한국의 기업집단에 있어서 피라미드 내계열사 위치의 결정요인

강형철 ( Hyung Cheol Kang ),박경서 ( Kyung Suh Park ),장하성 ( Ha Sung Jang ) 한국금융연구원 2008 韓國經濟의 分析 Vol.14 No.3

본 연구는 국내 대규모기업집단에 속한 계열사들의 기업집단 내 위치가 어떤 요인에 의해 결정되는가를 다루고 있다. 기업집단의 피라미드 구조를 직접적으로 다룬 연구로 Wolfenzon(1999) 및 Almeida and Wolfenzon(2006)의 이론적 연구들은 피라미드 구조가 내생적으로도 결정될 수 있음을 보여주고 있어 본 연구의 이론적 배경을 제공한다. 분석을 위해 기업집단에 속한 모든 계열사의 소유구조 자료를 바탕으로 기업집단 내 특정 계열사의 소유구조상 위치를 지수화하는 방법론을 제시하며, 이를 결정하는 데 있어 지배주주가 갖는 경제적 유인으로 지배가설(control hypothesis), 부의 이전가설(tunneling hypothesis), 상호지원가설(propping hypothesis) 및 위험분산가설(risk diversification hypothesis)을 실증적으로 검증한다. 실증분석 결과에 따르면, 가족지분과 기업규모가 클수록, 오래된 기업일수록, 상장회사일수록 피라미드의 상위에 위치하고 위험이 높은 신생 계열사일수록 피라미드의 하위에 위치하는 것으로 나타난다. 또한 피라미드 내 계열사 위치지수를 다양한 방법으로 측정하거나 지배주주의 현금흐름권(cash flow rights)을 피라미드 위치의 대용치로 사용하더라도 이러한 분석결과가 유지된다. 연립방정식 모형을 통한 내생성문제를 통제한 후에도 이러한 결과가 유지되고 있음을 고려할 때, 이는 기업집단의 지배주주가 기업집단 내 계열사의 위치를 결정하는 데 있어 그룹에 대한 지배권 확보와 계열사간 상호지원 및 투자위험의 분산을 고려하고 있음을 시사한다. This paper analyzes the pyramidal positions of member firms in Korean business groups. We investigate the factors that affect a controlling shareholder`s decision regarding the location of its member firms, using financial and ownership data on conglomerate business groups in Korea. Unlike existing studies, we directly measure the location of a member firm in a business group using stock investment relationships among its member firms as well as a controlling shareholder`s ownership, and identify the factors that affect it. An analysis on the location of a member firm in a group will shed more light on the driving force behind the decision on group structure, and allow us to better understand the incentives of controlling shareholders. The empirical analyses show that member firms with higher family ownership, larger asset size and longer business history tend to be located at higher levels of a group pyramid, while riskier and younger member firms are located at lower levels of a group pyramid. The empirical results suggest that controlling shareholders strategically choose the location and the circuitous ownership of member firms to secure control over the groups, while the risk diversification incentive of controlling shareholders is also found to affect the decisions.

한국 방송정책의 결정과정과 특징

강형철(Hyung-Cheol Kang) 한국방송학회 2011 방송통신연구 Vol.- No.75

한국 신문에 나타난 공영방송 개념

강형철(Hyung-Cheol Kang) 한국언론학회 2004 한국언론학보 Vol.48 No.1

This study examines editorials of Korean daily newspapers in order to grasp this print medium's view of Public Service Broadcasting (PSB). Content analysis shows that Korean newspapers in general have negative attitude toward PSB in Korea. The ideas of PSB sought by these Korean newspapers are being independent form the government, running on the licence fee, providing documentaries and informations, and enlightening the public. Their major concern is PSB's revenue from advertising. There is no much difference between the liberal and the conservative newspapers with regard to these ideas. This fact shows that material interests rather than the ideological spectrum is the one of the major factors in newspapers' views on PSB.

공영방송의 공적가치와 수행평가

강형철(Hyung Cheol Kang),심미선(Mi Seon Shim),오하영(Ha young Oh) 한국방송학회 2011 한국방송학보 Vol.25 No.1

금융연구(金融硏究) : 한국 대규모기업집단에서 내부자본시장과 대리인 문제: 그룹 현금보유의 역할

강형철 ( Hyung Cheol Kang ),장하성 ( Ha Sung Jang ) 한국금융학회 2014 금융연구 Vol.28 No.2

본 논문은 한국 대규모기업집단에 속한 모든 계열사들의 자료를 사용하여 그룹의 현금보유가 내부자본시장을 효율화하는지 아니면 대리인 문제를 심화시키는지를 분석한다. 그룹의 높은현금보유 수준은 상호보조기능을 통해 내부자본시장을 효율적으로 작동하게 하는 매개체 역할을할 수 있는 반면, 지배주주의 사적 이익을 위해 활용되어 터널링(tunneling), 프로핑(propping)과같은 대리인 문제를 유발할 수도 있다. 본 연구는 기업의 재무적 제약 수준을 기업연령과 상장여부로, 대리인 문제를 지배주주의 소유권(cash flow rights)으로 측정하고 이러한 가설을 검증한다. 분석 결과, 첫째, 그룹의 현금보유 수준이 높을수록 재무제약 기업의 수익성은 높아지지만 이는투자효율성 개선으로 인한 것이 아닌 것으로 나타난다. 둘째, 현금보유 수준이 높은 그룹에 속한 재무제약 기업의 투자-현금흐름 민감도가 상대적으로 낮지만 성장성은 투자에 유의미한 영향을 미치지 않아 내부자본시장이 작동하지만 그 기능은 비효율적임을 나타낸다. 셋째, 그룹의 현금보유가 매우 큰 경우에는 소유구조에 기인한 대리인 문제가 발생할 수 있으며, 금융위기 이후내부자본시장 기능이 약화된다는 증거를 제시한다. 이상의 결과는 그룹의 높은 현금보유 수준은재무제약 기업에 도움을 주지만 이러한 내부자본시장 기능은 대리인 문제로 인해 비효율적으로 작동하게 됨을 시사한다. 본 연구는 내부자본시장 또는 대리인 문제를 개별기업 특성에 초점을두고 분석하는 기존 연구와는 달리 그룹의 현금보유 수준이 중요한 매개요인이라는 점을확인했다는 학술적 의의를 지닌다. Corporate cash holdings in major developed countries have increased sharply because of the heightened economic uncertainty since the 2008 global financial crisis. In Korea, corporate cash holdings increased rapidly after the country went through two major crises in 1997 and 2008. In 2010, cash and cash equivalents (hereafter, ‘cash assets’) held by non-financial listed firms exceeded 100 trillion won (9.2% of total assets). The level of cash assets held by listed firms of the top 10 chaebol groups is especially noteworthy as it increased rapidly from 28 trillion won in 2006 to 124 trillion won in 2012. In the first quarter of 2014, the top 10 chaebols’ cash assets accounted for about 75% of the top 500 firms of Korea. It is clear that most of the cash assets in Korea are held by chaebols. However, media reports often raise the problem that chaebols do not invest as much as their cash holdings increase. This paper investigates the trade-off and effects that a group’ cash holdings has towards making internal capital markets more efficient or deepening agency problems. The high level of a group’s cash holdings can facilitate internal capital markets operations through cross-subsidization. On the other hand, it can trigger agency problems such as tunneling and propping if it is misused for the private benefit of controlling shareholders. Group-level cash holdings are meaningful and have important implications in terms of internal capital markets and agency problems. If a firm within a group is financially constrained, the group’s abundant cash holdings can help the firm overcome financial constraints. However, if a group’s cash is limited, the firm will be constrained. Following the free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986), agency problems in the business group also can be more likely to appear when the group’s cash is abundant. Although many existing literature have focused on firm-level cash holdings and the difference in the functioning of internal capital markets between chaebols and non-chaebols, they do not consider group-level cash holdings. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to directly intro- duce group-level cash holdings. This study intends to answer the following questions. First, are a group’s high cash holdings helpful to financially constrained firms within the group that have higher funding needs? Second, are the internal capital markets of business groups efficient? Third, do high cash assets cause agency problems such as tunneling and propping? Our sample firms are all affiliates of Korean large business groups (chaebols) in which a family is the controlling shareholder over the period of 2001 to 2010. Financially constrained firms are defined as firms below the median age within a group or unlisted firms that have low accessibility to capital markets. We use cash flow rights (hereafter, ‘CFR’) of controlling shareholders as a proxy of agency problem. The main results of this paper are as follows. First, controlling for other factors to explain firms’ profitability, financially constrained firms in a group have higher profitability than financially unconstrained firms as the level of the group’s cash holdings is higher. This result supports the claim that internal capital markets operate well in groups with high cash holdings. Second, a group’s high cash holdings lower financially constrained firms’ investment efficiency, which is estimated as the positive effect of investments on performance. In turn, this means a group’s abundant surplus resources can lead to agency problems such as overinvestment and also supports Jensen (1986)’s free cash flow hypothesis in the group-level. Third, only when the level of a group’s cash holdings is high is the investment-cash flow sensitivity of financially constrained firms lower than the sensitivity of financially unconstrained firms. This result shows that a group’s cash holdings can be a means for firms to overcome financial constraints. However, we do not find any evidence that fast-growing firms invest more actively. This means that internal capital markets within Korean business groups are not efficient. Fourth, when the level of a group’s cash holdings is clearly excessive, the investment-cash flow sensitivity of financially constrained firms is insignificant but the sensitivity of firms with low CFR is significantly positive. This implies that when a group holds too much cash assets, internal capital markets do not function well and agency problems based on ownership structure can occur. Fifth, before the 2008 financial crisis, the investment-cash flow sensitivity of financially constrained firms was significantly lower than the sensitivity of financially unconstrained firms when the level of the group’s cash holdings was high. However, this difference between financially constrained firms and unconstrained firms disappeared after the crisis. This means that the functioning of internal capital markets in chaebols has weakened after the crisis and supports Lee et al.(2009). Overall, the results of this paper suggest that the high level of groups’ cash holdings can be helpful to financially constrained firms but the functioning of internal capital markets contains inefficiency due to agency problems.

증권사의 수익구조가 증권사 가치에 미치는 영향: 자산관리 업무를 중심으로

강형철 ( Hyung Cheol Kang ) 한국금융학회 2016 금융연구 Vol.30 No.2

2009년 자본시장법 시행을 계기로 증권사는 다양한 수익구조를 갖게 될 것으로 기대되었지만 여전히 브로커리지 업무에 치중함으로써 수익성 악화를 겪게 되었다. 이에 본 연구는 국내 증권사의 수익구조를 분석하고 기업가치와의 관련성을 통해 다양한 업무 중 자산관리 업무의 중요성을 제시한다. 2010년 이후 상장 증권사를 대상으로 분석한 결과, 첫째, 브로커리지, 자산관리, 투자은행, 자기매매 업무 중 자산관리만이 기업가치(Tobin’s q)에 유의한 양(+)의 영향을 미치고, 자산관리업무는 시장상황이 활황(boom)일 때, 기업가치에 보다 큰 기여를 하는 것으로 나타난다. 둘째, 자산관리 세부업무 중 상품판매는 특화(수익비중)가, 랩(wrap)과 신탁 등 고객 자산관리 업무는 시장점유율이 시장상황과 무관하게 기업가치 측면에서 보다 중요하다는 것을 보여준다. 셋째, 자산관리 업무와 여타 업무 간 시너지를 분석한 결과, 투자은행 업무가 자산관리와의 시너지가 가장 큰 것으로 평가된다. 마지막으로 증권사를 독립 형태, 제조업 계열, 은행 계열로 구분하고 시너지를 분석한 결과, 자산관리 업무는 독립 형태에 비해 제조업 또는 은행 계열 증권사에서보다 큰 시너지를 누리는 것으로 나타난다. 국내 증권사의 자산관리 수익비중이 아직은 미미하고 저성장ㆍ저금리 시대가 고착화되고 있는 상황을 고려할 때, 본 연구의 결과는 증권산업에서 자산관리 업무가 차별화ㆍ활성화되어야 함을 시사하며 이를 위해 필요한 증권사의 성장전략과 정책적 시사점을 제시한다. The aging population with low growth and low interest rates is fast-paced in Korea. In this situation, investors`` behavior is expected to be changed into the direction that the demand on risky assets increases and this will make the movement of funds into the capital market actively happen. Profitability of domestic securities firms has continued to worsen and experts point out that they need to move away from traditional brokerage based business. Generally speaking, asset management business of securities firms is based on fee while other businesses are based on commission. Therefore, asset management service provides a more stable source of revenue for securities firms than other businesses. In these internal and external environment surrounding securities firms, if they strategically specialize and differentiate asset management services, It will provide benefits to both customers and themselves. However, it is true that the domestic securities firms have focused on simply selling funds or derivatives-linked securities rather than managing customers`` wealth as the real sense of asset management service. This study aims at understanding the importance of asset management service through a relationship between the various businesses of securities firms and their value. In general, the businesses of securities firms are classified as brokerage, asset management, investment banking, principal investment. Brokerage is the securities brokerage for customers, asset management means wrap accounts, trusts, and sales of financial products. Investment banking is securities underwriting and M&A advisory services, principal investment refers to directly trading of stocks, bonds, funds, and derivatives. The sample of this paper is domestic listed securities firms from 2010 until 2014. The first task is to disassemble the profit structure of four businesses as mentioned above and calculate the profit ratio (specialization) and market share of each business. After calculating these measures, this paper investigates the effects of them on securities firms`` value. This paper``s main results are as follows. First, only asset management unlike other businesses has consistently a positive impact on the firm value. This raises the need to activate asset management business in securities industry when considering the current situation that the market size and the profit ratio of this business is the smallest among other businesses. Second, when breaking down asset management business, sales business of funds or derivatives-linked securities shows a comparative advantage of specialization strategy, while customers`` wealth management service such as wrap, trusts enjoys a comparative advantage of market share maximization strategy in terms of firm value. The former implies that sales business requires the existence of funds or asset management affiliated company with good reputation. The existence of a reputable asset management affiliated company enables securities firms to easily specialize in sales business of funds. The latter means that customers`` wealth management business requires abundant capital to retain skilled advisory workforce and wide branch-network as key factors, and the abundant capital tends to increase the market share. Third, asset management business creates the highest synergy when combined with investment banking (IB) business among others. This is because IB is based on the corporate customers while asset management is based on retail customers. For example, structured products, private equity, corporate bonds designed in the process of IB and high-quality advisory services based on IB research can be provided for asset management customers in demand. Fourth, commercial bank-affiliated or group-affiliated securities firms enjoy a synergy in asset management business while independent securities firms do not. Commercial bank-affiliated securities firms can make the best use of bank``s wide branch-network for asset management customers. Group-affiliated securities firms can share highly reputable brand name value of group. In a nutshell, asset management is a key business to determine the value of securities firms under the recent environment. This is why securities firms need to cut back brokerage-based business and develope asset management business. Strategies of securities firms that this paper suggests to develope asset management business are as follows. First, securities firms need to reorganize their business to focus on asset management and pursue a comprehensive wealth management strategy beyond fund-sales or simple portfolio management through setting up a core customer base that meets their capabilities. Second, they need to provide customers with one-stop service through recently introduced branch-in-branch and enhance the professionalism and efficiency in terms of their own operations. Third, small independent securities firms need to differentiate their main customer base, pursue asset management strategy based on IT and low fee. When considering their insufficient capital and human resources, the core of their asset management strategy is a price competitiveness over large securities firms. For example, successful online asset management companies in the U.S., such as Betterment, Wealthfront, and Market Riders, deal only with ETF based on low commission strategy. In the institutional side, the compensation system in asset management business and the fee plan for advisory services need to be established to meet changing asset management environment. The compensation system in asset management should be in accordance with customers`` performance or satisfaction from service. Currently, advisory service of securities firms is free of charge. This is becoming an obstacle to the introduction of independent financial advisor (IFA), so that guidelines for setting up the appropriate advisory service fee are also required in Korean securities industry. Finally, assuming that asset management market expands in the near future, a conflict of interest problem may grow. This raises a need that the financial authority should complement the current regulatory framework to control the problem.

기업의 사회적 책임 활동은 대리인 문제를 완화하는가? 지배주주와 채권자 간 이해상충을 중심으로

강형철 ( Hyung Cheol Kang ),변희섭 ( Hee Sub Byun ) 한국금융연구원 2021 금융연구 Vol.35 No.1

본 연구는 채권자와 주주의 이해를 동시에 고려하여 기업의 사회적 책임(corporate social re-sponsibility, CSR) 활동의 편익을 확인한다. 이를 위해, CSR 활동이 파산위험에 미치는 영향이 소유-경영자의 지분에 따라 어떻게 달라지는지 실증적으로 분석한다. 분석결과, CSR 활동은 파산위험에 유의적인 영향을 미치지 않는 것으로 나타난다. 하지만 지배주주의 지분이 상대적으로 낮은 기업에서 CSR 활동의 적극적인 이행이 파산위험을 감소시키는 것으로 확인된다. 이러한 결과는 CSR 활동이 지배주주의 사적 이익 추구 유인을 완화하기 위한 대안으로 활용되어 채권자의 이해를 충족시킬 수 있음을 의미한다. 한편, 주요 결과는 수익성 또는 시장가치가 높은 기업, 업력이 낮은 기업, 외국인 투자자의 지분이 높은 기업에서 주로 관찰되어, 이러한 기업특성이 CSR 활동의 편익을 누리기 위한 선결 조건임을 확인할 수 있다. 본 연구의 결과는 전통적 대리인이론의 채권자와 주주 간 이해상충의 문제를 CSR 활동을 통해 완화할 수 있음을 제시하였다는 학술적 시사점을 가진다. Policy and practical interests in corporate social responsibility (hereafter, CSR) activities, as an alternative for expanding the sustainability of the national economy, are gradually increasing. Accordingly, academic studies have attempted to understand the benefits and costs of CSR activities from the perspective of stakeholders, moving away from the traditional approach that focuses on the interests of shareholders. As a representative discussion in terms of a stakeholder’s point of view, several studies have grasped the relationship between the interest of creditors and CSR activities. They argue that CSR activities can be an alternative to satisfy the interests of creditors through a variety of pathways, such as expanding future cash flows, improving productivity, controlling managerial risk, and mitigating agency problems (Attig, El Ghoul, Guedhami, and Suh, 2013; Jiraporn, Jiraporn, Boeprasert, and Chang, 2014; Oikonomou, Brooks, and Pavelin, 2014). Contrary to this discussion, some studies based on shareholders’ perspectives still raise concerns that CSR activities will be exploited by managers to pursue private benefits (Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Oh, Chang, and Martynov, 2011). These studies have shown the negative relationship between ownership of owner-managers and CSR activities. Since con-tradictory views are raised from the perspective of creditors and shareholders, it is difficult to generalize the benefits of CSR activities only with a limited approach focusing on a specific stakeholder. This paper investigates the benefit of CSR activities by considering the interests of creditors and shareholders at the same time. To this end, we analyze the effect of CSR activities on the default risk depending on the ownership of owner-managers. Empirically, we find that CSR activities do not have a significant effect on the default risk. However, in firms with low ownership of owner-managers, active CSR activities significantly reduce the default risk. This result suggests that CSR activities can be used as an alternative to alleviate the incentives for owner-managers to pursue private interests and be recognized as a means to satisfy the interests of creditors. On the other hand, the main result is primarily observed in firms with high profitability, market value, or ownership of foreign investors, and firms with low age. It can be seen that these characteristics are a prerequisite for enjoying the benefits of CSR activities. This study can provide several implications. First, it can contribute to the generalization of the theory related to CSR activities by suggesting that the results of existing studies based on the perspectives of creditors and shareholders are compatible at the same time. In detail, our results suggest that active CSR activities in firms with low ownership of ownermanager, shown in the existing study (Barnea and Rubin, 2010), can be considered as an effective means of satisfying the interests of creditors rather than the agency costs. Second, our results have implications for confirming a new path for the benefits of CSR activities. Existing studies suggest the benefits of CSR activities based on fragmentary relationships with the improvement of internal capabilities such as productivity, managerial risk, and corporate performance. However, considering the complexity of corporate decision-making, it is limited to fully grasp the benefits of CSR activities only with these approaches. Unlike previous studies, this study shows the effect of CSR activities as a means to mitigate the possibility of a conflict of interest between the stakeholders (shareholders and creditors) in a firm.

국제무역협상과 방송의 공적가치: 한미 FTA 협상을 중심으로

강형철 ( Hyung Cheol Kang ) 한국지역언론학연합회 2006 언론과학연구 Vol.6 No.3

본 연구는 한미 FTA 등 무역협상을 통한 방송영상 분야 개방을 앞두고, 이 분야의 협상대응책 마련에 도움이 되기 위해 의도되었다. 이는 특히 미국의 영상산업 무역 개방 요구 전략이 전통미디어 분야의 개방에서 디지털미디어의 개방으로 선회하고 있는 시점에서 공적가치를 보전하기 위한 한국의 미디어 정책 전략의 기조는 어떠해야 하는지 논의해보려는 것이다. 이 연구는 거시적으로 ``글로벌 미디어 시스템``의 확장이라는 측면에서 방송 시장 개방의 의미를 이론적 및 실증적으로 살펴본 후, 최근 여러 국가를 대상으로 이루어진 미국 FTA의 특성을 파악해 보았다. 이러한 선행사례들에 근거하여 본 연구는 한국의 방송 시장 개방에 앞서 공적 가치를 보호하기 위한 정책 기조의 방향을 제안하였다. This article proposes a new paradigm for media policy in South Korea before its wider opening of the audi-visual sector through international trade agreements such as the FTA with the USA. Especially, the author discusses policy alternatives in order to protect the public value of broadcasting when the U. S. strategies in trade negotiations are changing, from focusing on traditional media to demanding market opening of digital media. For this purpose, this article after reviewing literature of media globalization analyzes several recent U. S. FTAs which presumably reveal the trade strategies of the America. Finally, based on this analysis, policy implications of the prior FTAs are drawn, which would help South Korea protecting the public value of broadcasting in advance of its market opening.

텔레비전 축구중계 해설이 시청자의 판단에 미치는 영향

강형철(Kang Hyung Cheol),김남영(Kim Nam Young),양승찬(Yang Seungchan) 한국방송학회 2005 한국방송학보 Vol.19 No.4

경합형 공공방송기금론의 전개와 함의

강형철(Hyung-Cheol Kang),오하영(Ha-Young Oh),김효진(Hyo-Jin Kim),배정근(Jung-Kun Pae) 서울대학교 언론정보연구소 2008 언론정보연구 Vol.45 No.2

본 연구는 공영방송 재원을 보다 투명하고 효율적으로 활용하는 방안의 하나로, 공공방송기금을 특정 공영방송사가 독점하지 않는 방식, 즉 ‘경합형 공공방송기금’에 대해 분석해보았다. 이를 위해 본 연구는 경합형 공공방송기금도입에 대한 주장이 지속적으로 제기되고 있는 영국에서의 논의를 검토해보았고, 이에 대한 정의와 유형을 파악해 보았으며, 끝으로 한국에서 이 방식의 적합 가능성에 대해 논의해보았다. 분석을 통해 경합형 공공방송기금에 대한 주장은 디지털 시대에 공공방송기금을 보다 투명하고 효율적인 방식으로 사용하여야 한다는 책무성의 요구에서 출발함을 논하였다. 경합형 공공방송기금이란 경쟁이나 경매를 통해 공공서비스 주체를 선정하여 해당 방송사 및 제작사에 기금을 지급하거나 공공서비스 운영권을 부여하는 것이다. 이는 공공방송 콘텐츠 제작을 위해 조성된 기금이 개방경쟁을 통해 방송사나 제작사에 배분되는 방식으로, 기금수혜후보자들은 경쟁과정에서 공익실현 기능을 이행하는 데 자신이 얼마나 적합한 주체인지 증명해낼 수 있어야 한다. 한국에서 지난해 KBS 수신료 인상 시도가 좌절된 것도 이 방송사의 사회적 책무성과 효율성에 대한 사회적 신뢰가 부족했기 때문이었다. 영국에서도 그동안 공공서비스 부분의 효율성과 질 향상을 위한 개혁의 필요성에 대해 논의가 지속적으로 이루어져 왔는데, 수신료가 특정 방송사에만 지급되는 재원구조를 지닌 공영방송도 예외는 아닌 것이다. 경합형 공공방송기금은 기금을 분배하는 주체가 누구인지, 그것이 분배하는 기금의 내용은 어떠한 것인지, 분배 대상이 되는 단위는 무엇인지의 세 가지 차원에 따라 유형이 구분되며 이를 고려한다면 현실적으로 5가지 유형이 존재한다. 우선, 경합형 공공방송기금 유형 중에서 가장 경합성이 큰 것은 정부 또는 별도 기구(예를 들면, ‘공공방송기금위원회')가 개별 프로그램 단위로 제작비를 분배해 주는 형태이다. 두 번째로, 공공방송기금은 프로그램 단위가 아니라 방송사업자 단위로 그들의 방송 제작비 총량을 할당해주는 방식, 이름 하여 ‘방송사업자 제작비 경합’ 방식도 가능하다. 세 번째로, 방송사 단위로 기금이 분배되면서도 이 기금이 제작비뿐 아니라 방송사 운영비에도 활용될 수 있는 ‘방송사업자 제작 · 운영비 경합’ 방식도 있다. 네 번째로, 공공기금으로 운영되는 공공서비스방송 운영권을 놓고 사업자들이 경합을 벌이는 ‘공공서비스방송 운영권 경합’ 방식도 가능하다. 끝으로, ‘외주제작 경합’ 방식으로서 공영방송사가 자신의 공공기금을 가지고 외주 제작사의 경쟁을 통해 자신들이 원하는 프로그램을 제작하게 하는 방식도 있다. 경합형 공공방송기금 방식은 투명성을 바탕으로 점차 늘어가는 공영방송에 대한 비판 항목인 사회적 책무성을 제고한다는 점에서는 장점이 있지만 정작 다채널 시대에 더욱 중요해지는 공영방송의 기능인 창의성과 그를 통한 긍정적 외부효과 창출에는 부정적일 수 있다. 그러나 이것이 이른바 공익장르라고 하는 다큐멘터리와 교양 등 특정 장르에 대한 지원에 국한되는 것이 아니라 한 사회 내 방송의 창의성을 향상시키는 외부효과를 도출할 것이 예상되는 경우에 시도해 볼 수 있는 모델로 평가된다. 끝으로 한국에 이 방식이 도입된다먼 전문성과 효율성을 담보할 수 있는 배분 기관이 필요하며, 전체적인 공공 재원 규모의 확대가 필요할 것이다. This paper aims to explore the contestable public service broadcasting funding system by which public monies for the provision of public interest broadcasting are distributed not to one or two public service broadcasters but to any applicant in open competition. It traces, to this end, debates on the issue of funding public service broadcasting on the contestable basis and attempts to classify this funding system into several types. In addition, the possibility of introducing the contestable funding system into South Korea is examined. Arguments for funding public service broadcasting through open competition are based on the notion that competition will improve both the competitiveness and the accountability of public service broadcasters. Contestants for the fund have to demonstrate their suitability to discharge the public interest functions in question against rival potential suppliers. A similar approach in Western Europe has already become the norm for the distribution of public funds in fields other than broadcasting such as public transportation, electricity supply and health care. According to a policy report of UK Conservative Party, the contestable funding system is to provide not only a means of guaranteeing diversity of voice, but also a way of ensuring high creative standards. The authors divide this contestable funding system into five models: 'Funding Producers for Program Making', 'Funding Broadcasters for Program Making', 'Funding Broadcasters for Broadcasting Operation', 'Franchising Public Broadcasting Service', and 'Broadcaster's Program Commissioning'. First, 'Funding Producers for Program Making' is a competition model by which public fund is distributed through a government agency or an independent organization to producers for each program making. Second, under 'Funding Broadcasters for Program Making' model, broadcasters receive public fund for their total cost for public interest program making. Third, 'Funding Broadcasters for Broadcasting Operation' is a model by which broadcasters receive public fund for their operation cost in addition to total cost for public interest program making. Fourth, under 'Franchising Public Broadcasting Service' model, broadcasters would compete to run PSB channels. Fifth, 'Broadcaster's Program Commissioning' model would turn a public service broadcaster into a commissioner without any production, instead filling its broadcast schedule with programs made by independent producers. Objectors to the use of contestable funding such as BBC have argued that it would not be an efficient or effective use of public funding, since it would both spread limited resources more thinly, and could increasingly substitute for other sources of investment. Nevertheless, it might be expected that competition for public funding will introduce a quality driver comparable to the pressure under this current 'battle-far-ratings' system. If a society would introduce this competition model of public funding for broadcasting, it should guarantee beforehand two preconditions: the one is the distribution body's independence from political pressures and its capability of exercising adequate creative judgment and the other is to increase the volume of current PSB fund.