema is, so to speak, the meeting of two worlds. In truth, the meaning of a cinema generates from the ontological meeting of the two worlds.

하이데거의 존재-언어 경험

염재철 한국하이데거학회 1998 존재론 연구 Vol.3 No.-

대중 매체의 성격과 문화의 변화에 관한 존재론적 고찰

염재철 한국미학회 2003 美學 Vol.35 No.-

Renaissance which is a transitory period from the Middle ages to modern age was an important tra nsitory period in human history. Like Renaissance, contemporary age is another important transitory period of culture and civilization in human history. At th e center of the contemporary age, there are bio-engineering thinking and digital t hinking. In biological thinking lies the ambition to be a new creator of life by deci phering and controlling the DNA code. In digital thinking lies the epoch-makin g ambition to unify diverse ways of knowing into digital window. The greek word , "epoche," which now means a demarcated period, etymologically, meant "it can s ufficiently exist by itself." That is the demarcated period has its own wisdom w hich makes its existence possible. In that context, the ancients demarked their o wn time through mythological wisdom, mediaevals through Christian one, and modern thinkers through logo-centric philosophical one. What about us then? Does our t ime demarcate itself through any kind of wisdom? Contemporary wisdom, in cont rast to the past ones, springs from "our self-awareness of human power". Our anc estors, who established absolute and categorical definer, failed to fully recognize wh at human powers are. They subjected themselves to so-called Absolute, such as m ythological definer, religious God, philosophical spirit, and then led their own lives. Our times are, however, no longer mythological, religious, and philosophical times. That is to say, we humans, who are properly aware of divine powers, do no t feel the need of positing the old God, or Absolute Spirit. Our contemporary wisd om develop itself in our own version, as did each of past wisdoms. Its paradigma tic and main version is, we should say, our contemporary technological one. Toda y we humans become a creator of lives by means of controlling DNA inform ation provided by life-sciences, and unified the world into one version through d igital information. This technological information is, we should admit, an unprec edented stream of love. the direction in which our technological information develo p itself is, largely, towards "more in the amount of information", "more peopl e", "more rapidly", more conveniently". These four types of information bring great changes in our human life. the change in life, brought by technology, have both brig ht and dark sides, as do most other ones. First, on the road of "more in t he amount of information" there are "approach and sentimental attachment to a variety of information", which is its bright side, and "confusion in the choice o f information" and "reverse-impoverishment of knowledge", which is its dark sid e. Secondly, on the road towards "providing more information to more people" t here are brights sides, such as "popularization of information" and "democratization of culture." But at the same time, there are dark sides, such as "the mak ing of our life on dimensional," "controlling of information," and "violence of inform ation." Thirdly, on the road toward "more rapidly" makes us overcome the distanc e of space and time, so it can bring more leisure in our lives. But, on the other si de of the same token, it brings the humanly uncomfortable tempo of and the hastiness of life. In addition, informational knowing which does not accompany with the time of existence, but seeks only for "more rapidly" is likely to be disrooted k nowing. Fourthly, on the way toward "more conveniently" lies human-centere d convenience which human history has sought. Human beings who have to live natura lly prefer the convenience of life. But informational knowing which lacks ontological interaction, but seeks only convenience, lacks the affinity with things. So informat ion knowing is dry. It lacks the smell of sweat or the warmth of nature. It i s replete with human-centered consequentialism.