중국의 한국전 참전과 이후 북중소의 상호관계

기광서 한양대학교 아태지역연구센터 2024 중소연구 Vol.47 No.4

Although the Korean War became a full-blown international war with China’s participation, the positions of the three communist countries on the participation of the Chinese military and the subsequent situation were not always in agreement. Rather, differences in each country’s understanding and goals of the war led to hidden conflicts and contradictions between them. Both the UN and the Communist side preferred a limited, non- escalating war to a complete victory for their camp. However, Kim Il-sung’s leadership regarded China’s entry in the war as an opportunity to achieve its goals in the early stages of the war. For a while he used the following slogan and spread it throughout society: “Intensify the pace of attacks against the enemy, do not give the retreating enemy a chance to breathe, do not give them a chance to build new defensive positions, and do not give them time to reorganize their troops”. However, the second opportunity the North Korean leadership had after the outbreak of the Korean War was wasted because it reluctantly accepted the Chinese command’s policy towards the Chinese army, which needed rest after an intense battle. As a result, China’s ‘passive’ attitude seems to have led to its agreement to effectively consolidate the front line. For North Korea, there was no reason to continue the war, which was only adding to the damage caused by the war of attrition and the bombing by the US Air Force, while losing all hope of victory. Therefore, when the armistice negotiations began, North Korea continued to want the armistice the most, but the battlefield environment that had turned into an international war took more than two years to conclude the armistice agreement. 한국전쟁은 중국의 참전과 함께 본격적인 국제전으로 전환되었지만, 중국군대의 참전과 이후의 상황에 대한 공산 3국의 입장은 항상 합치된 것은 아니었다. 그보다는 전쟁에 대한 각국의 이해와 목표의 차이는 드러나지 않은 갈등과 모순을 초래하였다. 중국은 이념보다는 자국의 안보라는 실리가 더 중요했고, 소련은 종합적인 상황 관리를 위해서 단계마다 필요한 선택을 주도하고자 하였다. 유엔과 공산측 모두는 자기 진영의 완전한 승리보다는 확전을 자제한 제한전쟁을 선호하였다. 그러나 김일성 지도부는 중국의 참전을 계기로 전쟁 초기의 목표를 달성할 기회를 잡았다. 그는 한동안 자신이 발표한 “원쑤들에 대한 공격의 속도를 일층 강화하며, 후퇴하는 적들에게 숨 쉴 사이를 주지 말며, 새 방어진지를 구축하는 기회를 주지 말며, 병력을 재정리할 시간적 여유를 주지 말”라는 구호를 북한 사회 전체에 확산시켰다. 하지만 격렬한 전투를 치른 뒤 휴식이 필요했던 중국군대에 대한 중국지휘부의 방침을 마지못해 수용함으로써 한국전 개전에 이어 북한지도부에 찾아온 두 번째 기회는 물거품이 되었다. 중국의 ‘소극적인’ 태도로 말미암아 통일의 희망을 상실한 것이다. 더 이상 북한측으로서는 승전의 기대 없이 소모전과 미공군의 항공 폭격으로 인해 피해만 가중되는 전쟁을 지속할 이유가 없어졌다. 따라서 휴전협상이 개시되었을 때 북한이 가장 정전을 원하는 상황이 지속되지만, 국제전으로 변모한 전장 환경은 휴전협정 체결을 2년 이상이나 끌고 갔다.

[특집 - 역사용어 바로 쓰기] '소군정'은 실재했는가

기광서 역사비평사 2005 역사비평 Vol.- No.73

소련의 대한반도-북한정책 관련 기구 및 인물 분석 : 해방∼1948. 12. Military Organs and Personnels

기광서 경남대학교 북한대학원 1998 현대북한연구 Vol.1 No.1

<Abstract>This article is an analysis on the Soviet Union's policy organs and the people in charge of the Korean peninsula and North Korea between the liberation of Korea on August 15,1945 and December 1948. The purpose of this analysis is to look into the organization and system of the policy-making body and examine the function and special features of each organ and the role of each official involved, rather than to try and grasp the character and concrete details of the Soviet Unions Korea policy.In formulating the Soviet Union's policy on Korea, the Moscow leadership made decisions based on it and the military implemented the policy decisions The Moscow leadership consisted of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Government. In the Central Committee of the Party, the Politburo, which was the most powerful organ in the Soviet Union, the Party Secretariat, the External Policy Department and the Directorate of the Propaganda and Agitation were involved in the decision-making processes. On the Government and military side were the Foreign and the Armed Forces ministries. Under the Ministry of Armed Forces was the General staff and the General political Directorate. These organizations analyzed reports from the military forces in the North Korea and drafted decisions.The regional Soviet military consisted of the Command headquarters of the Maritime Military District, which was responsible for the North Korean area ; the headquarters of the 25th Army which was in charge of policy implementation in North Korea, under which came the Directorate of the Soviet Civil Administration and military komendaturas. Under the two headquarters were various political organs. These organs drafted policies and implemented them. Needless to say, intelligence reports filed by these two organs became the basis for the Soviet Union's policy toward the Korean peninsula and North Korea.In short, if I were to list the command hierarchy of the Soviet Union in North Korea from top to bottom, it would be : the Moscow leadership (the Communist Party Central Committee, the Foreign Ministry, the Armed Forces Ministry)→ (the Headquarters of the Soviet Far Eastern Forces)→ the Headquarters of the Maritime Military District → the 25th Army Headquarters (Directorate of the Soviet Civil Administration and military komendaturas) This article is an analysis on the Soviet Union's policy organs and the people in charge of the Korean peninsula and North Korea between the liberation of Korea on August 15, 1945 and December 1948. The purpose of this analysis is to look into the organization and system of the policy-making body and examine the function and special features of each organ and the role of each official involved, rather than to try and grasp the character and concrete details of the Soviet Union's Korea policy. In formulating the Soviet Union's policy on Korea, the Moscow leadership made decisions based on it and the military implemented the policy decisions. The Moscow leadership consisted of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Government. In the Central Committee of the Party, the Politburo, which was the most powerful organ in the Soviet Union, the Party Secretariat, the External Policy Department and the Directorate of the Propaganda and Agitation were involved in the decision-making processes. On the Government and military side were the Foreign and the Armed Forces ministries. Under the Ministry of Armed Forces was the General staff and the General political Directorate. These organizations analyzed reports from the military forces in the North Korea and drafted decisions. The regional Soviet military consisted of the Command headquarters of the Maritime Military District, which was responsible for the North Korean area ; the headquarters of the 25th Army which was in charge of policy implementation in Worth Korea, under which came the Directorate of the Soviet Civil Administration and military komendaturas. Under the two headquarters were various political organs. These organs drafted policies and implemented them. Needless to say, intelligence reports filed by these two organs became the basis for the Soviet Union's policy toward the Korean peninsula and North Korea. In short, if I were to list the command hierarchy of the Soviet Union in North Korea from top to bottom, it would be : the Moscow leadership (the Communist Party Central Committee, the Foreign Ministry, the Armed Forces Ministry) → (the Headquarters of the Soviet Far Eastern Forces) → the Headquarters of the Maritime Military District → the 25th Army Headquarters (Directorate of the Soviet Civil Administration and military komendaturas)

전쟁 시기 남한 정치인들의 월북, 납북

기광서 대한기독교서회 2020 基督敎 思想 Vol.738 No.-

논쟁적 사실 확인할 수 있는 공식적 자료

기광서 평화문제연구소 1998 통일한국 Vol.174 No.-

1940년대 전반 소련군 88독립보병여단 내 김일성 그룹의 동향

기광서 한국역사연구회 1998 역사와 현실 Vol.- No.28

해방 후 북한 반소반공운동의 실상

기광서 조선대학교 사회과학연구원 부설 동북아연구소 2019 동북아연구 Vol.34 No.2

The purpose of this paper is to identify the occurrences and major events of anti-soviet & anti-communism movement after the liberation of Korea, and to examine their general characteristics. The opposition to Soviet troops and the Communist Party continued shortly after liberation, and their ideological underpinnings were established by the policies and education of the former Japanese authorities. The most active among them were terrorist organizations from the South, centered on Baeg-uisa('White Clothes Society'), and the forces involved. The organized resistance of the students was actively made in the Sinuiju student Incident, Anti-trusteeship movement, Anti-land reform movement. During Provincial, city and county people's committees elections the Christian protest was actually the last organized mass resistance. Since 1947, the organizational resistance of the anti-Soviet forces was virtually ended by communist institutional and physical measures. Because of this, the anti-Soviet forces had become increasingly dependent on terrorism and sporadic resistance. After the liberation of Korea, the activities of anti-communist forces in North Korea were not systematically expanded and were isolated from the public. In the space of the liberation, their arguments did not have sufficient justification, and they lacked their political and organizational strengths to overcome the political environment led by the Communist Party.

소련군의 북한 진주와 '부르주아민주주의' 노선

기광서 朝鮮大學校 統一問題硏究所 2005 統一 問題 硏究 Vol.20 No.1

본 글은 해방 직후 소련의 정치세력에 대한 입장과 태도를 비롯한 정책적 조치, 그리고 소련의 대북한정책의 핵심적 사항인 ‘부르주아민주주의 권력’ 노선에 대해 조명한 글이다. 해방 전후 소련은 궁극적으로 한반도에 소련의 ‘우호적’ 정부가 수립되는 것을 목표로 하였다. ‘우호적인’ 정부란 반드시 사회주의 국가 건설이라는 이데올로기적 지향보다는 ‘친소적인’ 의미를 폭넓게 지니고 있었다. 이것은 실제 정치세력에 대한 평가에 있어서도 마찬가지 였다. ‘부르주아민주주의’ 노선은 공산당의 주도하에 보다 광범한 계층 연합을 통해 ‘친소적’ 기반을 강화시키려는 것이었으며, 이를 위해 소련은 민족주의 진영에 대한 지지 기반 구축에 힘을 기울였다. 이러한 북한 내 ‘좌우 연합’ 시도는 나중에 결국 실패로 끝나지만 소련의 대북정책에서 가장 커다란 의의로 간주할 수 있다.

한국전쟁 시기 북한의 남한지역 토지개혁

기광서 한국근현대사학회 2012 한국 근현대사 연구 Vol.62 No.-

This article investigates the process of Land Reform in the territory of South Korea, captured by North Korean army in the early period of Korean War. North Korea wanted to get solid support from South Koreans, conducting the election of people’s commissions and the Land Reform. During the reign of People’s Republic Land Reform in South Korea was carried on the basis of not completely rescinding Agrarian Reform conducted by Seung-man Rhee’s government before the War. North Korean authorities could not help recognizing farmers’ proprietary rights of lands that was acquired from landowners. Small farmers in South Korean Land Reform occupied the largest proportion in population numbers and scale of land distribution while landless farmers in North Korean reform(1946) made up the majority. It was involved with the reduction of absolute numbers of landless farmers as the result of sale of farming land by landowners and the Agrarian Reform of Seung-man Rhee’s government. There were commons between these two reforms like the abolition of tenant system, land distribution method, organization of Rural Commission. Though North Korean Land Reform was leaded by political powers, it seemed to reflect historical justification and people’s request to some extent. But Land Reform in South Korea was hard to get a lot of spontaneous support from South Korean farmers under wartime conditions. In the situations of an unpredictable war many people took wait-and-see attitude and didn’t have confidence over social change. Therefore, Land Reform in South Korea was more or less considered as ‘imposed’ one from top.

[역비논단]해방 직후 조선공산당에 대한 소련의 입장

기광서 역사비평사 2003 역사비평 Vol.- No.65