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소유구조와 이익관리가 대리인비용에 미치는 영향 : 중국의 상장회사를 대상으로
This study is focused on the findings of ownership structure elements, earning management and the interaction effects between ownership structure elements and earning management, which impact on the agency costs in Chinese enterprises. The research methodology is multi-variate model to test the impact of ownership structure elements, earning management and the interaction effects between ownership structure elements and earning management. The processes of this empirical study are establishment of research hypotheses, elaboration of test model, definition and measurement of variables, empirical analysis and interpretation of results. The samples of this study are 675 firms listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange excluding financial and insurance business. The data used in this research are provided from SSEportal and SinoFin information service Co. in China. The proxies of ownership structure(dependent variables) are ownership concentration, outside block-holders, legal person share, and the proxy of earning management is absolute discretionary accruals of modified Jones` model. the proxies of agency costs(independent variables) are ratio of sale expenses & management expenses per operating revenues, ratio of operating revenues per total assets, ratio of other operating expenses per operating revenues, the control variables are firm size, ratio of liabilities per total assets, ratio of net cash inflow per total liabilities, industry dummy variable. The results of this study are as followings. First, ownership concentration takes negative effects on agency costs, outside block-holders take positive effects on agency costs. But, legal person share does not take effects on the agency costs in Chinese enterprises. That is, Ownership concentrated companies tried to reduce agency costs more actively rather than ownership decentralized companies tried to do in China. Second, we find that the firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange implement earnings management opportunistically. Third, the interaction effect between ownership concentration and earning management takes negative effects on agency costs, the interaction effect between outside block-holders and earning management takes positive effects on agency costs. But the interaction effect between legal person share-holders and earning management does not take effects on the agency costs in Chinese enterprises.
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